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I. INTRODUCTION
Since the birth of the oil and gas industry, "joint operations have
facilitated the exploration [and development] of tracts whose operating rights
have been dispersed among co-owners with undivided interests."' Joint
operations have also
enabled the development of pooled and unitized tracts, contributing to
efficiency ... and conservation of a depleting resource. The coordination
necessary for all types of joint operations has been achieved primarily
through the [joint] operating agreement, [2] which has become the most
1.

Gary B. Conine & Bruce M. Kramer, PropertyProvisionsof the JointOperatingAgreement, 3-1

ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. (2007).

2. Several model form joint operating agreements (JOAs) have been developed within the industry
to simplify negotiations, standardize terms and provisions, and obtain consistency in legal interpretations.
In 1956, the American Association of Petroleum Landmen (which later changed its name to the American
Association of Professional Landmen (AAPL)) published the first version of its model form JOA,
designated AAPL Form 610 and designed for joint operations on private lands. AM. ASS'N OF PROF'L
LANDMEN, A.A.P.L. FORM 610-1956: MODEL FORM OPERATING AGREEMENT (1956) [hereinafter FORM
610-1956]. AAPL Form 610 was modified in 1967, 1977, 1982, and 1989. See Keith Hall, Joint
Operations and the New AAPL Form 610-2015 Model Form OperatingAgreement, 3-6 ROCKY MTN.
MIN. L. FOuND. (2016). These forms are referred to in this Article as the "1967 Form JOA," the "1977
Form JOA," the "1982 Form JOA," and the "1989 Form JOA," respectively. For an analysis of the
differences between the 1982 Form JOA and the 1989 Form JOA, read Comparison of the 1989 A.A.P.L.
Model Form OperatingAgreement to the 1982 Model Form. See Gary B. Conine, Comparison of the
1989 A.A.P.L. Model Form OperatingAgreement to the 1982 ModelForm, proceedings at the 4th Annual
Oil & Gas Institute, South Texas College of Law, Aug. 9, 1990. In 2011, the AAPL formed a task force
to revise the 1989 Form JOA in order to reflect the increasing use of horizontal drilling techniques,
changes in the law, and changes in industry practice. See Jeff Weems, The Model Form Meets the 21st
Century, 42D ANNUAL ERNEST E. SMITH OIL, GAS & MIN. L. INST. 2-3 (2016), https://utcle.org/ecourses
/0c6229/get-asset-file/assetid38093. In 2013, this AAPL task force published AAPL Form 610-1989
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common instrument in the industry after the oil and gas lease.
Most analytical papers dealing with the joint operating agreement (or
JOA) have focused on the crucial details of conducting exploration,
development and production operations within the designated contract area
and the legal relationship of the parties to the agreement. These papers
emphasize the functional aspects of the JOA [that] commit the parties to
participate in and share expenses for, and production from, joint operations.
But there are other important provisions in the JOA . . . [that] adjust the
rights and duties of the parties outside the context of actual operations. 3
In 1988, Professor Gary B. Conine published PropertyProvisionsofthe
Operating Agreement-Interpretation, Validity, and Enforceability, in the
Texas Tech Law Review, a highly-cited law review article that examines the
provisions of the Joint Operating Agreement (JOA) that expand, limit, and
define the property interests of the parties both inside and outside the contract
area. 4 These provisions
not only clarify the parties' rights with respect to the transfer, acquisition
and loss of interests but also facilitate such matters as the deferral of
commitments to participate in future operations .... [A]t first glance these
provisions may resemble a random collection of property clauses, many of
which are found in other instruments [used] in the industry and appear to be
only peripherally important to joint operations, [but] they ... are essential
to the structure and effectiveness of the JOA as a long-term transaction. In
(horizontal modifications), a modified version ofthe 1989 Form JOA to incorporate revisions relating to
horizontal development. Id. at 3. This form is referred to in this Article as the "1989-H Form JOA." In
2016, the AAPL published a revised version of its entire form JOA, the AAPL Form 610-2015, referred
to herein as the "2015 Form JOA." See AM. ASS'N OF PROF'L LANDMEN, A.A.P.L. FORM 610-2015:
MODEL FORM OPERATING AGREEMENT (2016) [hereinafter FORM 610-2015]. Although this Article
focuses on the AAPL model forms for onshore operations, it should be noted that various other form JOAs
have been published. See AM. ASS'N OF PROF'L LANDMEN, A.A.P.L. FORM 710-2002: MODEL FORM OF
OFFSHORE OPERATING AGREEMENT (2002); see also AM. ASS'N OF PROF'L LANDMEN, A.A.P.L. FORM
810-2007: MODEL FORM OF OFFSHORE OPERATING AGREEMENT (2007). For example, these include

AAPL Form 710-2002 and AAPL Form 810-2007 which govern offshore operations. See AM. ASS'N OF
PROF'L LANDMEN, A.A.P.L. FORM 710-2002: MODEL FORM OF OFFSHORE OPERATING AGREEMENT
(2002); AM. ASS'N OF PROF'L LANDMEN, A.A.P.L. FORM 810-2007: MODEL FORM OF OFFSHORE

OPERATING AGREEMENT (2007). In addition, the Rocky Mountain Oil & Gas Association issued its Form
I (undivided interests) and its Form 2 (divided interests) in 1954 and 1959, respectively, each of which
was designed for units on unproven tracts comprised, in part, of federal leases. ROCKY MOUNTAIN OIL
AND GAS ASS'N, ROCKY MOUNTAIN UNIT OPERATING AGREEMENT FORM 2 (DIVIDED INTERESTS) (1994);
ROCKY MOUNTAIN OIL AND GAS ASS'N, ROCKY MOUNTAIN UNIT OPERATING AGREEMENT FORM 1

(UNDIVIDED INTERESTS) (1954). In discussions with the President of the Colorado Petroleum Association,
a partial successor to the Rocky Mountain Oil & Gas Association, it appears these forms are no longer
published or in significant use.
3.

Conine & Kramer, supra note 1.

4. See generally Gary B. Conine, PropertyProvisionsofthe OperatingAgreement--Interpretation,
Validity, and Enforceability, 19 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1263 (1988). The 1988 article was prepared under a
summer research grant awarded by the Oil, Gas & Mineral Law Section of the State Bar of Texas. Id. For
further discussion and coverage of additional issues, the reader is referred to Professor Conine's 1988
article. See id.
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a sense, these provisions are the "mortar" that holds the procedural "bricks"
of the JOA together.
Professor Conine prepared an updated version of his influential article
for the 2008 Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Foundation Special Institute on
Joint Operations. 6 In both his article and special institute paper, Professor
Conine focused on the 1982 Form JOA.7 This Article is an update to those
prior works, to greater emphasize the 1989 Form JOA, cases and
developments since its publication, and the implications of the revisions to
the JOA in the new 2015 Form JOA published by the American Association
of Professional Landmen (AAPL). 8 Consistent with Professor Conine's 2008
Article, the purposes of this Article are to review and examine:
[(1)] the various provisions typically included in the JOA [that]
affect the property interests of the parties, ... [(2)] how [these
provisions] are used to structure the operating agreement, [(3)] the
ways in which [these provisions] are used to protect the integrity of
the transaction during its protracted term and promote fair dealing
among the parties through restrictions on transfers and acquisitions,
and [(4)] the legal issues that often arise with respect to the validity
and enforceability of these provisions.9
II. STRUCTURING THE JOINT OPERATING AGREEMENT
The JOA is designed to organize operations on a specific collection of
properties. Consequently, the transaction will be dependent on an accurate
identification of the boundaries within which its provisions apply.
[Because] ... allocation of costs and production among the parties for
future operations will be determined by the property interests contributed
by each, ... the interests contributed by each party [must] be clearly
described and ... some agreement [must] exist on how each party's share
of costs and production will be affected if title to all or part of its interest
turns out to be defective or fails during the term of the agreement. These
functions are performed by Exhibit A to the JOA and the [JOA's failure of
title provisions.]10
The JOA "also uses the property interests of the parties to facilitate some
of its most important provisions."" Specifically, property interests define

5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

Conine & Kramer, supranote 1.
See id.
See id.; see also Conine, supra note 4.
See infra Parts II-V.
See Conine & Kramer, supra note 1.
See id.
Id.
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"incentives and rewards for participating in future operations" and secure the
parties' obligations "to bear a share of costs in future operations" under the
"operator lien" provisions. 12
A. Creating(andRevising) the ContractArea
Operations conducted under the JOA take place within the [c]ontract
[a]rea created by the instrument. This area is comprised of the leasehold
and mineral interests[] contributed by the individual parties who execute the
JOA, as identified in Exhibit A to the agreement[.] Within this aggregation
of property interests, the operating agreement controls what mineral
activities will take place, the party that will conduct those projects, and the
manner in which costs and production will be allocated among the parties.
Despite the natural tendency to . . . conceptualize the [c]ontract [a]rea

as a region within certain surface boundaries, it is actually a
multi-dimensional zone that may cover less than all mineral substances, less
than all development rights, and less than all subsurface depths and
formations within its surface perimeter. [13 ] For this reason, [Article II of
the JOA] prescribes several pieces of information that should be included
[on Exhibit A] to obtain a full description of the [c]ontract [a]rea[.] 14
The functions of Exhibit A include: (1) to describe the lands subject to the
JOA; and (2) to describe the leases and interests subject to the JOA as well
as any applicable depth restrictions, the specific leases or mineral properties
involved, and the percentage of ownership held by each party within the
contract area.15 "The significance of precision in compiling and reviewing
the information in Exhibit A to the JOA [can be] illustrated" by several
cases. 16
In the absence of an Area of Mutual Interest (AMI) provision, leases
and interests acquired after the effective date are not usually contemplated by
the parties to be covered by the JOA. Consistent with this understanding, in
Clovelly Oil Co. v. Midstates PetroleumCo., the court held that the operating
agreement's preprinted language limited Exhibit A's definition of the
12. Id.
13. See, e.g., Morgan v. Mobil Oil Corp., 726 F.2d 1474 (10th Cir. 1984); Colorado Interstate Gas
Co. v. HUFO Oils, 626 F. Supp. 38 (W.D. Tex. 1984), aff'd, 802 F.2d 133 (5th Cir. 1986); Superior Oil
Co. v. Roberts, 398 S.W.2d 276 (Tex. 1966).
14. Conine & Kramer, supra note 1.
15.

See AM. ASs'N OF PROF'L LANDMEN, A.A.P.L. FORM 610-1982: MODEL FORM OPERATING

AGREEMENT art. II.A (1982) [hereinafter FORM 610-1982]. The 1989 Form JOA and the 2015 Form JOA
add "burdens on production" to this list and provide under Article IV.B.1(g) that if a party contributes an
interest in a wellbore or in production only, the party's absence of an interest in the remainder of the
contract area is a failure of title unless Exhibit A reflects that the party did not have any interest in the
remainder of the contract area. See AM. ASS'N OF PROF'L LANDMEN, A.A.P.L. FORM 610-1989: MODEL
FORM OPERATING AGREEMENT arts. II.A & IV.B.1(g) (1989) [hereinafter FORM 610-1989]; see also
FORM 610-2015, supranote 2.
16. Conine & Kramer, supranote 1.
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contract area to only those leases and interests owned by the parties at the
time the agreement was executed, reasoning that the parties could have
included an AMI provision if the parties intended the JOA to apply to future
leases. 17 Similar arguments were made in Anderson Energy Corp. v.
Dominion Oklahoma Texas Exploration & Production, Inc., in which the
plaintiff asserted that the operator had breached the JOA by acquiring leases
and interests within the contract area and drilling more than one hundred gas
wells.18 In its defense, the operator argued that because the JOA recital stated
that the parties are "owners" of leases and oil and gas interests, and the
definitions of "oil and gas" and "oil and gas interests" are those "owned" by
the parties, the parties only intended the JOA to apply to leases and interests
owned as of the effective date. 19 In this case, however, the JOA did include
an AMI provision. 2 0 The court rejected the operator's argument, reasoning
that because the parties referenced maps naming platting land and because an
AMI provision was included in the agreement, the lands and leases subject
to the JOA included the subsequently acquired leases and interests.2 1
Even in cases in which an AMI provision was absent, however, courts
have found that a JOA covers subsequently acquired leases and interests
within the geographic area described in Exhibit A.22 Consider the following
two cases. In Amoco Production Co. v. Charles B. Wilson, Jr., Inc., "the
lease did not cover all depths anticipated by the parties to the JOA." 23In
Kincaid v. West Operating Co., "the lease covered only an undivided onehalf of the mineral estate in an important tract." 2 4 In both cases, the
information as to these properties set forth in Exhibit A "suggested that all
mineral rights at all depths were included," and "the party contributing less
than all the operating rights in the leased area later acquired the outstanding
interest and asserted that the JOA did not apply to the newly acquired
property." 25 And in both cases, the court held that the parties intended the
JOA to include all interests acquired within a specific geographic area,
despite the absence of an AMI clause.26 These cases highlight the importance
17. See Clovelly Oil Co. v. Midstates Petroleum Co., 112 So.3d 187, 196 (La. 2013).
18. See Anderson Energy Corp. v. Dominion Okla. Tex. Expl. & Prod., Inc., 469 S.W.3d 280, 285
(Tex. App.-San Antonio 2015, no pet.).
19. Id. at 287.
20. Id at 285.
21. Idat290.
22. See Kincaid v. W. Operating Co., 890 P.2d 249 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994); Amoco Prod. Co. v.
Charles B. Wilson, Jr., Inc., 976 P.2d 941 (Kan. 1999) (holding that the absence of an AMI does not mean
the parties did not intend to include all interests acquired in the future).
23. Conine & Kramer, supra note 1; see Amoco Prod. Co., 976 P.2d at 944.
24. Conine & Kramer, supra note 1; see Kincaid, 890 P.2d at 251.
25. Conine, supra note 1; see Kincaid, 890 P.2d at 253; Amoco Prod. Co., 976 P.2d at 954.
26. See Kincaid, 890 P.2d at 253; Amoco Prod. Co., 976 P.2d at 954. In contrast, in a case in which
a party's leasehold interest was overstated in Exhibit A in anticipation of acquiring a larger interest by
way of a farmout arrangement when a well was drilled under the JOA, it was held that the newly acquired
interest was not to be shared among the JOA parties under the Acreage and Cash Contributions clause
under the rationale that Exhibit A already included the new interest, indicating that the parties intended to
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of attention to detail and clearly reflect the parties' intent when drafting
Exhibit A. 27
Recognizing that mistakes can be made during drafting, the new 2015
Form JOA adds a mechanism that requires the operator to amend Exhibit A
from time to time to correct mistakes or reflect changes of ownership
retroactive to the date of the mistake or change.28 This right is not unilateral,
however, but requires the consent of the affected parties.29 If a party fails to
grant consent, the operator may nevertheless amend Exhibit A to conform to
a title opinion, but the non-consenting party may pursue litigation to
determine the parties' interests.30
B. The Deemed Lease
If the contract area includes unleased mineral interests, the mineral
owner does not enter the transaction on equal footing with parties who
contribute only a leasehold working interest. 31 To place all JOA parties in
the same position, any mineral interest contributed is deemed subject to an
oil and gas lease, which is attached to the JOA as an exhibit. 3 2 Under this
scheme, the unleased mineral interest is encumbered with a cost-free royalty
(payable to the mineral owner regardless of its participation or
non-participation in drilling activities) and is given a term that expires if there
is no production after a prescribed date, just as with true leasehold interests
committed to the contract area.33
Rights under the deemed lease may be conveyed like any other interest
in oil and gas, so care must be taken in drafting the instrument to be attached.
The deemed lease was the subject of Prize Energy Resources, L.P. v. Cliff
Hoskins, Inc., in which a non-operator contributed a mineral interest to the
JOA, triggering the creation of the deemed lease. 3 4 The non-operator
subsequently sold all of its rights under the JOA except for its retained royalty
interest and possibility of reverter under the deemed lease, such that the
underlying mineral interest would revert back if the JOA terminated. The
JOA provided, like many JOAs, that it would remain in effect only so long
as the oil and gas leases subject to the agreement continued in effect. When
exclude the farmout interest from the Contributions clause when the operating agreement was executed.
See Martin Expl. Co. v. Amoco Prod. Co., 637 So.2d 1202 (La. Ct. App. 1994).
27. See generally Kincaid, 890 P.2d at 249; Amoco Prod. Co., 976 P.2d at 941.
28. See FORM 610-2015, supra note 2, at art. III.B.
29. See id. at art. HII.B.3.
30. See id. at art. HJ.B.6.
31. See id at art. III.A.
32. See id
33. See id
34. Prize Energy Res., L.P. v. Cliff Hoskins, Inc., 345 S.W.3d 537, 546 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
2011, no pet.).
35. Id.
36. See id; see FORM 610-2015, supranote 2, at art. XIII, Option #1.
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the leases that were contributed to the JOA terminated, the operator continued
to produce, and the successors to the non-operator sued to quiet title to the
mineral interest and for trespass and conversion.37 The court rejected the
operator's argument that the deemed lease somehow continued the JOA in
effect because, unlike the underlying leases, it did not contain a cessation of
production clause.38 The JOA's duration was dependent on the continuation
of the underlying leases, not the deemed lease.39
C. Failureof Title
Problems with lease and property descriptions arise in part because
at the time the JOA is being prepared for execution, there is little or no time
to conduct title examinations and the parties must act on the assumption that
each participant knows and has revealed the true size, extent and legal
quality of the interest it purports to contribute to the transaction. 40
There is no requirement that individual parties submit proof of their interest
before signing the JOA. 4 1 Rather, title examination is required on the
drillsite, or if it is requested by a majority of the parties that consented to the
drilling operations or the operator has elected, on the drilling unit, before
commencement of drilling operations.42
As a result, a party's representation of the interest it is contributing to the
[c]ontract [a]rea may turn out to be incorrect. It can also be correct initially
but later become partially or wholly invalid due to a failure to comply with
one of the express [or] implied covenants contained in a lease. 43
These failures of title have been dealt with in one of two ways: either
the loss from the title failure is imposed on the party that "contributed the
interest to the [c]ontract [a]rea," or "the loss is treated as a joint loss" and
imposed on all parties to the JOA." Industry has generally understood that
initial failures of title, that is, the failure of a party to own the interest it
purports to contribute at the outset, should be borne by the contributing party
alone, while subsequent losses of an interest for failure of production should
be shared by all of the parties.45 This understanding was called into question

37.

Prize Energy Res., L.P., 345 S.W.3d at 547.

38. . Id. at 554-55.

39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

See id. at 554.
Conine & Kramer, supranote 1.
See FORM 610-2015, supra note 2, at art. IV.A.
See id.; FORM 610-1989, supra note 15, at art. IVA.; FoRM 610-1982, supranote 15, at art. IV.A.
Conine & Kramer, supranote 1.
See id.
See generally id

2018]1

AN UPDATE FOR THE NEW 2015 FORMJOA

497

in EOG Resources, Inc. v. Killam Oil Co.4 6 There, EOG succeeded to
interests in certain zones earned by its predecessor under a farmout
agreement with the plaintiff, Killam, with operations governed by a JOA that
appears from the opinion to be the 1977 Form JOA.4 7 When EOG lost record
title in the zones contributed for failure of continued production, and such
title reverted to Killam under the farmout agreement, EOG argued that it
retained a contractual right under the JOA to share in its proportionate interest
in production.4 8 The court agreed with Killam that EOG lost all of its interest
in production from the zones under the unambiguous language of the JOA.49
To make clear the distinction between a failure to have title at the outset
and the subsequent loss of title, the 2015 Form JOA defines a "failure of title"
as occurring only when an interest contributed by a party is determined to be
invalid "as of the effective date," unless the limitations are disclosed on
Exhibit A. 50 Earlier versions were not clear that a failure of title excluded
interests lost for failure of production, simply stating that should a failure of
title occur, the party that contributed the affected interest or lease would alone
bear the entire loss.si

If a failure of title is established, the party who contributed the affected
interest is allowed ninety days to acquire or reacquire the interest, free of the
renewal and extension provisions of the JOA. 52 If the party is unable to
acquire the lost interest, the proportionate cost and production shares of the
parties in the contract area are revised to reflect the reduction in the interest
of the party that purported to contribute the failed interest.53 If title is found
to be invalid, however, a party is still entitled to its share of revenues, but
may not recoup its share of expenses before the date its title is found to be
46.
denied).
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

See EOG Res., Inc. v. Killam Oil Co., 239 S.W.3d 293 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2007, pet.
Id. at 296-97.
Id. at 299-300.
Id. at 300.
FORM 610-2015, supra note 2, at art. IV.B.1.
See FORM 610-1989, supranote 15, at art. IV.B.1; FORM 610-1982, supranote 15, at art. IV.B.1;

AM. ASS'N OF PROF'L LANDMEN, A.A.P.L. FORM 610-1977: MODEL FORM OPERATING AGREEMENT art.

IV.B.1 (1977) [hereinafter FORM 610-1977].
52. See FORM 610-2015, supra note 2, at art. IV.B.1.
53. See id Under the 1982 Form JOA, liability for conversion of production attributable to a failure
of title is borne entirely by the parties whose interests failed, while under the 1989 Form JOA and the
2015 Form JOA, such liability is shared severally by all parties that received such production based on
the amount of the converted production received. See id.; FORM 610-1989, supra note 15, at art. IV.B.1;
FORM 610-1982, supra note 15, at art. IV.B.1. If an interest of another party to the JOA in a producing
well increases as a result of a failure of title, then the party whose title was lost will be entitled to receive
any proceeds of production until it has been reimbursed for its unrecovered costs for the well, which afford
the losing party protection similar to a good faith trespasser. See FORM 610-2015, supra note 2, at art.
IV.B.1(c). Similarly, if the true owner of the failed interest who is not a party to the JOA later pays for
any costs previously incurred by the losing party, such payments are to be refunded to the party whose
interest failed. See id. at art. IV.B. 1(e). Such attempts to isolate JOA parties from liability to third parties
may be undermined where the transaction is held to create a partnership or to result in a cross-conveyance
of the properties described in Exhibit A.
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flawed, because the JOA provides that there shall be no retroactive
adjustment of revenues or expenses. 5 4 The failure of title itself does not
constitute proof of fraud. Because the JOA takes into account that a title
failure might occur in the future, the JOA provides a.lawful cause for the
formation of a contract even if a party is found not to own a valid oil and gas
lease at the time the JOA is executed.
Similarly, where a party, "through mistake or oversight," fails to make
or erroneously makes a payment required to maintain a lease or interest, and
as a result the lease or interest terminates, that party alone will bear the entire
loss by a proportionate reduction of its interest. 56 But other losses, such as
those resulting from a failure of the parties to propose and carry out
operations for the exploration and development of a lease, are treated as joint
losses." No adjustment is made in the interests attributable to the JOA
parties. 8 The same treatment is given to loss of a leasehold interest for
non-payment of a shut-in royalty payment resulting from the operator's
failure to promptly notify the non-operators that a well has been shut-in.59
D. StructuralTransfers
The oil and gas interests contributed by the parties comprise the contract
area for the JOA, but these interests are also used to structure some of the
mechanisms that define and implement the joint operations that take place
under the JOA. 6 0 Transfers of and encumbrances placed on these interests
are crucial to the function of the JOA and occur by contract under the
subsequent operations and operator's lien provisions of the JOA. 6 1 Such
transfers and encumbrances can also arise by implication as a result of the
cost and production sharing prescribed by the instrument.
1. Transfers as Penalties
Although the parties usually commit themselves under the JOA to
participate in initial operations within the contract area, decisions to
participate in subsequent operations are normally deferred until immediately

54. See FORM 610-2015, supra note 2, at art. IV.B.1(b).
55. See Mayne & M6rtz, Inc. v. Sweet Lake Land & Oil Co., 28 So.3d 1227, 1233-34 (La. Ct. App.
2010).
56. See FoRM 610-2015, supra note 2, at art. IV.B.2. Article IV.B.2 contains similar protections to
reimburse the party whose interest is lost for mistake or erroneous nonpayment or underpayment as those
described previously for a party whose title failed at inception. Id.
57. See id. at art. IV.B.3.
58. See id.
59. See Id. at art. VILE.
60. See generally id.
61. See id at art. VII.B.
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preceding commencement of the new project.62 The delay is intended to
insulate the parties from binding commitments to future projects and allows
each to consider the most current geologic information obtained from prior
operations, current market conditions, and its own changing financial
position before making further commitments.
Typically, this is accomplished by providing an opportunity for all
parties to elect to participate or not participate in major operations after the
drilling of the initial well, subject to some form of "penalty" for opting not
to participate in a project.6 3 A decision not to participate in a subsequent
operation is not a breach, and therefore this penalty does not involve
liquidated damages or an unenforceable penalty.64 Unless the operating
agreement provides otherwise, the operator may not impose nonconsent
penalties for failure to pay for the costs to drill the initial well. 65
Any party that desires to drill a subsequent well or to rework, deepen,
or plug a non-producing well is required to give written notice of the proposal
to each of the other parties. 66 The 1989-H Form JOA expanded the notice
requirement for horizontal wells to include more detailed information,
including total measured depth, surface hole location, terminus,
displacement, and utilization and scheduling of rigs.67 The 2015 Form JOA
incorporates these requirements for proposed horizontal wells and adds
similar requirements for vertical well proposals, including depth, surface and
bottom hole locations, objective zone, utilization and scheduling of rigs, and
stimulation operations. 6 8 In the case of both vertical and horizontal wells, the
62.

See generally id. at art. VI.B.1 (allowing the parties to consider and compile information before

committing to further development).

63. See id. at art. VI.B.2; FORM 610-1989, supra note 15, at art. VI.B.2; FORM 610-1982, supra note
15, at art. VI.B.2; FORM 610-1977, supranote 51, at art. VI.B.2. To avoid the characterization of the risk
penalty that is imposed associated with converting a consenting party into a non-consenting party in
connection with a default, the 2015 Form JOA adds a usury savings clause which states that, "to the extent
that all or any part of the risk penalty to be recovered pursuant to Article VI.B or Article VI.C, as the case
may be, in connection with the provisions of this Article VII.[D].3, is determined to constitute interest on
a debt, such interest shall not exceed the maximum amount ofnon-usurious interest that may be contracted
for, taken, reserved, charged, or received under law." See FORM 610-2015, supra note 2, at art. VII.D.3.
64. See Nearburg v. Yates Petroleum Corp., 943 P.2d 560, 566 (N.M. Ct. App. 1997) (citing Gary
B. Conine, Rights and Liabilitiesof CarriedInterest andNonconsent Partiesin Oil and Gas Operations,
37 INST. ON OIL & GAS L. & TAX'N § 3.04[3][c], at 3-32 (1986)). The penalty label has led to an attack
on the validity and enforceability of the provision. See id. Although in Hamiltonv. Texas Oil & Gas Corp.
the court of appeals construed the provision as an enforceable liquidated damages clause based on the risk
compensation achieved through the arrangement, in Valence OperatingCo. v. Dorsett, the Texas Supreme
Court relied on Nearburg v. Yates Petroleum Corp. to hold that the non-consent provision involved
reasonable compensation for risk-not a breach-and was more accurately referred to as a "sole risk
clause." See Valence Operating Co. v. Dorsett, 164 S.W.3d 656, 665 (Tex. 2005) (relying on Nearburg,
943 P.2d 560); Hamilton v. Tex. Oil & Gas.Corp., 648 S.W.2d 316 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1982, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
65. See Enterra Energy, LLC v. Wadi Petroleum, Inc., Nos. 06-9217 C/W 07-0409, 2008 WL
687183, at *1-2 (E.D. La. Oct. 2, 2008) (applying Louisiana law).
66. See FORM 610-2015, supra note 2, at art. VI.B.1.
67. See FORM 610-1989, supra note 15, at art. VI.B.1.
68. See FORM 610-2015, supra note 2, at art. VI.B..
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2015 Form JOA (unlike the 1989 Form JOA and earlier forms) now expressly
requires any such proposals for subsequent operations to be accompanied by
estimated drilling and completion costs set forth in an Authorization for
Expenditure (AFE).69
Upon receipt of the notice and proposal, a party's election to participate
must be exercised within thirty days, or within forty-eight hours if a drilling
rig is on location, and the proposal is to rework, sidetrack, recomplete, plug
back or deepen the well.70 A nonoperator that elects not to participate may
not thereafter change its election." The proposing party must act in good
faith when it decides that forty-eight hours notice is sufficient. 2 In Chisnos,
Ltd. v. JKM Energy, L.L.C., the court held that an attempt to. pass off a
workover rig as a drilling rig to trigger the forty-eight hour notice period was
in bad faith when the operator appeared to have plenty of time to send a
thirty-day notice.
The operator must then commence the proposed operation within ninety
days after the expiration of the thirty-day notice period (or as promptly as
possible after the forty-eight-hour notice period), although an operator may
commence the subsequent operations (or even complete the operations)
before sending the notice.74 Early commencement does not harm
non-operators, but instead places greater risk on the operator that the cost of
the operation will fall entirely on him.
"The risk and cost of the operation are borne by the" parties that consent
to the proposed operations "in proportion to the interest for which they have
elected to be responsible."7 6 For situations in which there are non-consenting
parties, this necessarily means that some of the consenting parties have had
to assume additional liabilities to pursue the project." To compensate them
for the assumption of these greater obligations, the consenting parties are
granted a benefit upon commencement of the operation." The mechanism to
achieve this adjustment varies, depending on the nature of the anticipated

69. See id.; FORM 610-1989, supra note 15, at art. VI.B.1; FORM 610-1982, supra note 15, at art.
VI.Bl; FORM 610-1977, supra note 51, at art. VI.B.1.
70. See FORM 610-2015, supra note 2, at art. VLB.1 (emphasis added).
71. See XTO Energy Inc. v. Smith Prod. Inc., 282 S.W.3d 672, 678-79 (Tex. App.-Houston 2009,
pet. granted).
72. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (suggesting that all
contracting parties have a duty of good faith and fair dealing).
73. Chisnos, Ltd. v. JKM Energy, L.L.C., 258 P.3d 1007, 1114 (N.M. Ct. App. 2011).
74. See Bonn Operating Co. v. Devon Energy Prod. Co., 613 F.3d 532, 535 (5th Cir. 2010) (applying
Valence and holding that an operator may even begin drilling and complete a well before sending notice
under the 1956 Form JOA); Valence Operating Co. v. Dorsett, 164 S.W.3d 656, 662 (Tex. 2005) (stating
that an operator may commence operations for drilling during the notice period for non-operators to elect
to participate or go non-consent).
75. See Valence OperatingCo., 164 S.W.3d at 663.
76. Conine, supra note 4, at 1288; see Bonn OperatingCo., 613 F.3d at 533.
77. See Bonn Operating Co., 613 F.3d at 533.
78. See Conine, supra note 4, at 1288.
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The most common method entails relinquishment by each
non-consenting party of its "interests in the well and its production until
proceeds from the sale of production[80 ] attributable to [its] interest[], after
deducting taxes and lease burdens," equal a specified multiple of the costs
incurred in the operation.
Once this recovery has occurred, the interest reverts to the
non-consenting party.82 This arrangement has been held to create a
Manahan-type carried interest in which the title to the relinquished interest
actually passes between the parties.8 3 During the "penalty" period, the
non-consenting party losses its possessory rights in the property, but retains
a future interest in the form of a possibility of reverter.8 4
The consenting parties will be responsible for the payment of royalty
and similar burdens on the leases and interests of the nonconsenting parties

79. See id.
Popular methods have included: (1) cash payments to consenting parties to cover additional
expenses; (2) transfer of the right to production for a limited time; and (3) forfeiture by the
nonconsenting party of all or part of its interest in the [contract area], with corresponding
adjustments in the parties' interests under the operating agreement.
Id; see John M. McCollam, A Selective Comparison of ContractualOperatingProblems under Federal
Offshore and Onshore Oil and Gas Leases, 29 INST. ON OIL & GAS L. & TAX'N 229, 254 (1978).
80. Note, however, that under the 1989 Form JOA and the 2015 Form JOA, relinquishment in the
case of reworking, sidetracking, deepening, or plugging back only pertains to a party's rights in
production. See FORM 610-2015, supranote 2, at art. VI.B.2(c); FORM 610-1989, supranote 15. The same
is true for a completion under Option #2 of art. VI.C. in the 1989 Form JOA and the 2015 Form JOA.
FORM 610-2015, supra note 2, at art. VI.C; FORM 610-1989,-supra note 15. The 1956 Form JOA provides
that the non-consenting party also relinquishes "its leasehold operating rights." FORM 610-1956, supra
note 2, at art. 12 ¶ 3. Other older forms call for relinquishment of the operating rights or working interest
in the well or even permanent relinquishment of the leasehold interests associated with the well.
81. Conine, supra note 4, at 1289; see Railroad Comm'n v. Olin Corp., 690 S.W.2d 628, 630 (Tex.
App.-Austin 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
82. See id.
83. See id.; PATRICK H. MARTIN & BRUCE M. KRAMER, WILLIAMS & MEYERS OIL AND GAS LAW:
ABRIDGED SECOND EDITION § 424.1 (2004).

84. See Olin Corp., 690 S.W.2d at 630. Nevertheless, the non-consenting party continues to have a
voice in many future operations affecting the well or the leased premises where the well is located. See
generally Tarrant v. Capstone Oil & Gas Co., 178 P.3d 866 (Okla. Civ. App. 2007); Hill v. Heritage Res.,
Inc., 964 S.W.2d 89 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1997, pet. denied). The non-consenting party is still permitted
to elect: (1) to participate in future wells regardless of location; (2) to participate in sidetracking the initial
well to a new bottom-hole location (provided it tenders its share of costs in drilling the initial well to the
point in which the sidetracking begins); (3) to vote on surrender of any lease in the contract area; (4) to
acquire an interest in any renewal or extension lease; and (5) to vote on removal and appointment of an
operator based on its original proportionate interest in the contract area. See Tarrant, 178 P.3d at 870;
Hill, 964 S.W.2d at 111. The retention of these rights normally associated with a working interest suggests
that the interest actually transferred to the carrying parties is a production interest. If so, the relinquished
interest might be better characterized as a Herndon-type carried interest. See Conine, supra note 4, at
1294-96 (providing a more thorough development of this argument). Note that the 2015 Form JOA adds
language that requires the operator to restrict the access of the non-consenting parties to the well location,
and to information, and reports until the earlier of recoupment or two years after the commencement of
the operation. FORM 610-2015, supra note 2, at art. V.D.5(b).
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during the nonconsent period. 5 The Texas Supreme Court in Tawes v.
Barnes held that this temporary structural conveyance of the nonconsenting
parties' interests is not an assignment or conveyance of a permanent interest
sufficient to put the consenting parties in privity of estate with the owners of
royalty in the nonconsenting parties' leases and interest or to give rise to a
third-party beneficiary relationship between these royalty holders and the
consenting parties. 8 6 The non-consenting party will, however, remain
responsible to pay and discharge any subsequently created interests, such as
an overriding royalty or production payment, created after the date of the
agreement, attributable to such production.87
Using complete forfeiture as the non-consent penalty is less common.
Although non-consent penalties with recoupments approaching 500% may
amount to a virtual forfeiture, the express requirement for forfeiture is clearly
the most extreme and certain incentive for participation.89 It also carries the
secondary advantage of precluding some parties from later benefiting from
the risks assumed by others in the early exploration of a sizeable contract
area. 90

Enforcement of a forfeiture penalty requires close attention to the proper
execution of the provisions on subsequent operations. Because of the
harshness of the result, forfeitures are not favored in law or equity. 9' The
forfeiture provision itself must be expressed clearly and unequivocally, and
must be executed in strict compliance with its terms. 9 2 The forfeiture
85. See FORM 610-2015, supra note 2, at art. VI.B.2(d).
86. See Tawes v. Barnes, 340 S.W.3d 419, 428-30 (Tex. 2011).
87. See FORM 610-2015, supra note 2, at art. III.C ¶ 1; FORM 610-1989, supra note 15, at art. Il.C
¶ 1. For a different result, where the court found that the holder of a subsequently created overriding
royalty was not entitled to any royalty during the non-consent period, see Boldrick v. BA Oil Producers.
Boldrick v. BA Oil Producers, 222 S.W.3d 672, 674 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2007, no pet.). In that case,
the JOA signed in 1973 contained an additional provision that stated that any subsequently created interest
shall be specifically made subject to all terms and provisions of the operating agreement and that a
subsequently created interest is chargeable with a pro rata portion of costs and expenses as if it were a
working interest. See id. Interestingly, the recording supplement puts the holder of a subsequently created
overriding royalty, production payment, or net profits interest on notice that its interest is "subject to
suspension if a party is required to assign or relinquish to another party an interest which is subject to such
burden[s]" and subject to the operator's lien. See AM. Ass'N OF PROF'L LANDMEN, A.A.P.L. FORM
61ORS-1989: MODEL FORM RECORDING SUPPLEMENT TO OPERATING AGREEMENT AND FINANCING

STATEMENT § 1.F(ii), (iii) (1989) [hereinafter FORM 610RS-1989].
88. See generally Long v. Rim Operating, Inc., 345 S.W.3d 79 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2011, pet.
denied). The parties are always free to negotiate a hybrid approach, where for certain operations a
non-consenting party may participate after the recovery of costs and the penalty and certain other
operations require a non-consenting party to relinquish its interest. See, e.g., id at 91 (upholding special
provision in operating agreement for non-consenting party to relinquish interest for a well or operation
necessary to perpetuate a lease).
89. See id at 84-85.
90. See id.
91. See Dickerson v. Bd. of Trs., 204 S.W.2d 418, 423 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1947, writ
ref'd).
92. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Rudd, 226 S.W.2d 464, 486 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1949,
no writ).
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provision is also subject to waiver, expressly or by conduct inconsistent with
the exercise of the right.93 The beneficiary of a right of forfeiture of a
property interest resulting from a breach of a condition can waive the right or
be estopped to enforce it if he fails to exercise the right to the detriment of
the forfeiting party when he acquires knowledge that the requisite conditions
have occurred.9 4 For example, if forfeiture were imposed as a result of a
party's non-consent, but the subsequent operations were unsuccessful, a later
oversight permitting that party to participate in operations in the forfeited
property requiring expenditure of his funds on the project would most
certainly be grounds for waiver or estoppel. 9 5
2. Liens and Security Interests
The second express conveyance in the operating agreement is the grant
of liens and security interests.96 The operator is authorized to pay all
expenses incurred during the development and operation of the contract area,
keeping an accurate record of the joint account reflecting all charges and
credits. At its election, the operator may charge each party with its share of
expenses after those costs have been paid by the operator or it may invoice
each party for advance payment of estimated expenses for the next
succeeding month. 9 8 Interest at a rate prescribed in the accounting
procedures is incurred for failure to promptly pay or reimburse the operator. 99
Ultimately, if a payment is not made within 120 days after the rendition of a
statement, the non-defaulting parties, upon request of the operator, must pay
their proportionate share of the unpaid amount from their own funds. 0 0
Although the lien in the operating agreement historically has been
referred to as the "operator's lien," under the 1989 Form JOA and the 2015
Form JOA, the lien runs to and from all parties to the JOA.10 To secure
payment of all of a party's obligations under the JOA, each party grants to
the other parties a contractual lien and security interest on its oil and gas
93. See Am. Cas. Co. v. Conn., 741 S.W.2d 536, 539-40 (Tex. App.-Austin 1987, no writ).
94. See Lawyers Tr. Co. v. City of Houston, 359 S.W.2d 887, 891-92 (Tex. 1962). This presents a
particular problem for consenting parties in jurisdictions that apply the cross-conveyance theory, in which
the non-consent provisions arguably become conditions to each party's title creating a fee simple on
condition subsequent subject to a right of entry for condition broken. In this context, forfeiture is not
automatic, but requires assertion of the forfeiture by the benefiting party. Failure to assert forfeiture in a
timely manner and to properly reflect its effects in accounting and other practices under the operating
agreement may result in a waiver of the penalty. See id. at 890-91.
95. See id at 891; see also Benavides v. Hunt, 15 S.W. 396, 399 (Tex. 1891); Hedick v. Lone Star
Steel Co., 277 S.W.2d 925, 929-30 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1955, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
96. See FoRM 610-2015, supra note 2, at art. VII.B.
97. See id. at art. V.D.2.
98. See id at art. VII.C. In the 2015 Form JOA, the time to pay such an advance has been extended
from fifteen to thirty days after the date the estimate and invoice has been received. See id
99. See id.
100. See id at art. VII.B ¶5.
101. See, e.g., FORM 610-1982, supra note 15, at art. VIL.B I 1 (granting lien to operator only).
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leases and oil and gas interests in the contract area and its share of all
production and equipment. 10 2 This lien is an enforceable security interest,
and the lienholder has the right to foreclose on any of the collateral specified
in the security agreement.103 As long as the JOA expressly authorizes
foreclosure, or the use of any other remedy at law or equity, against any or
all of the collateral without limiting or prescribing the exercise of such rights,
the operator may exercise those remedies on any portion of the collateral,
regardless of any fiduciary duties that might be imposed under the JOA.104
The contractual lien in the operating agreement meets the basic
requirements for the creation of a mortgage and a security interest in certain
parts of the real and personal property of each party.'0 o However, several
writers have noted deficiencies in the security provisions of some earlier JOA
forms that may result in fewer rights for the lienholder than expected.1 06 As
described below, these deficiencies largely were remedied in the 1989 Form
JOA and the 2015 Form JOA if used together with the AAPL-Form
61ORS-1989 Model Form Recording Supplement to Operating Agreement
and Financing Statement (Recording Supplement) published by the A.A.P.L.
in 1989.107
a. CollateralDescriptions
First, complaints were raised as to the sufficiency of collateral
descriptions in older forms such as the use of the ambiguous term "oil and
gas rights"108 that "may not include all of a party's rights associated with the
mineral estates within the [c]ontract [a]rea, such as non-operating interests

102. See FORM 610-2015, supra note 2, at art. VII.B ¶ 1; FoRM 610-1989, supranote 15, at art. VIL.B
T 1.
103. See Gunn v. Stagg, 197 So. 2d 125, 129 (La. Ct. App. 1967); Doanbuy Lease & Co. v. Melcher,
488 P.2d 339, 342 (N.M. 1961); Syring v. Sartorious, 277 N.E.2d 457, 459 (Ohio Ct. App. 1971).
104. See Bays Expl., Inc. v. PenSa, Inc., No. Civ-07-754-D, 2012 WL 4128120, at *16 (W.D. Okla.
2012) (quoting Conine, supra note 4, at 1303-04); Amarex, Inc. v. El Paso Nat. Gas Co., 772 P.2d 905,
908 (Okla. 1987); Houston & W. Tex. Co. v. Storey, 117 S.W.2d 832, 837 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso
1938, no writ); Andreau v. Mich. Wis. Pipeline Co., 712 P.2d 372, 377 (Wyo. 1986). However, wrongful
exercise of the operator's lien can result in charges of conversion and intentional interference with
contractual relations. See Estate of T.K. Jackson v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 676 F. Supp. 1142, 1146, 1148
(S.D. Ala 1987).
105. See FORM 610-2015, supranote 2, at art. VII.B ¶ 5; FORM 610-1989, supranote 15, at art. VII.B
T 5.
106. See Robert C. Bledsoe, OperatingAgreementsfrom the Standpointof the Non-Operator,ST. B.
TEX., ADVANCED OIL, GAS & MINERAL L. COURSE F-16 (1985); J. David Heaney, The Joint Operating
Agreement, the AFE and COPAS-What They Failto Provide, 29 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 17-1 (1983);
George J. Morgenthaler, PlanningAheadfor a Co-Participant'sBankruptcy: A Stitch in Time, 32 ROCKY
MTN. MIN. L. INST. 13-1 (1986); J. 0. Young, Oil and Gas Operating Agreements: Producers 88
Operating Agreements, Selected Problems and Suggested Solutions, 20 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 7-1
(1975).
107. See FORM 610RS-1989, supranote 87.
108. See FORM 610-1982, supra note 15, at art. VII.B; FoRM 610-1977, supra note 51, at art. VII.B.
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and reversionary rights." 09 Further, a defaulting party's share of production
is included in the listed collateral, but under older forms, property such as
10
inventories, accounts, and proceeds are not.o
Although a security interest
in collateral such as production will continue in any identifiable proceeds, the
security interest ceases to be perfected twenty-one days after receipt by the
debtor if the financing statement does not expressly apply to proceeds."
Moreover, in the absence of an assignment of proceeds in the security
agreement, most purchasers are reluctant to pay proceeds to the operator, and
a demand for payment will likely result in no more than a suspension of
payments to any party.112 In addition, the collateral descriptions under older
forms may not include after-acquired property such that only the interests
owned by a party at the time of its default may be subject to foreclosure. 1 13
In contrast to older forms, the 1989 and 2015 AAPL Form JOAs use the
more clearly defined terms "Oil and Gas Leases" and "Oil and Gas
Interests."1 14 They also expand the description of the collateral covered by
the lien and security interest to include, among other things, leasehold
interests, working interests, operating rights, royalty and overriding royalty
interests, as-extracted oil and gas, accounts, contract rights, inventory, and
15
general intangibles.s
The lien and security interest now expressly covers
all after-acquired real property interests of a party in the contract area and all
products and proceeds of all of the specifically described categories of
collateral.1 16
Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) was significantly
revised, effective July 1, 2001, including provisions recommended by a task
force on oil and gas finance."'7 The 2001 revisions to UCC Article 9 clarified
that minerals in the ground are treated as real property and excluded from
Article 9,118 minerals subject to attachment at the time of extraction are a new
category of "as-extracted collateral," and treated separately,' 19 and minerals
109. Conine & Kramer, supranote 1.
110. See FoRM 610-1982, supra note 15, at art. VII.B; FORM 610-1977, supranote 51, at art. VII.B.
111. See U.C.C. § 9-315(d) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2018).
112. See Walter K. Boyd, Crude Oil Purchasing-ItsTitle Opinions and Division Orders, 18 INST.
ON OIL & GAS L. & TAX'N 233, 268 (1967); Morgenthaler, supra note 106, at 13-1; Young, supra note
106, at 7-1.
113. Whether after-acquired collateral is covered under a security agreement is a question of contract
interpretation and is not covered by a statutory rule in the UCC. See U.C.C. § 9-108, cmt. 3 (AM. LAW
INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2018). If the security agreement covers after-acquired collateral, then a
financing statement will be effective to cover after-acquired collateral of the types of property indicated
in the financing statement without mentioning after-acquired collateral. See id. § 9-502, cmt. 2.
114. FORM 610-2015, supranote 2, at art. VII.B; FORM 610-1989, supra note 15, at art. VII.B.
115. See FORM 610-2015, supra note 2, at art. VII.B; FORM 610-1989, supra note 15, at art. VII.B.
116. See FORM 610-2015, supranote 2, at art. VII.B 1; FoRM 610-1989, supranote 15, at art. VII.B.
¶ 1.
117. See Alvin v. Harrell, Oil and Gas Finance under Revised UCC Article 9, 33 TEX. TECH. L. REv.
31, 32 (2001).
118. See U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(44) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2018).
119. See id. § 9-102(a)(6).
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subject to attachment after extraction are goods, usually as inventory held for
sale.1 2 0 The collateral descriptions in the 1989 and 2015 Form JOAs and the
recording supplement comport with the UCC revisions, but as discussed
below, implicate the filing of financing statements. 12 1
b. Secured Obligations
Second, commentators complained that earlier forms limited secured
obligations to debts owed for costs and expenses, but did not apply to other
indebtedness created in the course of the transaction. 122 These obligations
might include, inter alia, liability of the operator for funds collected in excess
of operating costs that are misappropriated by the operator for other uses. 12 3
In response, the 1989 and 2015 AAPL Forms expanded the obligations
secured by the lien and security interest to cover "all ... obligations" under
the operating agreement, including obligations to assign and relinquish
interests in oil and gas leases and obligations of the operator to properly
perform operations1 24 rather than just payment obligations.1 2 5
c. Remedies
Third, commentators complained of deficiencies in available remedies.
For example, earlier forms granted to the operator alone the right to receive
direct payments from purchasers of production after a default. 12 6 After a
default by the operator, the non-operators had no reciprocal right in their lien
on its interest. 12 7 The drafters of the 1989 and 2015 Form JOAs responded
by expanding the right to collect proceeds of production to all of the parties,
and by expressly providing that purchasers may rely on a notice of default
instructing the purchaser to release production.1 2 8

120. See id § 9-102(a)(44), (48).
121. See FoRm 610-2015, supra note 2, at art. VLI.B; FORM 610-1989, supra note 15, at art. VII.B;
FORM 61ORS-1989, supra note 87.
122. See FORM 610-1982, supra note 15, at art. VII.B (specifying "to secure payment of its share of
expense"); FORM 610-1977, supra note 51, at art. VII.B. (providing "to secure payment of its share of
expense"); 1956 Form JOA, supra note 2, at § 9 (specifying "to secure the payment of all sums due"); see
also Conine & Kramer, supra note 1.
123. See Conine & Kramer, supra note 1.
124. See FORM 610-2015, supra note 2, at art. VII.B, 1; FORM 610-1989, supra note 15, at art. VII.B

¶ 1.
125.
126.
VII.B ¶
127.
VII.B ¶
128.

14.

See, e.g., FORM 610-1982, supra note 15, at art. VII.C.
See, e.g., FORM 610-1982, supra note 15, at art. VII.B ¶ 1; FORM 610-1977, supra note 51, at art.
1.
See, e.g., FORM 610-1982, supra note 15, at art. VII.B ¶ 1; FORM 610-1977, supra note 51, at art.
1.
See FORM 610-2015, supra note 2, at art. VI.B, ¶ 4; FORM 610-1989, supra note 15, at art. VII.B

2018]

AN UPDATE FOR THE NEW 2015 FORM JOA

507

Older forms also relied exclusively on standard legal procedures for
foreclosure, which imposed a considerable burden on lienholders.' 29 No
provision was made for non-judicial foreclosure or, where permitted by law,
for the waiver or reduction of rights of redemption, valuation, appraisement,
stay of execution, or marshalling of assets, which can greatly speed recovery
and reduce attorneys' fees. 13 0 These rights and a number of new contractual
remedies were inserted into the 1989 and 2015 Form JOAs, including the
suspension of a defaulting party's rights under the agreement, the express
right of the non-defaulting parties to bring a suit for damages, and the right
of the non-defaulting parties to deem a defaulting party to have elected not to
participate in an operation.13 1
d. Failure to Ensure ProperPerfection
Perhaps no defect in the lien is as significant as the absence of sufficient
information to facilitate perfection of the liens created in the operating
agreement. The lien is effective between the parties without being placed of
record, 13 2 but must be filed in the real property records and as provided in the
UCC to establish priority over third parties as to the real and personal
property described as collateral in the JOA.1 3 3 Unperfected security interests
are avoidable in bankruptcy1 34 and subordinated to the interests of most other
claimants. 135
Each party must be responsible to ensure the perfection of its lien and
security interest against the other parties, which under the UCC requires the
filing of a financing statement.1 36 This has become a much simpler process
since the issuance of the Recording Supplement.1 3 7 Although simple form

&

129. See Conine, supra note 4, at 1381-84.
130. See id
131. See FORM 610-2015, supra note 2, at art. VII.D; FORM 610-1989, supra note 15, at art. VIID.
For a comprehensive discussion of the perfection and priority of the liens and security interests and the
remedies of the parties upon a default under the 1989 Form JOA in particular, see Jeffrey S. Munoz
Nikita S. Taldykin, Best ManagementPractices-SecuringYour Position, 56 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST.
3-1 (2010).
132. See Wilson v. TXO Prod. Corp. (In re Wilson), 69 B.R. 960, 964 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1987).
133. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 13.001(a) (West 1984). But see K.E. Res., Ltd. v. BMO Fin. Inc.
(In re Century Offshore Mgmt. Corp.), 119 F.3d 409, 413 (6th Cir. 1997) (stating mortgage filed first
under Louisiana's race recording statute is contractually subordinate to interests under the operating
agreement in which the mortgage cites that it is "subject to" the operating agreement); Grace-Cajun Oil
Co. No. 3 v. FDIC, 882 F.2d 1008 (5th Cir. 1989) (maintaining that under Louisiana Revised Statute
31.204, a mortgage of production proceeds is encumbered by the obligation to pay well costs pursuant to
an unrecorded JOA).
134. See 11 U.S.C. § 544(a) (2011) (stating that a trustee in bankruptcy may set aside unperfected
security interests).
135.

See U.C.C.

§ 9-334

(AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2018).

136. See id. § 9-310.
137. See Paul G. Yale, The AAPL OperatingAgreement and the DeadbeatNon-Operator,38-2 OIL,
GAS & ENERGY L. SEC. OF THE ST. B. TEX. 7 (2014), http://m.grayreed.com/portalresoufce/lookup/
wosid/cp-base-4-37802/media.name=/AAPLOperatingAgreementandDeadbeatNonOperator.pdf
("The
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financing statements are available for filing in all states, the Recording
Supplement may be filed as a financing statement as it contains all the
elements for a financing statement required by the UCC.'3 " As to personal
property, the signatures of the other parties are no longer required for the
filing of a financing statement to perfect a security interest in personal
property under the UCC.13 9 Signatures and acknowledgments, however, will
be required to perfect the lien in the real property records and enforce the real
property lien against third parties. 14 0
Perhaps the most neglected requirement since the adoption of Revised
Article 9 relates to the locations in which the financing statement must be
filed. 141 To perfect the lien on real property against third parties, state law
will ordinarily require the filing of the JOA or the recording supplement in
the county or parish where the contract area is located.1 42 Similarly, the UCC
requires the filing of a financing statement that covers fixtures and
as-extracted collateral in the county or parish records.1 4 3 However, to perfect
and establish priority as to other types of personal property, including
equipment, severed oil and gas held for sale as inventory, and the proceeds
thereof, the financing statement must be filed in the state filing office, often
the secretary of state, where each other party to the JOA is "located"defined for most entities as the state office where the party is incorporated or
organized.'" If there are multiple parties to a JOA and a party desires to
recording supplement was designed to comply not only with the real property laws of the states ... but
also with security interest provisions of the [UCCI").
138. See U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(39), (70) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2018) (defining
"financing statement" and "reward," respectively); see also FORM 610-1989, supra note 15, at art.
VII.B.15-20. Under Revised Article 9, to perfect a security interest for most collateral types, a financing
statement need only provide the name of the debtor, the name of the secured party, and a description of
the collateral. See id. at § 9-502(a). An important exception applies to as-extracted collateral and any
oilfield equipment that may be considered fixtures, for which the financing statement must also state that
it covers as-extracted collateral and fixtures, indicate that it is to be filed in the real property records
(usually by recital), provide a description of the real property, and provide the name of the record owner
if the debtor is not the record owner. U.C.C. § 9-502(a), (b). This last requirement might easily nullify a
financing statement as to the property on a lease if the working interest owner that contributed the lease
has not put the lease on record and the record owner is not indicated in the financing statement. See
generally id.
139. See U.C.C. § 9-502(b) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2018).
140. See Amarex, Inc. v. El Paso Nat. Gas Co., 772 P.2d 905, 908 (Okla. 1987).
141. See U.C.C. § 9-501 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2018).
142. See FORM 610-1989, supra note 15, at art. VII.B.15-20.
143. See U.C.C. § 9-501 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2018). Perfection and priority of a
security interest in as-extracted collateral is governed by the law where the wellhead is located. See id.
§ 9-301.
144. The UCC reaches this result in a somewhat meandering route. See id § 9-307(c). Under UCC
§ 9-307(e), a debtor that is a registered organization (defined in UCC § 9-102 to include corporations,
limited partnerships, limited liability companies, etc.) is located in its state of organization. See id While
a debtor is "located" in the jurisdiction, the local law of that jurisdiction governs perfection and priority.
See id. § 9-301(1). This choice-of-law rule is true in all cases, except when the collateral is located in
another jurisdiction. See id. § 9-301(1)--(2). When the local law of a state governs perfection of a security
interest, then the financing statement must be filed in the state filing office. See id. § 9-501(a)(2). Of note,
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perfect its security interest against each other party, it must therefore file a
separate financing statement in each state where each party is organized or
incorporated. 14 5 In making such filings, a party must be particularly careful
to use the name of the other parties indicated on their articles or certificate of
incorporation (for a corporation), or in the articles or certificate of formation
of organization (for an LLC), among other things. 14 6
After perfection and priority are obtained, the parties must vigilantly
monitor perfection to account for the propensity of JOA parties to transfer all
or a portion of their interests, often multiple times, during the life of the JOA,
or to merge or combine with other parties. 147 Although generally a financing
statement filed against a transferor of assets is effective to perfect assets
secured by the JOA against the transferee that becomes bound by the JOA,
this statement is subject to some qualifications. 14 8 First, if a transfer or
merger causes the name of the debtor on the financing statement to be
seriously misleading, then a filed financing statement is only effective as to
assets acquired by the transferee before or within four months after the
transfer or merger.1 4 9 In other words, the financing statement remains
effective as to the transferred assets, but not as to assets acquired more than
four months after the transfer or merger unless a new financing statement is
filed during that four-month period.'s Second, if the transferee is
incorporated or organized in a different jurisdiction than the transferor, the
financing statement will expire one year after the transfer of the collateral
unless a new financing statement is filed against the transferee.'
Further, much like the parties must monitor the primary term of their oil
and gas leases, the parties must also monitor financing statement filing dates
for expiration.1 52 Generally, a financing statement becomes ineffective
within five years after the filing of the financing statement unless a
continuation statement is filed within six months before the expiration of the
Louisiana has not adopted this state filing system. See LA. STAT. ANN. § 10:9-501 (2011). If Louisiana
law governs, a financing statement may be filed with the clerk of court of any parish without regard to the
location of the debtor or the collateral. See id Louisiana has made a number of other significant
non-uniform changes to Article 9; for a discussion, see generally, James A. Stuckey, Louisiana's NonUniform Variations in the U.C.C. Chapter9, 62 LA. L. REv. 793 (2002).
145.

See U.C.C.

§ 9-501

(AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2018).

146. See id §9-503. Failure to use the exactly correct name may render the financing statement
fatally defective. See id §§ 9-506, 9-508, 9-516. In 2010, the UCC was amended to provide that a
registered organization's name for Article 9 purposes is the "name on the public organic record most
recently filed with or issued or enacted by the registered organization's jurisdiction of organization which
purports to state, amend, or restate the registered organization's name." Id. § 9-503(a)(1).
147. See id. § 9-508.
148. See id. § 9-508(a).
149. See id § 9-508(b)(1); see also JULIAN B. MCDONNELL & JAMES P. NEHF, 1-1A SECURED
TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UCC § A.05 (2014).
150. See U.C.C. § 9-508(b) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2018).

151. See id. §9-316(a)(1).
152. See generally id § 9-515 (providing information regarding the duration and effectiveness of a
financing statement).
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five-year period. 1 53 There is an exception for financing statements that
constitute a "record of mortgage" filed in the county or parish records,
whereby the financing statement remains effective until the record is
released.1 54
Although the recording supplement appears to satisfy the requirements
for a "record of mortgage" filed as a financing statement so long as the
recording supplement is duly recorded,15 5 recall that the recording
supplement is only effective as a financing statement under the UCC to cover
fixtures and as-extracted collateral.' 6 Also, the official UCC appears to
contain a strange glitch, in that the continued effectiveness of a record of
mortgage only remains effective as a fixture filing, but not with respect to
as-extracted collateral.' 5 7 Texas has corrected this glitch,' 5 8 but other
producing states have not. 159 In states that carried forward this glitch when
adopting Revised Article 9, financing statements filed of record in the county
or parish must be continued every five years to protect as-extracted collateral
similar to financing statements filed in the state office.1 60
Finally, consider that the operator may'also utilize state mechanics' and
materialmen's liens, or similar statutory liens, against the interests of the
non-operators under the express terms of the 1989 and 2015 Form JOAs,161
even though the operator is also the owner of a working interest.1 62 These
153. See id. § 9-515(a), (d), (e).
154. See id § 9-515(g).
155. See id. §§ 9-502(c), 9-102 (defining "mortgage" as an interest in real property).
156. See id §§ 9-102(aX39), (70), 9-502(b).
157. See id. § 9-515(g).
158. See TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.515(g) (West 2017).
159. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 4-9-515(g) (West 2017); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 84-9-515(g) (West
2018); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 55-9-515(g) (West 2017); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 41-09-86 (West 2017);
WYO. STAT. § 34.1-9-515(g) (West 2017).
160. See Telephone interview with Lynn P. Hendrix, Partner, Bryan Cave (Sept. 6, 2016). Mr.
Hendrix stated that he has advocated to the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws to correct this problem. See id
161. See FORM 610-2015, supranote 2, at art. VII.B, ¶7; FORM 610-1989, supranote 15, at art. VII.B,
¶ 7. In the absence of a contractual lien, each party may have a partner's lien on a defaulting party's
interest for advances made on its behalf, assuming the operating agreement is construed to create a mining
partnership. Terry Noble Fiske, MiningPartnerships,26 INST. ON OIL & GAS L. & TAX'N 187,221 (1975).
If the interests within the contract area are subject to concurrent ownership among all parties, the operator
would have a similar right in most states as a co-tenant to offset production against expenses incurred in
developing the minerals. It has been suggested that parties to the operating agreement might also be
protected by an equity lien in the absence of an express security interest, provided the facts infer an intent
to pledge the property for such a debt. See Heaney, supra note 106, at 17-1.
162. See, e.g., Amarex, Inc. v. El Paso Nat. Gas Co., 772 P.2d 905, 909-10 (Okla. 1987) (citing Uncle
Sam Oil Co. v. Richards, 158 P. 1187 (Okla. 1916)) (dismissing the notion from Uncle Sam Oil Co. v.
Richards that an operator who is also a co-owner is not entitled to enforce an oil and gas lien). In Kansas,
it appears that a statutory lien claimed by an operator is valid if it is limited to the interest of his cotenant,
but is not valid if it is claimed on the entire lease. See Klima Well Serv., Inc. v. Hurley, 133 F. Supp. 3d
1297, 1301 (D. Kan. 2015) (quoting David Pierce, Kansas Oil and Gas Lien Law, 56-J. KAN. B. ASS'N 8,
8-9 (Aug. 1987)) (concluding that while the statute sets the breadth of the statutory lien to reach the whole
leasehold, the unjust enrichment policy underlying the statute allows a lien to be asserted against a
nonoperator's fractional interest in the lease).
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liens often arise under statutes specifically aimed at labor or material
furnished for oil and gas operations.1 6 3 The statutory lien will attach only to
the specific property mentioned in the lien statute, which generally will
include oil and gas leases and interests, and material or machinery,164 but may
or may not include the proceeds of production. 16 5
If an operator asserts a statutory lien, it must strictly comply with the
procedures to perfect the lien under the lien statute. 16 6 For example, under
Texas law, to secure a lien the claimant must file an affidavit with the county
clerk of the county where the property is located.167 In In re Wave Energy,
Inc., an engineer who performed work filed a lien claim on a document that
contained an oath and was acknowledged by a notary. 16 8 The court held that
the document failed to constitute an affidavit because an affidavit requires a
jurat (a statement by the notary or other authorized person showing that the
oath was sworn in her presence), and an acknowledgment is not a jurat. 16 9
3. Implied Reciprocal Transfers
One further structural feature that should be noted is the possibility of
the creation of co-tenancies among the JOA parties with respect to the leases
contributed to the contract area, whern none existed before execution of the
agreement.1 70 There are no words of grant contained in the JOA that produce
the transfers needed to accomplish this redistribution of title.171 Instead, such
transfers are implied under legal theories applied by some courts. When the
phenomenon has occurred, the transfer has been based on the analogy
between the sharing arrangements established by the JOA and those in
pooling and unitization agreements. 17 2

163.

See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-24-101; N.M. STAT. § 70-4-1; TEX. PROP. CODE ANN.
(West 1984).
See TEX. PROP. CODE § 56.003(2); see also COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-24-101; N.M. STAT.

§ 56.003(2)
164.

§ 70-4-1.
165. Compare N.M. STAT. § 70-4-1 (stating that the lien includes "the proceeds from the sale of oil
and gas produced therefrom inuring to the working interest"), with Chambers v. Nation, 497 P.2d 5, 8
(Colo. 1972) (stating that the lien statute does not cover proceeds of production), and Wilkins v. Fecht,
356 S.W.2d 855 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1962, writ ref'd) (stating that lien does not cover proceeds
of production). But see Abella v. Knight Oil Tools, 945 S.W.2d 847 (Tex. App.-Houston 1997, no writ)
(holding that statutory lienholders entitled to the appointment of a receiver to protect the value of oil and
gas leases covered by liens until foreclosure action where defendants claim they have the right to receive
proceeds of production).
166. See, e.g., TEX. PROP. CODE § 56.021(a).
167. See id
168. Wave Energy, Inc. v. Ogle (In re Wave Energy, Inc.), 467 F. App'x 248, 249 (5th Cir. 2012).
169. See id. at 251-52.
170. See Masgas v. Anderson, 310 S.W.3d 567,'570 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2010, pet. denied).
171. See id. (stating JOA and division order could not be read together to constitute a deed because
neither contained words of grant indicating intent to convey disputed working interests).
172. See Conine, supra note 4, at 1278-86.
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"In most instances, the pooling and unitization of tracts has been
characterized as a contractual arrangement among the owners of separate
properties for the sharing of expenses and production .... The rationale for
the contract theory focuses on the absence of granting language in pooling
agreements." 1 73 "In contrast, the courts of Texas, California, Illinois, and
Mississippi [have taken] the position that pooling [and] unitization
[agreements] result[] in a cross-conveyance of interests among the
parties .... As a result, title to each tract in the unit is" deemed to be literally
assigned to each party in an amount equal to its participation.174 "This
cross-conveyance theory is based on the provisions of the pooling
instrument" ascribing an interest in production to each party regardless of the
location of the well within the unit. 75 In Texas, as in other states, the issue
of whether a pooling agreement is a cross-conveyance arises most often in
situations in which a party claims that all parties to the agreement are
indispensable parties to a lawsuit,7 7 but it also has implications for rights of
partition, the Statute of Frauds, the Rule against Perpetuities, and other rights
and restrictions arising under property law. 177
One might argue that the sharing of production under a JOA according
to the parties' respective ownership creates a cotenancy.1 78 One Texas court
extended the concept of implied cross-conveyancing to the JOA, but the
precedential value of the case is severely limited by its factual setting, which
did not directly raise an issue of title but involved distribution of production
from a gas unit created inside a contract area. 1 Further, the requirement that
each party take in kind or separately dispose of its share of production
"militates against a common ownership theory." 80
Despite the right of each owner to separately take and market its share
of production, the Oklahoma Supreme Court in Harrellv. Samson Resources
Co. concluded that, although the parties did not own undivided interests in
the same property, the ownership clause created a co-tenant-like relationship
as to gas sold.' 8 ' Under this rationale, the attempted sale by the overproduced
cotenant was a "derogation" of the rights of the underproduced cotenant that
constituted an outster, and thus it required an accounting to the

§

173.
174.
175.
176.

Id. at 1279-80.
Id. at 1280.
See id.
See generally, e.g., Veal v. Thomason, 159 S.W.2d 472 (Tex. 1942).

177.

See 2 BRUCE M. KRAMER & PATRICK H. MARTIN, THE LAW OF POOLING AND UNITIZATION

19.01 (3d. ed. 2015).
178. In a recent North Dakota case, the plaintiff argued that it was entitled to well information from
the operator in part because the parties to the JOA were cotenants. See Come Big or Stay Home, LLC v.
EOG Res., Inc., 816 N.W.2d 80 (N.D. 2012). The court rejected this argument, noting that North Dakota
law also rejects the idea that pooling creates a cotenancy. See id at 87.
179. See Gillring v. Hughes, 618 S.W.2d 874 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1981, no writ).
180. Doheny v. Wexpro Co., 974 F.2d 130, 134 (10th Cir. 1992) (applying Wyoming law).
181. Harrell v. Samson Res. Co., 980 P.2d 99, 103 (Okla. 1998) (citing David Pierce, The Law of
DisproportionateGas Sales, 26 TULSA L. J. 1 (1990)).
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underproduced cotenant in equity where there was no balancing
agreement. 18 2 Because of this co-tenancy relationship, the court held that the
underproduced cotenant was entitled to predepletion cash balancing in the
absence of a provision that limited available remedies to balancing in kind
and because "balancing in kind was not feasible." 183 In a more recent case
applying Harrell, the court stated that a sale by an overproduced party is not
automatically a "derogation" of rights that results in an ouster, but rather
requires a balancing of the equities and depends upon whether the seller
denies any future liability for the overproduction."
Most operating agreements used today, including the 2015 Form JOA,
contain an express disclaimer of any cross-conveyance of interests,18 ' and
court decisions involving pooling agreements containing such disavowals
have consistently respected the express intent of the parties by rejecting any
implication of cross-conveyance. 186 Indeed, the court in Harrellpointed out
that the 1956 Form JOA at issue did not contain the cross-conveyance
disclaimer that the AAPL added to the 1977 Form JOA and 1982 Form
JOA.187
III. RESTRICTIONS ON TRANSFERS AND RELINQUISHMENTS

Although each party to the JOA contributes one or more leasehold or
mineral interests to the contract area, it also retains its individual title to that
property."' This puts each party in a position in which it can disrupt the
structure of the JOA and endanger the relationships created by the transaction
simply by exercising those property rights.189 Several provisions have been
inserted into the standard JOA forms to limit or restrict the exercise of these
rights.
182. See id. at 102.
183. See id. at 104.
184. Unit Petroleum v. Mobil Expl. & Prod. N. Am., Inc., 78 P.3d 1238, 1242 (Okla. Civ. App. 2003);
see also Sanderson v. Yale Oil Ass'n, 246 P.3d 1109, 1112 (Okla. Civ. App. 2010) (stating that the sale
by an underproduced party is not a derogation of rights that constitutes an ouster; the statute of limitations
did not start to run).
185. For example, Article III.B of the 2015 Form JOA, 1989 Form JOA, and 1982 Form JOA declares
that it shall not "be deemed an assignment or cross-assignment of interests covered hereby." FoRM
610-2015, supra note 2, at art. III.B; FORM 610-1989, supra note 15, at art. III.B; FoRM 610-1982, supra
note 15, at art. III.B.
186. See, e.g., Stumpf v. Fid. Gas Co., 294 F.2d 886, 894-95 (9th Cir. 1961); Phillips Petroleum Co.
v. Peterson, 218 F.2d 926, 930 (10th Cir. 1954); Garvin v. Pettigrew, 350 P.2d 970, 971 (Okla. 1958).
This is distinctly different from the practice before the 1950s by which parties to the operating agreement
exchanged leasehold assignments within the contract area. See, eg, U.S. Truck Lines v. Texaco, Inc., 337
S.W.2d 497 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1960, writ denied).
187. Harrell, 980 P.2d at 102-03. It thus appears unresolved whether the disclaimer of
cross-conveyance language in the more recent form JOAs would defeat the co-tenancy in production in
Oklahoma. Of the subsequent cases citing Harrell, both Unit Petroleum and Sanderson appeared to
involve a 1956 Form JOA. Sanderson, 246 P.3d at 1110; Unit Petroleum, 78 P.3d at 1239.
188. See FORM 610-2015, supranote 2, at art. IV.
189. See generally id
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A. Waiver ofPartition
In many instances, the contract area covered by the JOA is subject to
joint ownership among the contracting parties. This may result from the fact
that the JOA was executed among cotenants to facilitate the joint
development of a single tract. 190 Alternatively, the cotenancy may have been
formed as a result of an express or implied cross-conveyance of interests
when several tracts originally owned by different parties were committed to
the JOA or a related pooling agreement. 191 In either event, each cotenant may
have the right to seek a division of the joint property through judicial
partition.1 92 This gives each owner the potential to force a dissolution of the
contract area and an early termination of the JOA.1 93
Although the right ofjudicial partition is regarded by both common law
and statutory law as an absolute right of any cotenant,1 94 it can be waived by
express or implied agreement of the joint owners. 19 5 To prevent the early
termination of the JOA by judicial partition, beginning with the 1977 Form
JOA, the AAPL form operating agreements include an express provision by
which each contracting party waives the right of partition within the contract
area during the term of the JOA.1 9 6 Provided the agreed waiver is limited to
a reasonable period of time and reasonably related to the purpose of the
restriction, it is not regarded as an unreasonable restraint on alienation and in
the absence of fraud or misrepresentation is fully enforceable.1 97
Nevertheless, there are instances in which the waiver of partition has
been omitted from the JOA form or intentionally deleted by the parties.1 9 8
When this is the case, a question will sometimes arise as to whether a waiver
of partition is implied from the general terms of the JOA.1 99 Not surprisingly,
courts of the various producing states are divided over the issue.20 0 Two
distinct approaches have emerged.2 01 One gives deference to the cotenant's
right of partition and refuses to imply waiver under the JOA regardless of its
terms; the other recognizes an implied waiver in which the terms of the JOA

190. See generally id.
191. See generally supra Section II.D.3 (discussing implied reciprocal transfers).
192. See, e.g., Daven Corp. v. Tarh E&P Holdings, L.P., 441 S.W.3d 770, 777 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio 2014, pet. denied).
193. See generally id.
194. See id. at 776-77. Texas law favors partition-in-kind and mineral interests are susceptible to
partition if the property can be divided in kind without materially impairing its value. See id
195. See Warner v. Winn, 191 S.W. 2d 747, 751 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1945, writ denied).
196. See, e.g., FORM 610-2015, supra note 2, at art. VIII.E; FORM 610-1989, supra note 15, at art.
VIII.E; FORM 610-1982, supranote 15, at art. VIII.E; FORM 610-1977, supra note 51, at art. VIII.F.
197. See, e.g., Figge v. Ohio L & M Co., Inc., No. 625, 1993 WL 472773 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993).
198. See Conine, supra note 4, at 1311-12.
199. See id.
200. See id. at 1312-13.
201. See id.
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pass a certain threshold in modifying the property rights of the parties.202
For example, the courts of Oklahoma and Kansas have long concluded
that there is no implied bar to partition under written agreements placing
exclusive management of properties in one party that is obligated to operate
and fully develop the leases, 2 03 even when complemented by provisions
granting a preferential right to purchase 204 or non-consent penalties requiring
forfeiture and assignment of each non-participant's working interest. 205
A more accommodative position on the issue has been developing in
Texas. Initially, it appeared that Texas might take the same position that
developed in Oklahoma and Kansas. In Warner v. Winn, a Texas court was
asked to grant a decree of partition affecting a collection of leases subject to
a 1937 operating agreement.206 The operating agreement obligated the
operator, at his own expense, to drill four wells on the leases. 207 Thereafter,
operating and development expenses were to be borne proportionately by the
2081.th a
In the absence of an express restriction on partition, the court
parties.
granted the plaintiffs request for a decree, making it clear that a delegation
of control over operations would be insufficient in itself to indicate that the
parties intended to waive the right of partition.20 9 At the same time, the
Warner court recognized that there could be exceptions to the absolute right
to partition, noting that an agreement precluding partition could be implied
"when a granting of such relief would destroy the estate sought to be
partitioned." 2 10
This exception was first applied to an operating agreement in Sibley v.
Hill.2 1 1 In that case, some of the co-owners of two leases brought suit for
partition and cancellation of the operating agreement that covered the
properties. 2 12 The operating agreement provided that it was to continue in
202. See id.
203. See, e.g., Sweeney v. Bay State Oil & Gas Co., 133 P.2d 538, 539 (Okla. 1943). For a similar
position taken by a Louisiana court, see generally Delta Drilling Co. v. Oil Finance Corp., 196 So.2d 914
(La. 1940).
204. See Komarek v. Perrine, 382 P.2d 748, 750 (Okla. 1963).
205. See Home-Stake Prod. Co. v. Tri-State Pipe Co., 415 P.2d 377 (Kan. 1966).
206. Warner v. Winn, 191 S.W.2d 747, 748-49 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
207. See id. at 748-49.
208. See id. at 749.
209. See id at 751-52.
210. See id at 751. Over time, Texas courts have acknowledged several contractual provisions
affecting title that imply a waiver of partition. See, e.g., Hulsey v. Keel, 700 S.W.2d 255,258 (Tex. App.San Antonio 1985, writ refd n.r.e.) (specifying grants of carried interests in any development of the
property); Long v. Hitzelberger, 602 S.W.2d 321, 323 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1980, no writ) (stating
express drilling covenants that comprise part of the consideration for the transfer of a leasehold interest);
Inner City Props., Inc. v. Gibbs, 560 S.W.2d 503, 504 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.], writ refd
n.r.e. 1977) (maintaining restrictions of use and occupancy granted to parties jointly approved by the
co-owners); Allison v. Smith, 278 S.W.2d 940, 945-46 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1955, writ ref d n.r.e.)
(discussing transfers of executive rights); Elrod v. Foster, 37 S.W.2d 339, 342 (Tex. Civ..App.-Austin
1931, writ ref d) (stating express drilling covenants that must be performed to maintain a lease).
211. See Sibley v. Hill, 331 S.W.2d 227, 229 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1960, no writ).
212. Id. at 227-28.
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effect so long as there was production from the leases, and contained a
preferential right to purchase clause benefiting each party to the JOA.213 The
court construed these elements to indicate "a clear implication that the
absolute right of partition had been contracted away." 2 14 "A contrary result
would enable the plaintiffs to escape their contractual commitments relating
directly to title matters."215
More recently, in Dimock v. Kadane, the Texas Court of Appeals sitting
in Eastland, Texas affirmed a district court holding that an implied waiver of
partition is created in operating agreements containing (1) a term provision
stipulating that the JOA is to remain in full force and effect as long as any of
the leases within the contract area are alive, and (2) a subsequent operations
provision imposing a non-consent penalty. 216 The court explained that to
allow a party "to partition and thereby destroy the joint ownership of the
leases, [the non-consent mechanism in the JOA] would be rendered
meaningless."2 17 The court noted several other provisions in the operating
agreement creating property rights that are also inconsistent with the right of
partition. 2 18 These include the maintenance of uniform interest clause, the
provision on extension and renewal of leases, and the provision on the
surrender of leases.219
The Texas courts seem to be telling us that there is no reason to imply a
waiver of partition where cotenants have entered into an operating agreement
that does no more than appoint a single party to operate existing wells under
circumstances in which there is no remaining contingent drilling obligation
in any party.220 Partition can still be accomplished equitably among all
co-tenants through sale and liquidation because the only value any owner can
expect to receive is through its proportionate share of production. 22 1
On the other hand, where partition will "destroy" 22 2 (that is, where "a
contracting party could frustrate or completely avoid responsibilities and
rights under a contract" 223) rights beyond those established by co-tenancy
213. Id at 228-29.
214. Id at 229.
215. Conine, supra note 4, at 1314 (citing Sibley, 331 S.W.2d at 229).
216. Dimock v. Kadane, 100 S.W.3d 602, 605-06 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2003, pet. denied). Another
Texas decision, MCEN 1996 Partnershipv. Glassell, took a more lenient position on implied waiver of
partition, but in the context of co-tenancies created by cross-conveyances under several pooling
agreements. MCEN 1996 P'ship v. Glassell, 42 S.W.3d 262, 264 (Tex. App-Corpus Christi 2001, pet.
denied). The court of appeals indicated that the various term provisions in each of these pooling
agreements amounted to an express waiver of partition. Id The Dimock court was presented with the
argument that the term stated in the JOA was sufficient in itself to find an implied waiver. Dimock, 100
S.W.3d at 606. The court did not endorse the argument. See id at 606 n.3.
217. Id. at 606.
218. Id at 606-08.
219. See id at 606-07; accord Conine, supra note 4, at 1314-15.
220. See Dimock, 100 S.W.3d at 602; Sibley, 331 S.W.2d at 227.
221. See Dimock, 100 S.W.3d at 602; Sibley, 331 S.W.2d at 227.
222. Dimock, 100 S.W.3d at 606.
223. Id. at 608.
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itself before the end of the term of the operating agreement, the Texas courts
are willing to imply a waiver of the co-tenant's right of partition.22 4 In the
two cases in which this implied waiver has been found, a partition would
have effectively ended the operating agreement and destroyed the
non-consent penalty imposed for refusals to participate in future development
or the preferential right to purchase, which is available if a co-tenant decides
to sell its interest in the contract area.225 The same destruction of valuable
property rights would occur if there was a partition of an operating agreement
containing any of the other three provisions mentioned by the Dimock
court.226 If any of these provisions are contained in the operating agreement,
the contract area cannot be partitioned equitably.227
B. PreferentialRight to Purchase
Over time, the preferential right to purchase (preferential right) clause 2 28
has been the most controversial property provision in the JOA. 22 9 It typically
requires any party proposing a bona fide sale of any of an interest in the
contract area to give written notice to the other parties of the terms of the
prospective sale, 23 0 and grants a right to the other parties, exercisable within
a prescribed period2 3 1 after receipt of the notice, to purchase the interest under
the same terms proposed in the transaction with the third party. 232 It is
224. See id.
225. See id.; Sibley, 331 S.W.2d at 229.
226. See Dimock, 100 S.W.3d at 606-08.
227. See id In each instance the parties are assuming risks for themselves individually and benefits
for others that can be escaped by partitioning the contract area and terminating the operating agreement.
See id.
228. Also known as a right of first refusal or preemptive right. See Conine, supra note 4, at 1316
n.207. Although it has been referred to as a form of option, it is distinguished from an option because the
holder of the preferential right may only exercise the right in connection with a sale by the other parties.
See id at 1316. A true option allows the optionee to exercise the right during a prescribed option period
at a specified price regardless whether the optionor desires to sell at that time. See id at 1317. The
distinction between a right of first refusal and an option is important in the context of the Rule against
Perpetuities and the Rule against Restraints on Alienation. See infra Sections V.B, C (discussing the rules
at length). That said, a preferential right is essentially a dormant option that ripens into an option when
an interest is offered in connection with a sale. See McMillan v. Dooley, 144 S.W.3d 159, 171 (Tex.
App.-Eastland 2004, pet denied).
229. See, e.g., Conine, supranote 4, at 1315.
230. The terms to be communicated in the notice are often kept to a minimum and include only the
name and address of the prospective transferee, the purchase price, and the terms of the offer. See FORM
610-1982, supra note 15, at art. VIII.F. The 1989 Form JOA and the 2015 Form JOA add "a legal
description sufficient to identify the property" to this same article. FORM 610-2015, supra note 2, at art.
VIII.F; FoRM 610-1989, supra note 15, at art. VIII.F.
231. The period to exercise the right is usually short in order to avoid undue delay in closing the
third-party sale if the option is not exercised. See, e.g., FoRM 610-2015, supranote 2, at art. VIII.F; FORM
610-1989, supra note 15, at art. VIII.F; FORM 610-1982, supra note 15, at art. VIII.F (providing a ten-day
period).
232. See FORM 610-2015 supra note 2, at art. VIIIF; FORM 610-1989, supra note 15, at art. VIII.F;
FORM 610-1982, supra note 15, at art. VIII.F; FORM 610-1956, supra note 2, at § 18.
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common to provide that the parties exercising their rights will share
proportionately in the acquisition based on the relative size of their interests
in the contract area.233
The holder of a preferential right has no power to force a sale.234 The
decision on when, and under what terms, an interest is to be sold rests
exclusively in the hands of the owner of that interest. 23 5 As a result, despite
the impediment the provision can create to the transfer of property, properly
drafted preferential rights have been declared valid and enforceable.236 As is
true for options, however, the preferential right is strictly construed against
the holder of the right.237
In the JOA, the preferential right serves two purposes. First, it assures
its holder an opportunity to acquire further interests in the contract area. The
holder's evaluation of the area may be greatly enhanced by initial
development and may increase its interest in procuring a larger stake in future
operations under the JOA.2 38 Further, there is some feeling that if any parties
should have an opportunity to acquire an interest in the contract area, it ought
to be those that were at risk during the exploratory efforts that led to the
development of the property. 2 39
The second purpose behind the preemptive right is control over the
admission to the joint operations of undesirable participants who may not
have the necessary financial ability to bear their share of expenditures or who
may frustrate development with engineering and management philosophies
opposed by the current parties to the JOA.240
Unfortunately, the preemptive right is not always interpreted in a
manner that promotes these two functions of the clause.2 41 This limited
effectiveness and the various complications created by the provision, together
with the discouraging effect the clause can have on potential buyers reluctant
to incur the cost of evaluating a property and negotiating its purchase when
it may be subjected to preemption, often leads to the deletion of the provision
from the JOA form.24 2 Retention or deletion of the preferential right is a
233. See Conine, supra note 4, at 1316-17.
234. See id at 1317.
235. See Fasken Land and Minerals, Ltd. v. Occidental Permian Ltd., 225 S.W.3d 577, 590 (Tex.
App.-El Paso 2005, pet. denied); see also Hartnett v. Jones, 629 P.2d 1357, 1363 (Wyo. 1981); 5A
CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1197 (1964); 6 ATKINSON ET. AL., AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY 507 (Casner ed.
1952). The preemptive right is not triggered by preliminary negotiations between offerors and potential
purchasers. Tenneco Inc. v. Enter. Prods. Co., 925 S.W.2d 640, 645 (Tex. 1996) (discussing natural gas
fractionation plant).
236. See Conine, supra note 4, at 1317.
237. See Exeter Expl. Co. v. Fitzpatrick, 661 P.2d 1255, 1269 (Mont. 1983).
238. See Questa Energy Corp. v. Vantage Point Energy Inc., 887 S.W.2d 217, 222 (Tex. App.Amarillo 1994, writ denied).
239. See id; Brown v. Samson Res. Co., Nos. 99-6344, 99-6345, 2000 WL 1234851, at *2 (10th Cir.
Aug. 31, 2000).
240. See Questa Energy Corp., 887 S.W.2d at 222.
241. See id
242.

See Arthur J. Wright, Joint OperatingAgreements-Common Amendments and Mistakes, 50
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matter which deserves careful consideration before the outset of joint
operations, but must be made without a clear picture of the future transactions
that may be affected by the decision.243
1. Restrictions on Applicability
Under most clauses, preferential rights are contingent on a proposed
"sale" by the current owner- 244 a triggering event that has been the subject
of extensive litigation.24 5 Though not universally accepted, it appears that
most courts construe the term to require an arms-length agreement between
willing parties to the transfer of property based on a cash consideration.2 46
The majority of decisions have concluded that the preferential right does not
apply to "involuntary" sales.247 Thus, transfers by descent or public sales by
administrators,248 condemnations, 249 judicial sales, 2 50 and foreclosure sales 2 5 1
generally do not trigger the option.2 52 The courts also tend to refuse to
activate the clause when the transfer is a gift or is based on a donative intent

ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 7-1,

§ 7.06

(2004).

243. See Questa Energy Corp., 887 S.W.2d at 218-19, 222.
244. See Navasota Res., L.P. v. First Source Tex., Inc., 249 S.W.3d 526, 530 (Tex. App.-Waco
2006, pet. denied). Even where the provision is contingent on an "assignment," there has been a tendency
to equate that event with a sale. See Exeter Expl. Co. v. Fitzpatrick, 661 P.2d 1256, 1258-59 (Mont. 1983)
(reasoning that the term "assignment" was ambiguous in this context and that the later provisions of the
clause granted "an option to purchase," intimating that the preemptive right would only apply in the event
of proposed sale to a third party (emphasis in original)).
245. See, e.g., Isaacson v. First Sec. Bank, 511 P.2d 269 (Idaho 1973); McLeod v. Sandy Island Corp.,
216 S.E.2d 746 (S.C. 1975); Navasota Res., L.P., 249 S.W.3d at 526.
246. See, e.g., Rainbow Oil Co. v. Christmann, 656 P.2d 538, 543-44 (Wyo. 1982) (addressing
preemptive right in farmout agreement).
247. See P.G. Guthrie, Annotation, Rights ofHolderofFirst Refusal Option on Real Propertyin Event
ofSale at Foreclosureor Other Involuntary Sale, 17 A.L.R. 3d 962, § 2 (1968).
248. See, e.g., McIntosh v. Alger (In re Rigby's Estate), 167 P.2d 964, 969 (Wyo. 1946). But see
Hartnett v. Jones, 629 P.2d 1357 (Wyo. 1981) (dicta) (concluding that a preemptive right to purchase was
void because it violated the rules against perpetuities).
249. See J.P. Ludington, Annotation, Right to Damages or Compensation upon Condemnation of
Property, of Holder of UnexercisedOption to Purchase, 85 A.L.R. 2d 588, § 2 (1962).
250. See, e.g., Richfield Oil Corp. v. Security-First Nat'l Bank, 323 P.2d 834, 837-38 (Cal. Dist. Ct.
App. 1958) (holding that where a tenant has a first refusal clause, the tenant is entitled to specific
performance when, within twenty days of a higher bid by a third party, the tenant confirms it will match
the bid); Blankman v. Great W. Food Distribs., Inc., 293 N.Y.S.2d 368, 370-71 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1968). But
see Cities Serv. Oil Co. v. Estes, 155 S.E.2d 59, 61-64 (Va. 1967) (holding that a tenant should have right
of first refusal when giving bona fide offer within thirty days of a public judicial sale after death of
landlord).
251. See, e.g., Draper v. Gochman, 400 S.W.2d 545, 547 (Tex. 1966) (holding that an owner had "a
desire to borrow money, rather than a desire to sell the property"). But see Price v. Town of Ruston, 132
So. 653, 654-56 (La. 1931) (upholding a preferential right in foreclosure sale on the theory of transferred
intent to sell in execution of mortgage).
252. See, e.g., Blankman, 293 N.Y.S.2d at 368; In re Rigby's Estate, 167 P.2d at 964; Ludington,
supra note 249, at § 2. In most instances, however, the preferential right will survive the transaction and
continue to burden the property interest as to future sales by the new owners. See Draper,400 S.W.2d at
547.
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due to the absence of an arms-length sale. 253 A transfer on the basis of
non-cash consideration, such as performance of a drilling obligation or an
exchange of properties in some cases, has been held not to constitute a
"sale." 2 5 4 Additionally, for unexplained reasons, the preemptive right has
been held inapplicable to a sale by one co-tenant to another.255
Also limiting the application of the preferential right are express
restrictions included in the JOA itself. 256 It is common for the provision in
the JOA to explicitly preclude its application to transfers through mortgages,
dispositions by merger, reorganization or consolidation, or the sale of all, or
substantially all, of the assets to a related company. 257 The provision only
applies to sales of assets, so the sale of a participating company's stock from
one entity to another is not subject to the right even though a change of
control of the participant might result from the transaction.258 A Texas court
of appeals in Houston has held that a right of first refusal may by triggered
where a party transfers its interest to a wholly-owned subsidiary and then
sells all of the subsidiary's stock to a third party-a so-called "Texas
two-step"259-stating that the character of the transaction depends on the
intent and purpose of the parties. 26 0 But the Texas Supreme Court expressly
disapproved of this reasoning, stating that to view multiple transactions as a
single transaction undermines the law's mandate that restrictions on transfer

253. See, e.g., Isaacson v. First Sec. Bank, 511 P.2d 269 (Idaho 1973); Exeter Expl. Co. v. Fitzpatrick,
661 P.2d 1256, 1258-59 (Mont. 1983); Perritt Co. v. Mitchell, 663 S.W.2d 696 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth
1983, writ refd n.r.e.).
254. See Panuco Oil Leases, Inc. v. Conroe Drilling Co., 202 F. Supp. 108, 114-15 (S.D. Tex. 1961)
(assigning interest pursuant a to farmout agreement). But see Anderson v. Armour & Co., 473 P.2d 84, 89
(Kan. 1970) (holding that when property is allegedly traded, a lease provision that requires notice of sale
to the lessee is effective, allowing the lessee to negotiate purchase and sale).
255. See Tex. Co. v. Graf, 221 S.W.2d 865, 866 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1949, writ ref'd); see
also Pellandini v. Valadao, 7 Cal. Rptr. 3d 413, 418 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that the right of first
refusal was not triggered by co-tenant's conveyance to another co-tenant). The concept may form the
basis of a holding that the preemptive right in the JOA does not apply among joint venturers. See generally
John S. Sellingsloh, PreferentialPurchaseRights, 11 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 2-1 (1966).
256. See Coral Prod. Corp. v. Cent. Res., Inc., 730 N.W.2d 357, 383, 397-98 (Neb. 2007); El Paso
Prod. Co. v. Geomet, Inc., 228 S.W.3d 178, 179 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2007, pet denied).
257. See Questa Energy Corp. v. Vantage Point Energy, Inc., 887 S.W.2d 217, 222 (Tex. App.Amarillo 1994, writ denied). Thus, in Questa Energy Corp. v. Vantage Point Energy, Inc., a sale of oil
and gas interests by Sceptre Resources Limited and three of its wholly-owned subsidiaries to Vantage
Point in exchange for cash, a promissory note, and 81% of the stock of Vantage Point did not trigger the
preferential right, but constituted a transfer of the property interests from three existing Sceptre
subsidiaries to a new Sceptre subsidiary created by the transaction. See generally id. Related companies
are usually listed as subsidiaries, parents, subsidiaries of parents, and companies in which the company
owns a majority of the stock. See id.; e.g., Kroehnke v. Zimmerman, 467 P.2d 265, 266-67 (Colo. 1970)
(discussing a conveyance of real property to a family corporation).
258. See Tenneco Inc. v. Enter. Prods. Co., 925 S.W.2d 640, 644-46 (Tex. 1996) (affecting ownership
of natural gas fractionation plant); Rainbow Oil Co. v. Christmann, 656 P.2d 538, 543--44 (Wyo. 1982)
(discussing farmout agreement).
259. See Wright, supra note 242, at § 7.06.
260. Galveston Terminals, Inc. v. Tenneco Oil Co., 904 S.W.2d 787, 791-92 (Tex. App.-Houston
[tst Dist.] 1995, writ dism'd).
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be narrowly construed.2 61 Note, however, that although the provision is
narrowly construed and highly restricted, its applicability to assets includes
not only rights and interests contributed to the JOA, but also "rights and
interests in the [contract area]," which has caused courts to conclude that it
applies to overriding royalty interests held by a participant.2 6 2

Parties may also modify the preferential-rights provision to restrict its
applicability even further.26 3 In Coral Production Corp. v. Central
Resources, Inc., the parties modified the provision to also exclude from its
coverage a sale of "substantially all of the assets and/or stock of the selling
party [that] is sold to a non-affiliated third party." 26 After a defendant sold
substantially all of its assets to multiple non-affiliated third parties, the
plaintiff argued that the exception was not applicable because by its plain
language it only applied to a purchase by a single non-affiliated party. 265 The
court held that, because of the rule of construction in the JOA instructing that
words used in the singular include the plural, the parties intended to exclude
a sale when the selling party was exiting the oil and gas business, even when
there were multiple purchasers.266
The extensive list of exclusions, both express and by implication,
severely narrows the range of transactions that trigger the preemptive right. 26 7
Though there are uncertainties from state to state, unless the transaction is a
voluntary cash sale of assets to a party that is not controlled by the seller,
there exists a question over whether the notice initiating the purchase option
must be given. Although this in some instances undermines a purpose of the
provision to stymie participation by undesirable parties, the limitations may
be necessary to avoid the characterization of the provision as an undue
restraint on alienation.
2. Obligationsand Procedures
When the preferential right has been triggered by a pending sale, the
obligations of the parties are relatively clear, but the parties must strictly
comply. 2 68 The selling party is required to give the prescribed notice of the
proposed sale and allow the holder of the preemptive right an opportunity to
261. Tenneco Inc., 925 S.W.2d at 646 (citing Conine, supra note 4, at 1302 n.231, 1320).
262. See Coral Prod. Corp. v. Cent. Res., Inc., 730 N.W.2d 357, 372-75 (Neb. 2007) (holding royalty
interest sold in an arms-length sale is covered by the preferential right but remanding as to whether transfer
was an arms-length sale); El Paso Prod. Co. v. Geomet, Inc., 228 S.W.3d 178, 179, 182 (Tex. App.Dallas, 2007, pet. denied).
263. See CoralProd. Corp., 730 N.W.2d at 370-73.
264. Id. at 364 (emphasis removed).
265. See id. at 368-69.
266. See id. at 371-72.
267. See Keith T. Smith & Shawn H.T. Denstedt, Preemptive Rights and the Sale of Resource
Properties:PracticalProblems and Solutions, 30 ALTA. L. REV. 57 (1992) (discussing the nature of, and
exceptions to, preemptive rights).
268. See id. at 76.
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exercise its option. 2 69 The holder of the right must be extended the option to
acquire the property on the same terms available to the third party, not at an
increased price270 or on terms to be negotiated.2 7' Once the holder receives
notice of the proposed sale, the preferential right matures into an enforceable
option and is treated as an outstanding offer of sale for the duration of the
option period.272 This is true regardless of the fact that the seller failed to
send notice and the optionee nevertheless obtained actual 273 or inquiry 274
notice by some other means.2 75
To exercise the right of first refusal, the holder of the preferential right
must respond with an unequivocal acceptance based on the same terms
established in the transaction between the seller and the third party. 27 6 As to
269. See Hill v. Zuckermen, 355 P.2d 521, 525 (Mont. 1960).
270. See Fordoche, Inc. v. Texaco, Inc., 463 F.3d 388, 392 (5th Cir. 2006). In Fordoche, Inc. v.
Texaco, Inc., the court of appeals, applying Louisiana law, determined that the written notice was deficient
for two reasons. Id. at 389. First, the notice failed to adequately describe the property being offered for
sale. See id. at 393-94. The only descriptive information provided was a list of the JOAs involved and
the wells and well numbers subject to each of the JOAs, together with supplemental designations of the
production units and sands from which the oil and gas were being obtained. See id No clarification was
provided as to whether the properties being sold were "mineral leases," "leasehold interests," "working
interests," or "unitized substances." See id at 396. Because the notice did not clearly describe the
particular property interests for sale, the court held that the notice failed to comply with the requirements
of the preemptive clause of the JOAs. See id. Second, the notice was deficient because it excluded certain
properties that were being offered to the third-party purchaser. See id at 395. These exclusions included
the seller's interest in tangible facilities, surface leases, and rights-of-way used in the operation of each
unit. See id. at 397. These excluded properties were to be sold to the third-party purchaser in any event,
and the right holders were informed that they would have to enter into a production-handling agreement
with that party if they elected to exercise their purchase rights. Id. at 393. This precluded the right holders
from being able to take control of unit operations after the transactions were completed. See id at 394.
To make matters worse, no adjustment was made in the price allocation to reflect the value of these
exclusions, meaning that the right holders would be charged 10% to 15% more than the third-party
purchaser for the properties actually offered in the notice. Id. at 397. The court of appeals concluded that
the seller's offer breached the provisions of the preferential right by failing to include all attributes of the
seller's working interest (including both tangible and intangible properties needed for operation of the
units) and by failing to offer the properties to the right holders at the same price offered to the third-party
purchaser. Id at 397-98.
271. See, e.g., Superior Portland Cement, Inc. v. Pac. Coast Cement Co., 205 P.2d 597, 613-14
(Wash. 1949). In a situation in which the subject of the proposed sale is governed by a series of JOAs,
each with its own preemptive right clause but executed by less than all of the current parties to the joint
operations, notices are to be sent and options allowed in the order in which the separate JOAs were signed.
IMCO Oil & Gas Co. v. Mitchell Energy Corp., 911 S.W.2d 916, 919 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1995, no
writ).

272. See McMillan v. Dooley, 144 S.W.3d 159, 172 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2004, no pet).
273. See Exeter Expl. Co. v. Fitzpatrick, 661 P.2d 1256, 1258 (Mont. 1983).
274. See Humphrey v. Wood, 256 S.W.2d 669, 672 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1953, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
275. In many cases, the holder of the preemptive right does not discover the sale to an outsider until
the new owner begins to propose new operations or requests that future production or proceeds of
production be sent to it, rather than the seller. However, constructive notice through the recording of an
instrument of conveyance will not impart the required knowledge in this context. See Exeter Expl. Co,
661 P.2d at 1258.
276. See Pinchin v. Kinney, 623 S.W.2d 783, 785-86 (Tex. App.-Austin 1981, no writ); see also
Tenneco, Inc. v. Enter. Prods. Co., 925 S.W.2d 640, 644 (Tex. 1996).
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the interests covered by the preferential right, the optionee's acceptance must
be "unconditional, identical to the offer, and ... [must] not modify, delete or
introduce any new terms. ...
Any attempt to modify the terms of the
sale in exercising the option will constitute a rejection of the offer,278 as will
an attempt by the optionee to accept only a portion of the interest being
offered that is subject to the preemptive right, such as when a party elects to
acquire the working interest in only one of two wells included in the JOA's
contract area.279
In MRC Permian Co. v. Three Rivers OperatingCo., the defendant was
required to give the plaintiffs notice under a preferential rights provision of a
sale that included five properties in the contract area.28 0 The defendant
delivered an offer to the plaintiffs for the five contract area properties for an
allocated price of $6.3 million and included a box to check for the plaintiffs
to elect to purchase. 2 8 1 The plaintiffs responded by letter that they were
exercising their preferential rights as to the five properties, and further stated
that they made "this election to purchase all of [the defendant's] interest in
the [contract area] created by the subject JOA ...
even if the interest [was]
not specifically listed in Exhibit A" to the letter that was sent to them by the
defendant.282 Along with their letter they returned the defendant's notice with
the box checked.2 83 The defendant then sent a second notice letter purporting
to withdraw the initial offer and stating this new letter was sent as a
substitute.2 84 In this second substitute letter, the defendant offered ten
properties for an allocated price of $14.2 million. 28 5 The plaintiffs responded
by letter that they still intended to purchase the properties offered in the
original notice but that they wanted to meet to resolve the differences in the
properties offered.286 They did not check the box indicating their willingness
to purchase the ten properties. 2 87 The third-party buyer excluded all ten
properties from its purchase, but the plaintiffs refused to purchase all ten
properties, asserting that they had a contract to buy the five properties offered
in the first notice.288

277. Samson Res. Co. v. Amerada Hess Corp., 41 P.3d 1055, 1059 (Okla. Civ. App. 2002).
278. See McMillan v. Dooley, 144 S.W.3d 159, 178-80 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2004, pet. denied);
Hutcherson v. Cronin, 426 S.W.2d 638, 641 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1968, no writ).
279. See Brown v. Samson Res. Co., Nos. 99-6344, 99-6345, 2000 WL 1234851, at *4-5 (10th Cir.
Aug. 31, 2000) (applying Oklahoma law). This is particularly true when the JOA containing the
preemptive right contains a uniform interest provision. Amerada Hess Corp., 41 P.3d at 1059.
280. MRC Permian Co. v. Three Rivers Operating Co., No. 05-14-00353-CV, 2015 WL 4639711,
at *2 (Tex. App.-Dallas Aug. 5, 2015, pet. denied).
281. See id. at *3.
282. Id.
283. See id
284. See id at *4.
285. See id
286. See id. at *5.
287. See id
288. See id
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The court recited the rules that the offeror controls an option and that an
acceptance must conform to the conditions of the offer to create a binding
contract, but that an offer may not be withdrawn once accepted.28 9 Based on
these rules, the court held that the plaintiffs complied with the conditions of
acceptance in the first notice and accepted the defendant's original offer as
to the five properties included in the original notice. 29 The defendant argued
that the plaintiffs' response constituted a rejection and counteroffer of the
original notice because it stated that the plaintiffs elected to purchase
additional properties. 2 9 1 The court, however, turned to the contract rule that
"an acceptance that merely reserves rights or expresses an interest in buying
more items 'is not thereby invalidated unless the acceptance is made to
depend on an assent to the changed or added terms."'292 Because the
plaintiffs did not condition their acceptance, but merely added that they
would purchase all of the defendant's interests in the contract area, their
293
acceptance was not a counteroffer or rejection.
The defendant also argued that the plaintiffs could not accept an offer to
purchase less than all of the properties in the contract area because the
preferential-rights provision applied to all of the properties. 294 The court
essentially dismissed this argument because it was up to the defendant to
identify the relevant properties in its offer notice. 29 5 As to the second notice
from the defendant, the court held that the plaintiffs had never accepted this
offer because they did not strictly comply with the terms of the offer.296
Regardless of the manner in which the right holder acquires notice of
the sale,297 failure to exercise the option within the prescribed period will
constitute a waiver of the preemptive right and is equivalent to a rejection.29 8
Still, the election period may not begin to run until long after the
consummation of a sale if the only notice to the right holder is long delayed
299
actual or inquiry notice.
Il such a case, the election may even accrue to
289.
290.
291.

See id. at *7.
See id at *10-11.
See id. at*11.

292.

Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS

§ 61

(AM. LAW INST. 1981)).

293. See id. at *10.
294. See id
295. See id. at*11.
296. See id. at *6.
297. See Chesapeake Operating, Inc. v. Pintail Prod. Co., Inc., No. CIV-12-55-D, 2013 WL
5596899, at *8-9(W.D. Okla. Oct. 11, 2013) (explaining that, in the context ofatag-along right, a party
has constructive notice of acquisition and is charged with the duty of further inquiry when acquisition is
reported in market publications and the party receives information indicating the interest has been
transferred).
298. See Ellis v. Waldrop, 656 S.W.2d 902, 904 (Tex. 1983); McMillan v. Dooley, 144 S.W.3d 159,
180 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2004, writ denied). But see Mobil Expl. & Producing N. Am., Inc. v. Graham
Royalty Ltd., 910 F.2d 504 (8th Cir. 1990). With a ten-day election period, Mobil became aware of the
March sale in mid-June and waited until October 11 to assert its preferential right to purchase, two days
after post-closing settlement was concluded by seller and buyer. See id.
299. See, e.g., GrahamRoyalty Ltd., 910 F.2d at 508.
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the right holder's successors and be exercised by them. 300 However, during
the period in which notice is delayed, the right holder can lose its rights under
the preferential right on a theory of laches if it waits an unreasonably long
30
time to exercise its righto
or under a theory of quasi-estoppel if it engages
in conduct that is inconsistent with an intention to exercise its right to
purchase, as when it enters into a beneficial agreement with the buyer orjoins
with the buyer in obtaining benefits from the state conservation commission,
which stems from the activities of the buyer on the property in question.30 2
Nevertheless, the preferential right is a continuing right and failure to
exercise the right of first refusal in one transaction does not extinguish the
right as to subsequent sales.303
Remedies for breach of the preferential right vary depending on whether
the sales transaction involves a package sale and depending on the
jurisdiction of the court considering the matter. 30 4 Generally, if only an
interest burdened with the preemptive right is involved in the sale, the holder
of that right can obtain damageS 305 or specific performance. 0 In package
sales, courts finding a breach have enjoined the owner from completing the
transfer to the third party, 307 ordered a reconveyance to the original owner
with an injunction on future sales that do not honor the preemptive rights of
the plaintiff,3 0 8 or decreed specific performance allowing the right holder to

acquire the burdened property alone3 09 or all properties in the package sale
under the terms of the third party's agreement with the seller. 3 10 The latter
remedy has been a subject of controversy, with some courts refusing to order
specific performance in the context of package sales on the theory that, in the
absence of an allocation formula, there is no reasonable method for
determining the terms of sale for the burdened property alone.311
300. See id.
301. See, e.g., Kirk v. Cimarex Energy Co., 604 F. App'x 718, 728 (10th Cir. 2015); Marken v.
Goodall, 478 F.2d 1052, 1054 (10th Cir. 1973).
302. See, e.g., Mulvey v. Mobil Producing Tex. & N.M. Inc., 147 S.W.3d 594, 607-08 (Tex. App.Corpus Christi 2004, pet. denied).
303. See, e.g., Foster v. Bullard, 496 S.W.2d 724, 736 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1973, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
304. See generally Gamble v. Cornell Oil Co., 154 F. Supp. 581 (W.D. Okla. 1957), affd, 260 F.2d
860 (10th Cir. 1958).
305. See id. at 588.
306. See Foster, 496 S.W.2d at 735.
307. See Myers v. Lovetinsky, 189 N.W.2d 571, 576 (Iowa 1971).
308. See id.
309. See Pitman v. Sanditen, 626 S.W.2d 496, 497 (Tex. 1982); Navasota Res., L.P. v. First Source
Tex., Inc., 249 S.W.3d 526, 529 (Tex. App.-Waco, 2008, pet. denied). This can include rescission of a
completed sale in which the third-party purchaser cannot claim to be a bona-fide purchaser because it
received actual notice of the preferential right to purchase before the assignment of the property. See
Larson Operating Co. v. Petroleum, Inc., 84 P.3d 626, 628 (Kan. Ct. App. 2004).
310. See Beets v. Tyler, 290 S.W.2d 76, 82-83 (Mo. 1956); First Nat'l Exch. Bank v. Roanoke Oil
Co., 192 S.E. 764, 770 (Va. 1937) (involving efforts by the initial owners to compel the optionee to accept
all properties in the package).
311. See Myers, 189 N.W.2d at 577; see also AtI. Ref Co. v. Wyo. Nat'l Bank, 51 A.2d 719, 722 (Pa.
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To protect the good-faith purchaser, use of reconveyance or specific
performance is limited to those situations in which the third party has actual
or constructive notice of the JOA and its preemptive provisions.3 12 However,
for situations in which the assignment to the outside party is made expressly
subject to the JOA and the buyer has had an opportunity to examine the
seller's land records containing the JOA, the buyer is bound to the terms of
that instrument and its provisions, making it jointly and severally liable along
with the seller for breach of the preferential right.3 13 At this point, ultimate
responsibility for any damages may hinge on the indemnity provisions of the
sales contract between the buyer and the seller.314
3.

MechanicalProblems and Complications

One of the principal objections to including the preferential right in a
JOA is the chilling effect it can have on the ability to market an interest in
the contract area. This problem can be overcome by obtaining a waiver of
the preemptive right from the other parties to the JOA before a prospective
purchaser undertakes to evaluate the properties and negotiate a sales
contract. 3 1 5 This approach works well if the holders of the preemptive right
316
But
are cooperative and have no desire to acquire the property at any price.
in cases in which the JOA parties want to see the negotiated terms before
making their decisions on exercise of the option, it may be difficult to attract
potential buyers."
The preferential right is also beset with other problems that reduce its
appeal. The most widely cited is the uncertainty generated by a package sale
in which the seller's interest in the contract area is only a part of the properties
being sold. Some courts have held that a package deal involving multiple
properties does not invoke the preferential right,318 although Texas courts
appear to follow the rule that a preferential right is invoked by package
sales.319 Most judicial decisions in the oil and gas context have held that the

1947).
312. Cf Gamble v. Cornell Oil Co., 154 F. Supp. 581, 588 (W.D. Okla. 1957), aff'd, 260 F.2d 860
(10th Cir. 1958).
313. See Mobil Expl. &ProducingN. Am., Inc. v. Graham Royalty Ltd., 910 F.2d 504, 506 (8th Cir.
1990).
314. See id at 508. The court of appeals in Graham Royalty Ltd. held that, because the breach
occurred when notice was required (at least ten days before the sale), the buyer was protected by the
seller's indemnity in their sales agreement, which made the seller responsible for all liabilities arising prior
to closing. See id
315. See John English, Dealing with Third Parties,43 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 7-1 (1995).
316. See id.
317. See id
318. See Guaclides v. Kruse, 170 A.2d 488, 495 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1961); Sawyer v.
Firestone, 513 A.2d 36, 39 (R.I. 1986).
319. See Navasota Res., L.P. v. First Source Tex., Inc., 249 S.W.3d 526, 532-33 (Tex. App.-Waco
2008, pet. denied); McMillan v. Dooley, 144 S.W.3d 159, 171 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2004, pet. denied).
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preemptive right is applicable to a package sale, 3 20 but differ on whether the
right must be exercised against the unit interest alone 3 2 1 or against the entire
property package.322
For situations in which the right of first refusal extends only to the
interest within the JOA's contract area, it will be necessary for the parties to
allocate an appropriate portion of the total sales price to that interest before
the right holder is provided with notice of the sales terms being presented.
Although some modern sales contracts in the oil and gas industry now
provide a mechanism for allocating the sales price among the various
properties in a package,323 the resulting allocation is often the subject of some
dispute between the parties to the JOA.
Fasken Land & Minerals, Ltd. v. Occidental Permian Ltd. provides an
example.324 In 2000, Occidental Permian agreed to purchase all of the assets
of Altura Energy, a limited partnership between AMOCO and Shell Oil
Company, for a total of $3.6 billion.3 2 5 Included in the package was an
interest in the Midland Farms Unit that was subject to a unit operating
agreement containing a typical preferential right.32 6 Although Occidental
disagreed, representatives for Altura concluded that it had to provide notice
to the other working-interest owners in the unit.3 27
In advance of the notice, Altura asked Occidental, as buyer, to allocate
a portion of the purchase price to the Midland Farms Unit (Unit) on the
rationale that the purchaser had a better understanding of how the property
was valued within the package.32 8 Occidental did this by reviewing the
independent reserve report on the properties and making adjustments in the
global assumptions to reflect differences in the Unit. 3 29 In doing so,
Occidental cut the Unit's projected probable reserves in half and retained the
original numbers for proved developed reserves and proved developed
non-producing reserves.3 3 0 The resulting allocation placed the purchase price
for the Midland Farms Unit at $63 million. 33 1 This figure was within the
320. See Harlan Abright, Preferential Right Provisions and Their Applicability to Oil and Gas
Instruments, 32 Sw. L.J. 803, 808 (1978).
321. See generally Maron v. Howard, 66 Cal. Rptr. 70 (Cal. Ct. App. 1968); Humphrey v. Wood, 256
S.W.2d 669 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1953, writ ref d n.r.e.).
322. See First Nat'l Exch. Bank v. Roanoke Oil Co., 192 S.E. 764, 771-72 (Va. 1937).
323. See, e.g., Brown v. Samson Res. Co., Nos. 99-6344, 99-6345, 2000 WL 1234851, at *1-2 (10th
Cir. Aug. 31, 2000) (involving a sales contract allowing for exclusion of properties due to the exercise of
preferential rights and a corresponding reduction of the total purchase price based on a schedule allocating
values to individual leasehold interests).
324. See Fasken Land & Minerals, Ltd. v. Occidental Permian Ltd., 225 S.W.3d 577 (Tex. App.-El
Paso 2005, pet. denied).
325. Id at 581-82.
326. Id. at 590.
327. Id. at 582.
328. Id
329. Id. at 582-83.
330. Id at 583.
331. Id.
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value range of $40 million to $110 million set by Altura's personnel, based
on which risk factors were used.332 However, $63 million was still well
above the minimum value that could have been assigned to the property. 33 3
In the March 22 notice sent to the plaintiffs, Altura set the purchase price
at $63 million, payable in cash at closing, and requested an election within
fifteen days after receipt of the notice.334 The plaintiffs responded with a
letter asserting they had not been provided with "sufficient information" with
which to make a decision.335 They requested that Altura provide the exhibits
to the purchase and sale agreement that were not included with the notice
materials, along with information to verify the basis of the price allocation.336
The plaintiffs asserted that this information was necessary to meet the notice
requirements calling for "full information concerning [the] proposed sale"
and that the plaintiffs would not consider the option period to have
commenced until the information was received.33 7
Subsequent communications and discussions failed to resolve the matter
and the plaintiffs eventually brought a lawsuit concerning compliance with
the preferential right as a related issue dealing with attempts to replace
Occidental as operator of the Unit.3 3 8

'

With regard to the adequacy of the written notice under the preferential
right, the appellate court held that the purpose of the requirement was to
provide prompt notification of a proposed sale and that the notice was only
required to include those pieces of information specifically enumerated in the
clause (that is, name and address of the proposed purchaser; the purchase
price allocated to the property; the legal description of the property; and the
terms of the proposed sale). 339 The court concluded that the notice did not
have to include information on the method used to allocate the purchase
price.3 40 Citing Mecom v. Gallagher,the court noted that the notice provided
by Altura was "sufficient to reasonably disclose the proposed transaction and
to provide . .. an opportunity to exercise" the preferential right, despite
technical deficiencies that might render the notice less than perfect.3 4
There are often a number of questions that arise in the context of a
package sale that can be of concern to a right holder. However, the notice of
the proposed sale that the right holder receives does not have to provide
answers to every conceivable question about the transaction. 3 42 It is adequate
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.
337.
338.
339.
340.
341.
342.

Id.
Id. at 583-84.
Id. at 584.
Id. at 585.
See id.
See id. at 585, 589.
See id at 585.
See id. at 590.
See id
Id. (citing Mecom v. Gallagher, 213 S.W.2d 304, 312 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1947, no writ)).
See generally id
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if it makes a reasonable disclosure of the terms of the deal. Although the
right holder does not have to act until it receives a reasonable disclosure of
the terms of the proposed sale, it has a duty to undertake a reasonable
investigation to clarify any terms that it does not understand.3 43 Given the
requirement that a reply of acceptance must be unequivocal and not alter the
terms of the offer, it may be difficult for the right holder to secure information
without responding in a way that will be construed as a rejection.
In McMillan v. Dooley, the original lessee to an oil and gas lease on his
family property had retained a right of first refusal under a farmout agreement
by which the leasehold was eventually transferred to McDonald. 3 " When
McDonald later agreed to sell the lease and three others in a package deal,
the right holder was notified of the proposed sale and invited to purchase the
entire package of four leases.345 The right holder declined to purchase all
four properties and delayed further discussions on the purchase of his original
lease until after his election period had expired. 346 The court ultimately
decided that the notice was adequate, despite the fact that he was not required
to accept other properties included in the package, and the right holder should
have taken affirmative steps to preserve its option within the election
period.3 47 This could have been accomplished, the court noted, by declaring
its intent to exercise the preferential right subject to objections over the
specific terms in the notice. 348 The timeliness with which the right holder
brings its lawsuit to enforce its rights may also be a factor, particularly if
production values are rising.3 49
C. Maintenance of Uniform Interest
Further restrictions on the transfer of interests within the contract area
are contained in the provisions that require the maintenance of uniform
interests (MOI). Except as otherwise provided in the JOA 3 50 no party to the
JOA may transfer or encumber its interest in leases, wells, equipment, or
production within the contract area unless the disposition covers (1) the
party's entire interest within the contract area or (2) an equal undivided

343. See McMillan v. Dooley, 144 S.W.3d 159, 174, 177 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2004, pet. denied)
(citing Koch Indust., Inc. v. Sun Co., Inc., 918 F.2d 1203, 1212 (5th Cir. 1990)).
344. Id. at 164-65.
345. Id at 166.
346. Id at 167.
347. See id. at 178.
348. See id. at 181.
349. See id. at 180-81.
350. See FORM 610-2015, supra note 2, at art. VI.B.2(d). The language "except as otherwise provided
herein" was added to the JOA in recognition that the contract itself may require a party to transfer its
interest in a well or property in a non-uniform way. See id. (detailing the relinquishment of the interest of
a non-consenting party); see also id at art. VI.F (discussing the relinquishment of interest in connection
with abandonment).
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percent of its present interest in all assets within the contract area.351 This
assures each party will maintain the same ratio of ownership throughout the
contract area.3 5 2 Unlike some of the other property provisions, this restriction
applies to any form of transfer, whether by sale, gift, exchange, encumbrance,
or otherwise, and is not conditioned on the exercise of any option or an
election by other parties to the JOA.353
The MOI provision serves two purposes. The purpose most often cited
is the avoidance of complications that can interfere with the efficient
administration of the joint operations.354 Unless the fractional interests of the
parties remain uniform, as initially established under the operating
agreement, the operator will confront an increasingly complex pattern of
ownership that varies by geographic area. 5 Such variations will inevitably
necessitate different notices, responses, and accounting for each well or
project; complicate gas balancing; and require separate metering of
The result will be an increase in
production from different wells. 5
administrative burdens and costs for the operator that will eventually be
passed through to the non-operators.357
A secondary purpose of the MOI provision is to protect the integrity of
certain mechanisms in the operating agreement, such as the operator's lien.358
If a party were allowed to sell its interest in productive wells in the contract
area, the operator's ability to recover that party's unpaid costs for subsequent
operations on new wells could be severely hampered depending on the
treatment given the original encumbrance by the courts.359 Interestingly, the
most significant decision that has emerged with regard to the MOI provision
focused on this secondary purpose and the effect of a horizontal sub-division
on elections for participation in subsequent operations.360

351. See id at art. VILD; FORM 610-1989, supra note 15, at art. VIII.D; FORM 610-1982, supra note
15, at art. VIII.D; FORM 610-1956, supra note 2, at § 20. Earlier JOA forms required the granting party
to convey "an equal undivided interest." See, e.g., FORM 610-1982, supra note 15, at art. VIII.D; FORM
610-1956, supra note 2, at § 20. This language could either refer to a conveyance of the same fractional
interest in each lease (for example, a "one-quarter working interest" in each lease owned in the contract
area), or to an equal fractional share of the grantor's interest in each lease (for example, "one-half of the
assignee's right, title and interest" in each lease). The 1989 Form JOA and the 2015 Form JOA change
the language to "equal undivided percent of the party's present interest," making clear that the clause
requires the assignee to convey an equal fractional share of its interest in each lease, which is the only way
to assure uniform interests are maintained throughout the contract area. FORM 610-2015, supranote 2, at
art. VIID; FORM 610-1989, supra note 15, at art. VIII.D.
352. See Pitco Prod. Co. v. Chaparral Energy, Inc., 63 P.3d 541, 544 (Okla. 2003).
353. See id
354. See George F. Kutzschbach, OperatingAgreement Considerationsin Acquisitions ofProducing
Properties,36 INST. ON OIL & GAS L. & TAX'N 7-1, 7-27 (1985).
355. See id.

356.

See id.

357.

See id

358.
359.
360.

See Conine, supra note 4, at 1328-29.
See id
See id.
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In ExxonMobil Corp. v. Valence Operating Co., the two litigants were
successors-in-interest to companies that had entered into an operating
agreement in 1983 covering a single lease and containing an MOI
provision. 3 6 1 Three wells had been drilled in the contract area that were
producing from the Cotton Valley Lime formation.362 During drilling
operations, it was determined that the shallower Cotton Valley Sand
formation also contained proven, behind-the-pipe reserves.363
In 1996, ExxonMobil entered into a farmout agreement with Wagner
Brown, Ltd. and C.W. Resources, giving these farmees a right to drill certain
wells in the contract area to a depth sufficient to test the shallower Cotton
Valley Sand formation and earn the conveyance of ExxonMobil's interest in
the lease covered by the contract area from the surface down to the base of
the Cotton Valley Sand.364 The farmees' proposals to drill two new wells in
the contract area were ignored by Valence, which had no knowledge of the
farmout agreement at that time. 3 65 As a result, the farmees deemed Valence
to be a non-consenting party and subject to the non-consent penalty on the
two wells. 36 6 Following inquiries to ExxonMobil, Valence was informed
about the farmout and elected to participate "under protest" in three
subsequent wells proposed by the farmees.367
Valence eventually sued ExxonMobil for breach of contract.36 8 In an
appeal of a verdict in favor of Valence, the court held that, by fanning out
and horizontally sub-dividing its working interest in the lease, ExxonMobil
breached the MOI provision in the JOA.369

361. ExxonMobil Corp. v. Valence Operating Co., 174 S.W.3d 303, 307 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 2005, pet. denied); see also Pitco Prod. Co. v. Chaparral Energy, Inc., 63 P.3d 541, 543 (Okla. 2003)
(explaining how a prior violation of MOI resulted in different ownership in two wells and an election of
separate operator for each).
362. ExxonMobil Corp., 174 S.W.3d at 307.
363. See id
364. See id
365. See id
366. Id.
367. Id
368. See id.
369. Id. at 314. ExxonMobil argued that it did not breach the MOI based on two factors. id. at 31112. First, it noted that a nonstandard introductory clause reciting that the purpose of the MOI was to
maintain uniformity of interest had been stricken from the JOA. Id It argued that this indicated that the
parties never intended JOA to require that the parties maintain uniform ownership within the contract area.
Id. The court declined to accept this argument, electing instead to adopt Valence's explanation that the
introductory clause was deleted because there was initially no uniformity (that is, equality) of interests
because ExxonMobil started with an 81.8% interest in the leases, compared to Valence's 18.2%. Id. at
314. The court reasoned that the remaining language of the MOI would have no rational meaning if
ExxonMobil's explanation was adopted. Id. Second, ExxonMobil argued that the MOI was not applicable
unless its assignment covered not only its interest in the lease but also its ownership in the existing wells,
equipment, and production, none of which were to be transferred under the farmout agreement. Id at 3 11.
The court responded by noting that any assignment of a leasehold working interest carried with it any
interest in wells, equipment, and production pertaining to that portion of the lease. Id. at 314.
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Valence recovered damages for two types of injury, neither of which
had any relation to additional administrative costs associated with the
horizontal sub-division. 37 0 First, it was awarded damages for the production
lost as a result of the imposition of the non-consent penalty for the first two
farmout wells. 3 71 Because the transfer of rights to the farmees violated the
MOI provision, any notice of proposed operations from the farmees was no
more than an invalid notice from a stranger to the JOA.372
Second, Valence recovered the proportion of the costs it paid for drilling
the last three farmout wells in excess of what it would have cost to simply
plug back and complete the existing wells, on the theory that the only reason
the new wells were drilled was to satisfy the terms of the farmout
agreement.3 7 3 Valence successfully argued that, but for ExxonMobil's
improper farmout, the parties to the JOA would have waited until the lower
Cotton Valley Lime formation was depleted and then re-completed the
original wells in the Cotton Valley Sand at much less expense, rather than
drilling three new wells.374
The court noted that, "The purpose of the MOI provision was to ensure
that the parties to the JOA retained the same interests in the lease that they
had when they executed the contract," unless certain conditions were met in
any assignment.375 If ExxonMobil had not breached the MOI, it would have
continued to own the same interest as Valence in capturing as much
production as possible from the entire unit by the most economical means. 376
By farming out a disproportionate portion of its interest, ExxonMobil
"severed its interest" from that of Valence, creating separate investment
regimes and causing Valence to incur additional costs necessitated by the
terms of the farmout agreement.3 77
Despite its broad language, the MOI provision has been held not to
prevent a party from conveying an interest in production, such as an
overriding royalty or a production payment, out of its working interest.3 78 In

McCall v. Chesapeake Energy Corp., the named plaintiff in a class action
370. Id at 315.
371. Id. at 316-17.
372. Id
373. Id. at 315.
374. Id.
375. Id.
376. Id
377. Id at 316. But consider El Paso Production Co. v. Valence Operating Co., in which a
non-operator, under threat of a condemnation action and for a cash consideration, released its surface
rights in a ninety-one-acre unit and assigned its rights to authorize plugging and abandonment of the unit
well to the surface owner, Houston Lighting and Power Company. See El Paso Prod. Co. v. Valence
Operating Co., 112 S.W.3d 616, 620 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, pet denied). The appellate
court held that the non-operator neither repudiated nor waived its rights under the JOA by its actions. Id.
at 622. Although the court noted that the JOA contained a MOI provision, the clause did not play a role
in the court's rationale. Id.
378. See McCall v. Chesapeake Energy Corp., 817 F. Supp. 2d 307, 319 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), aff'd, 509
F. App'x 62 (2d Cir. 2013).
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alleged that the defendants violated the MOI provision in a JOA by entering
into ten volumetric production payment transactions with certain bank
defendants. 379 The court held that the MOI provision applies only to mineral
interests in the ground, not to a party's share of production.so In reaching its
decision, it looked to the provisions relating to subsequently created interests
as evidencing the right of a party to convey an interest in its proportionate
share of production.

381

D. Surrender ofLeases
Given the release provisions in most oil and gas leases, which expressly
permit the lessee to surrender all or any part of the leasehold, each party to
the JOA is likely to have the power to surrender all or part of the interest it
contributed to the contract area. 3 82 The surrender of a lease will have the
effect of carving that interest out of the contract area and releasing it from the
terms of the JOA, a result which may or may not be acceptable to the other
parties to the operating agreement.3 83 To provide the other parties some
control over the surrender of a lease, the JOA typically includes its own
surrender of lease provision that has some of the same mechanisms as the
preferential right but with something similar to a "put" rather than a "call"
384
option.
The provision prohibits the surrender of all or any part of a lease
included in the contract area unless all parties have consented to the
release.
If unanimous consent is obtained, the leasehold interest may be
released without a reduction of the cost and production share allotted to the
lessee in the JOA, the released interest having been judged essentially

379. Id. at 316.
380. Id. at 319.
381. See id. Note that the standard MOI clause includes "production" in the list of interests that are
subject to the clause. See FORM 610-2015, supra note 2, at art. VIIID; FORM 610-1989, supranote 15, at
art. VIII.D; FoRM 610-1982, supra note 15, at art. VIII.D. In reading the opinion, one has to wonder why
the court in McCallnever addressed the meaning of the word "production" as it is used in the MOI clause.
See McCall, 817 F. Supp. 2d 307, 307-22. Reading the JOA as a whole, in light of the taking in kind by
the parties of their share of production and the recognition in the JOA that parties may subsequently create
overriding royalties and production payments, the term "production" as used in the MOI clause logically
means future production of minerals in places associated with the sale of the underlying oil and gas leases
or interests. See FORM 610-2015, supranote 2, at art. VIID; FORM 610-1989, supra note 15, at art. VIID;
FORM 610-1982, supra note 15, at art. VIID. The drafters of future versions of the form should consider
clarifying this point by excepting from and cross-referencing in the MOI clause the provision on
subsequently created interests.
382. See FORM 610-2015, supranote 2, at art. VIII.A.
383. See id at art. VIII.A.
384. See FORM 610-2015, supranote 2, at art. VIII.A; FORM 610-1989, supra note 15, at art. VIII.A;
FORM 610-1982, supranote 15, at art. VIII.A; FORM 610-1956, supra note 2, at § 24. Only very minor
changes were made to the surrender of leases provision in the 2015 Form JOA. See FORM 610-2015, supra
note 2, at art. VIII.A.
385. See FORM 610-2015, supranote 2, at art. VIII.A.
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worthless or unusable by all the parties.38 6 On the other hand, if any JOA
party objects to the proposed release, protection is afforded to the leasehold
owner by requiring the objecting party or parties to accept an assignment of
the leasehold interest,387 without warranty of title, and to compensate the
surrendering owner for his share of the salvage value in any wells and
equipment sited on the assigned property.388 The assigned interest is
automatically released from the contract area and the provisions of the
operating agreement,389 and the assignor is relieved of all future obligations
accruing under the JOA with respect to the assigned interest.390
E. Abandonment of Wells and Reassignment Duties
A provision similar to the Surrender clause is the provision on plugging
and abandoning previously producing wells for which the recoupment period
under the non-consent penalty has run.391 Under the terms of the
abandonment provision, such wells cannot be abandoned without the consent
of all parties to the JOA.392 If all parties have not agreed to a proposed
abandonment within thirty days of notice, those wishing to continue to
386. See id.
387. See id. The assigned interest will cover all leasehold interests (whether operating or
non-operating), rights in subsequent production, and all interests in wells, equipment, and material
associated with the property proposed for surrender. See id Non-operating rights owned by another party
but subject to the restrictions on subsequently created interests would also be included in this transfer. See
id. If the surrendering party owns a mineral interest deemed subject to a lease under the JOA, the assignor
is not required to convey the mineral estate but to grant an oil and gas lease in the form attached as an
exhibit to the JOA. See id
388. See id Salvage value is to be determined by deducting estimated costs of equipment salvage
and plugging and abandoning any existing well from the value of all material determined in accordance
with the JOA's accounting procedures. See McCollam, supra note 79, at 293. Because the cost of
removing an offshore drilling or production platform can exceed salvage value, the assigning party may
owe a cash payment to the assignees, a possibility that should be specially addressed in the offshore
operating agreement. See id.
389. A new operating agreement for the assigned interest must be negotiated by the assignees. For
small areas in which a complex sharing formula is not required, it has been suggested that the initial JOA
provide that the released area be automatically subject to a new operating agreement in a form substantially
identical to the original JOA, with appropriate adjustments in interests to reflect the proportionate
ownership of the new owners, as required under the Acreage or Cash Contributions provision. See FORM
610-2015, supra note 2, at art. VIII.C.
390. See id at art. VIID.
391. See id at art. VI.F.2; FORM 610-1989, supra note 15, at art. VI.E.2; FORM 610-1982, supra note
15, at art. VI.E.2. Abandonment of dry holes is governed by art. VI.E.1 (or art. VI.F.1 in the 2015 Form
JOA), which does not entail any assignment of interests, but treats a suggestion to continue operations as
a proposal for subsequent operations governed by art. VI.B. See FORM 610-2015, supra note 2, at art.
VI.F.1. The 2015 Form JOA changes the consent requirement for abandonment of a dry hole from all
parties to all parties owning an interest at the time of the dry hole completion proposal, meaning that
non-consenting owners no longer have the right to consent to such abandonment. See id. The 2015 Form
JOA also changes the time required to respond to an abandonment proposal from forty-eight hours to
thirty days where a drilling rig is not on location, recognizing that there may be some time between drilling
and completion of a well and the drill rig might be moved off-site in the interim. See id.
392. See FORM 610-2015, supra note 2, at art. VI.F.3.
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operate the well from subsurface intervals then open to production must pay
each of those desiring to abandon the well his proportionate share of the
salvage value of the material and equipment in the well. 39 3 In return, those
electing to continue operations receive an assignment of the abandoning
parties' interests in the well and its equipment and the leasehold estate as to
the intervals then open to production.394 Again, this assignment is made
without warranty of title or fitness for use.395
As to producing wells for which the recoupment period has not yet
expired, parties who elected to participate are first given an opportunity to
determine whether they desire to conduct further operations with the well. 3 96
If not, then the non-consenting parties are also afforded an opportunity to
take over the well before it is permanently plugged and abandoned.397
Unlike the case with the surrender of a lease, the terms of the JOA
continue to apply to the assigned interest following an abandonment
proposal.398 However, the abandoning parties are released from any
responsibility for the well or the transferred leasehold interest, and the
interests of the parties in other portions of the contract area remain
unchanged. 3 99 This procedure produces an -internal variation in the
participation rights of the JOA parties within the contract area that is
inconsistent with the goals of the MOI provision.400 The 2015, 1989, and
1982 JOA Forms ameliorate the impact of non-uniform ownership by
requiring the parties electing to continue operations to reimburse the operator
for any additional costs that may arise as a result of their separate ownership
in the well. 40 1
In the event the well and its leasehold interests are assigned to parties
who desire to continue operations and those assignees later propose to plug
and abandon, the original assignors are granted a reassignment option to

393. See id.
394. See id. It should be noted that the properties covered by this assignment include not only the
well but also the leasehold rights associated with it. See id. at art. M.A. As to depth, the leasehold rights
assigned must cover any intervals open to production. See id. As to surface area, they must include all
rights within the well's drilling unit, described in the JOA's definitions to include the area required for
drilling a single well under applicable conservation regulations or, if no rule or order exists, an area
consistent with the prior drilling pattern in the contract area. See id. at art. I. If the interest of the
abandoning party includes a mineral interest, the owner must deliver an executed lease covering the
abandoned interest using the lease form attached as an exhibit to the JOA, with a primary term of one
year. See id. at art. VI.F.3.
395. See id at art. VIII.A.
396. See id at art. VI.F.2.
397. See id at art. VI.F.3; FORM 610-1989, supra note 15, at art. VI.E.3; FORM 610-1982, supra note
15, at art. VI.E.J.
398. See FORM 610-2015, supranote 2, at art. VI.F.2.
399. See id
400. See id. at art. VIII.D.
401. See id. at art. VI.F.2; FORM 610-1989, supra note 15, at art. VI.E.2; FORM 610-1982, supra note
15, at art. VI.E.2.
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repurchase their earlier interests at salvage value. 4 02 Reassignment clauses
are often employed to protect a non-operating interest against premature loss
by providing its owner an opportunity to preserve the lease during its primary
term despite the desire of the working interest owner to allow the lease to
expire.403 They may also be used, as in the JOA, to avoid decisions to forego
operations at any time during the term of the lease.404 In the operating
agreement, it is possible that the lease is being maintained by production
elsewhere in the contract area.4 05 Thus, the intent is to limit the effect of the
initial abandonment assignment so that it does not become a forfeiture of
interest. 406 Instead, the original owner is allowed an option to reacquire his
interest, after reassessing the potential of the property on the latest-available
data, when the operating parties again determine to discontinue operations.40 7
This assures that the maximum benefit is obtained from the initial investment
in drilling the well by keeping the well open as long as some party believes
operations to be worthwhile.4 08
This reassignment clause is incredibly simple, leaving many terms open
to interpretation. 4 0 9 A well-drafted provision must address the precise
interest to be reassigned and the time parameter for the option notice and
election.4 10 Neither is provided in the AAPL operating agreement.41 1
Literally, the provision only requires the reassignment of an interest in the
well alone, despite the initial conveyance of the well, its equipment, and the
leasehold related to the well's drilling unit.4 12 It is only equitable and logical
to assume that all of these interests are to be reassigned, but this is far from
clear.4 13 Similarly, it is not clear that the reassignment is to be without
warranty, although the reacquiring party is protected by provisions on
subsequently created interests.414

402. See FORM 610-2015, supra note 2, at art. VI.F.2.
403. See Paul W. Eaton, The Reassignment Provision-Meaningfulor Not?, 20 ROCKY MTN. MIN.
L. INST. 17 (1975).
404. See Al. Ref. Co. v. Moxley, 211 F.2d 916 (5th Cir. 1954); United Cent. Oil Corp. v. Helm, 11
F.2d 760 (5th Cir. 1926).
405. See FORM 610-2015, supra note 2, at art. IIIB.
406. See id. at art. VIII.D.
407. See id. at art. VI.F.2.
408. See generally Eaton, supra note 403.
409. See FoRm 610-2015, supra note 2, at art. VI.F.2. The provision simply provides: "Upon
proposed abandonment of the producing zone assigned or leased, the assignor or lessor shall then have
the option to repurchase its prior interest in the well (using the same valuation formula) and participate in
further operations therein subject to the provisions hereof." Id
410. See James M. Colosky, The Reassignment Provision-The Agony in the Oversight, 30 ROCKY
MTN. MIN. L. INST. 5 § 5.02 (1984).
411. See FORM 610-2015, supra note 2, at art. VI.F.2.
412.

See id

413.
414.

See id.
See id
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Along this same line, it should be noted that no guidelines are provided
on the time within which notices and elections must be communicated.415
Professor Conine has warned that, "This could become a serious problem if
the leasehold is about to expire and the prior owner is precluded from a timely
opportunity to keep it alive."4 16 Since that warning, operators have been sued
for providing notice of an intent to abandon the sole well in the contract area
after the well ceased producing and the leases had been allowed to expire.4 17
In Fuller v. Phillips Petroleum Co., the court held that the abandonment
clause imposed no obligation on the operator to provide notice of an intent to
abandon a well before the expiration of the underlying leases because the
abandonment clause "mandates notice only of an ...

intent to plug and

abandon a well, not notice ... of an impending lease termination."4 18
Given the difficulty and uncertainties in determining the precise
moment at which a lease terminates for failure to produce in "paying
quantities," it is highly unlikely that the drafters of the JOA forms ever
intended to burden the operator with the duty of notifying the non-operators
of such an event.4 19 Instead, it is more logical to assume the drafters
intentionally left the risk of loss of a lease or leases due to a failure to conduct
operations on the individual parties to the JOA, each of whom is in a position
to monitor the progress of operations and circulate their own proposals for
any corrective action that they believe are prudent and necessary to maintain
the leases within the contract area. This interpretation is buttressed by a
change to the 2015 Form JOA which allows any party to submit an
abandonment proposal.420
IV. DISTRIBUTION OF ACQUIRED INTERESTS
Another set of property provisions grants each party to the JOA a right
to share proportionately in acquisitions by others after the operating
agreement goes into effect. 4 21 The obligation to notify others and allow them

415. See id.
416. Conine, supra note 4, at 1336.
417. See generally Fuller v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 872 F.2d 655 (5th Cir. 1989).
418. Id at 659. The court proceeded to hold that the Surrender of Lease provision in the JOA was
also inapplicable to the case because it applied to a voluntary relinquishment of a lease, not a termination
of a lease by its own terms for failure to maintain operations. Id. at 659-60. The court in Norman v.
Apache Corp., reached the same conclusion but remanded the case for a determination of whether the
failure to give notice of lease termination by the operator of a gas well was a breach of his duty to conduct
himself as a prudent operator under circumstances in which it may have given assurances that it intended
to keep the leases in effect through continuous operations. Norman v. Apache Corp., 19 F.3d 1017, 103031 (5th Cir. 1994).
419. See FoRM 610-2015, supranote 2, at art. VI.F. 1; see also T.W. Phillips Gas & Oil Co. v. Jedicka,
42 A.3d 261, 277 (Pa. 2012); Windsor Energy Grp., L.L.C. v. Noble Energy, Inc., 330 P.3d 285, 287
(Wyo. 2014).
420. See FoRM 610-2015, supra note 2, at art. VI.F.2.
421. Seeid. atart.VIII.B-C,XVI.K.

538

TEXAS TECH LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 50:489

an opportunity to elect to participate in the acquisition can be found in the
Acreage or Cash Contributions clause, the Lease Renewal and Extension
clause, and if added to the JOA, the AMI clause.422 In each instance, these
provisions are intended to ensure a fair distribution of benefits derived from
the joint investment of the parties and the information and data obtained from
joint operations.42 3
These considerations are similar to those that arise in fiduciary
relationships, in which the trust and confidence placed in another places him
in a position to take advantage of the situation.424 As a consequence, in those
jurisdictions that characterize the JOA as a joint venture, the requirements
contained in these sharing provisions would likely be imposed on the joint
venturers in any event. 4 2 5 Although sometimes limited to acquisitions within
the area targeted by the venture,426 fiduciary duties have been applied to
acquisitions of neighboring properties that may be developed from data
obtained in joint operations or which may be needed to protect the area of
operations from drainage.42 7 There is a hint that these same results might also
be reached through an extension of fiduciary duties to cotenants.428
In any event, having attempted to remove fiduciary obligations from the
JOA by denying the existence of any joint venture or partnership, the
operating agreement contractually applies some of the protections
surrendered in this denial by imposing sharing arrangements on certain
429
acquisitions.
A. Acreage and Cash Contributions
To encourage exploration activity, mineral owners and lessees in the
vicinity of a drill site who may gain indirect benefits from the drilling of a
well will often agree to support the operation through cash or acreage
contributions. 43 0 Where drilling is a joint effort of multiple parties, the
422. See id.
423. See, e.g., Superior Oil Co. v. Cox, 307 So. 2d 350, 355 (La. 1975). Occasionally, however,
parties have limited the application of such clauses to a term shorter than that of the JOA itself. See Ballard
v. Devon Energy Prod. Co., 678 F.3d 360, 362 (5th Cir. 2012) (limiting the AMI to three years);
McFarland Energy Inc. v. Texoil Co., CIV. A. No. 89-5298, 1990 WL 93848, at *1 (E.D. La. June 25,
1990) (limiting the AMI to one year).
424. See, e.g., ERI Consulting Eng'rs, Inc. v. Swinnea, 318 S.W.3d 867, 873-74 (Tex. 2010).
425. See Kaye v. Smitherman, 225 F.2d 583, 594 (10th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 913 (1955);
Tex. Oil & Gas Corp. v. Hawkins Oil & Gas, Inc., 668 S.W.2d 16, 17 (Ark. 1984). However, establishing
that the protections of one of these clauses apply even though not expressly included in the JOA can be
difficult. See Cont'l Res., Inc. v. PXP Gulf Coast, Inc., No. CIV-04-168 1-F, 2006 WL 2865509 (W.D.
Okla. Oct. 5, 2006) (holding, under Texas law, that an AMI provision does not create a joint venture,
partnership, or agency relation between the parties).
426. See Fuqua v. Taylor, 683 S.W.2d 735, 738 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984, writ ref d n.r.e.).
427. See Foley v. Phillips, 508 P.2d 975, 979 (Kan. 1973).
428. See Rex Oil Ref., Inc. v. Shirvan, 443 P.2d 82 (Okla. 1968).
429. See generally FoRM 610-2015, supranote 2.
430. See id. at art. VIII.C.
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industry generally deems it inequitable for one party to take advantage of the
other participants by contracting for such contributions for itself alone. 4 3 1 To
promote a fair distribution of these contributions, the Acreage or Cash
Contributions clause of the operating agreement requires that such
contributions be distributed among the parties that share the cost of the
operations. 43 2
Under this provision, any party obtaining a cash contribution based on
a joint operation must pay the contribution to the operator for application
against the expenses of the operation; 433 a contribution of acreage must be
promptly assigned, without warranty of title, to the consenting parties that
shared the cost of operation in proportion to the costs each has borne for the
operation.434 This latter obligation also applies to acreage outside the
contract area that is contributed to support the drilling of a well inside the
contract area.435
Controversies involving this clause have focused primarily on acreage
contributions in which one party to the JOA assigns an interest to another
party to the JOA as part of a farmout agreement between them.436 Under
those circumstances, the courts decided that the Contributions clause does
not apply.437 The issue was first confronted by a Louisiana court in Superior
Oil Co. V. Cox. 4 3 8 Pursuant to a farmout agreement with Superior, Midwest,
and Belco, Cox drilled and completed a producing well and the four parties
entered into a JOA.439 Midwest and Belco thereafter entered into a second
farmout agreement, whereby Cox could earn additional acreage outside the
contract area by drilling a second well within the contract area)4 4 0 All four
parties elected to participate in the second well, and after it was completed,
Superior brought suit to compel Cox to assign Superior a part of the outside
431. See Martin Expl. Co. v. Amoco Prod. Co., 637 So. 2d 1202, 1207 (La. Ct. App. 1994).
432. See FORM 610-1989, supranote 15, at art. VIII.C; FORM 610-1982, supranote 15, at art. VIII.C;
FORM 610-1956, supra note 2, at § 25.
433. See FORM 610-1989, supranote 15, at art. VII.C; FORM 610-1982, supranote 15, at art. VIII.C;
FORtM 610-1956, supra note 2, at § 25. Note that to avoid confusion between a cash contribution and
payments received for the sale of production, the 1982 Form JOA, the 1989 Form JOA, and the 2015
Form JOA expressly exclude receipts from the sale of production from the effects of the Contributions
clause. See, e.g., FORM 610-2015, supra note 2, at art. VIII.C. Other operating agreements extend this
exclusion to advance incentive payments for production and advances obtained in loan transactions. See
McCollam, supra note 79, at 285.
434. See generally FORM 610-2015, supra note 2, at art. VIII.C. The acreage acquired does not
become part of the contract area covered by the original operating agreement. See id. Instead, it is treated
as a new area subject to a separate but substantially similar operating agreement among the assignees. See
id.

435. See FORM 610-2015, supranote 2, at art. VIII.C.
436. See id Note that such an assignment would be dealt with under the preferential right to purchase
provision but for the fact that the transactions did not entail a sale for a monetary consideration.
437. See Superior Oil Co. v. Cox, 307 So. 2d 350, 355 (La. 1975); Martin Expl. Co. v. Amoco Prod.
Co., 637 So. 2d 1202 (La. Ct. App. 1994).
438. Cox, 307 So.2d at 355.
439. Id at 351.
440. Id at 352.

540

TEXAS TECH LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50:489

acreage earned under the second farmout." 1
The court concluded that the acreage contribution clause was not
intended to apply to contributions among parties to the operating agreement,
reasoning that the clause functions only to protect the parties to the operating
agreement "against the possibility that one of them might obtain an undue
advantage from an outsider at the expense of. those paying for the
operations .... " 2 The second conveyance only rearranged interests
belonging to the parties to the operating agreement. In the aggregate, the
assignment did nothing to improve the position of the other parties over
Superior.443 It was a zero-sum transaction in which no one gained anything
over Superior that would not have been obtained among the other parties in
"

the absence of the assignment to Cox.4

Martin Exploration Co. v. Amoco Production Co. represented the first
reported case interpreting the clause involving an acreage contribution made
by an outside party, but the court declined to apply the protections of the
Contributions clause based on the peculiar facts.445 Anticipating drilling a
well, Amoco approached Martin and Gulf Oil requesting that they farm out
their acreage in the area to Amoco.4 6 Gulf agreed to farmout part of its lease
to Amoco, but Martin did not." 7 Later, when some of Martin's leases were
included in the unit and Amoco began drilling a second well, Martin agreed
to participate in the costs of the second well and the two parties executed a
JOA that was back-dated to a date before the date of the Gulf-Amoco
farmout." 8 Martin then demanded that it be assigned part of the acreage that

was earned by Amoco under the Gulf-Amoco farmout agreement for drilling
the second well. 4 4 9

With an assignment from a non-party (Gulf) based on an agreement (the
Gulf-Amoco farmout agreement) that post-dated the effective date of the
JOA between Amoco and Martin, the elements needed to trigger the
Contributions clause seemed to be present. 4 50 The court, however, concluded
441. Id.
442.. Id. at 355 (emphasis in original); see also Harper Oil Co. v. Yates Petroleum Corp., 733 P.2d
1313 (N.M. 1987) (relying on Cox, the court held that the Contributions clause applied only to acreage
adjacent to the contract area owned by non-parties to the operating agreement).
443. See Cox, 307 So. 2d at 354-55.
444. See id The court also argued that the assignment to Cox did not affect Superior's proportionate
interest in the well and that there was no actual contribution, apparently in the sense that Cox assumed
that portion of the costs for which Midwest and Belco would have been responsible without increasing
the costs charged to Superior. Id. at 355. This part of the court's rationale is suspect, because the
Contributions clause is concerned with the improper advantage gained by one party, not by the loss shifted
to another. It may be a valid argument where the assigned interest is limited to the well being drilled, but
not when a broader interest is being assigned.
445. Martin Expl. Co. v. Amoco Prod. Co., 637 So. 2d 1202, 1207-08 (La. Ct. App. 1994).
446. Id. at 1203.
447. Id. at 1203-04.
448. Id. at 1204.
449. Id.
450. See id at 1204-05; see also Superior Oil Co. v. Cox, 307 So. 2d 350, 355 (La. 1975) (discussing
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that the purpose of the Contributions clause was not violated. Although
Amoco had no interest in Gulf's lease at the time the JOA became effective,
Exhibit A to the operating agreement attributed that leasehold interest to
Amoco, and only the Amoco interest was burdened or affected by Gulf's
back-in interest at payout. 4 5 1 Because the cost attributable to that acreage
was borne by Amoco, it gained no undue advantage over Martin when it
eventually gained actual ownership of the interest from Gulf.4 52 The case
therefore both illustrates the application of the Contributions clause and
serves as a reminder of the importance of the information contained in
Exhibit A.453
From these cases, it is clear that the purpose of the Contributions clause
is "to protect the participants of a joint operating agreement against the
possibility that one of them might obtain an undue advantage from an
outsider at the expense of those paying for the operations."45 4 It also appears
from the facts of these disputes that it makes no difference whether the
contract for the acquisition was executed before or after the JOA became
effective or whether the acreage acquired is inside or outside the JOA's
contract area.455 here a party to the JOA obtains an interest in consideration
ofjoint operations-whether the arrangement was established before or after
the JOA was executed and regardless of location-the Contributions clause
grants the other participants a proportionate share in the acquisition unless a
court concludes that the parties intended to exempt the acquisition from the
effects of the provision.4 56
B. Area ofMutual Interest
The standard form JOA does not prohibit a party from acquiring
properties except in connection with the extension or renewal of leases or
under the Contributions clause if the properties are acquired in consideration
of conducting operations that are covered under the JOA.457 Subject to those
limited exceptions, a party is free to acquire properties either inside or outside
the contract area without obligation to the other parties to the JOA.4 58 Unless
the parties have fiduciary duties to each other because they have formed a
partnership or joint venture (or are deemed to form a partnership or joint
the purpose of the Contributions clause).
451. Martin Expl. Co., 637 So. 2d at 1208.
452. Id.
453. See id at 1207-08.
454. Id at 1207 (citing Superior Oil Co., 307 So. 2d at 355).
455. Note that the 2015 Form JOA changed the application of the clause from an operation "on the
[c]ontract [a]rea" to an operation "under this agreement." FORM 610-2015, supra note 2, at art. VIII.C.
456. See generally SuperiorOil Co., 307 So. 2d at 355; Martin Expl. Co., 637 So. 2d at 1207-08.
457. See Clovelly Oil Co. v. Midstates Petroleum Co., 112 So. 3d 187, 193-96 (La. 2013) (describing
Exhibit A's definition of the contract area).
458. See id.
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venture), they may compete with one another in their land acquisitions taking
full advantage of information obtained from joint operations. 4 59 To prevent
this competition, the parties may insert an AMI provision into the JOA.4 60
Although not a part of most standard JOA forms, 4 6 1 the AMI provision
merits discussion because the clause is often the subject of disputes.46 2
Attorneys also debate the advisability of adding such a provision. 463 Absent
an effective release and novation, the original parties to the JOA may
continue to be bound by the AMI provision as a personal covenant long after
they have assigned away their leases and interests in the contract area.4 64
Further, an active party that has entered into multiple operating agreements
may find it difficult to account for intersecting areas of interest and
obligations that may conflict. 4 65
[An] AMI clause .. . ensure[s] every party to the JOA an opportunity to
acquire a proportionate interest in any acquisitions within a prescribed area
encompassing the [c]ontract [a]rea, regardless of the state of development
of the newly acquired acreage. In essence, the AMI clause requires that any
party acquiring an oil and gas interest within the [c]ontract [a]rea or within
a specified distance from its perimeter give notice of the acquisition and its
459. See id
460. For further materials on the AMI clause, see Mark T. Nesbitt, Area ofInterest Provisions-Two
Edged Swords, 35 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 21 (1989); Dante L. Zarlengo, Area of Mutual Interest
Clauses Regarding Oil and Gas Properties:Analysis, Drafting, and Procedure,28 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L.
INST. 14 (1982).
461. One writer has recommended the following AMI interest clause for use with the 1982 Form
JOA:
Except for acquisitions pursuant to Article VIII(B) or VIII(C), if at any time prior to 5 years
from the date hereof any party hereto acquires any interests in oil and gas within the contract
area or within 2 miles of the outer perimeter of the contract area, such party shall give notice
in writing to all of the other parties hereto which notice shall contain a description of the
interest acquired, consideration paid therefore, and all other pertinent information necessary to
describe such acquisition. All parties receiving such notice shall have 15 days from the receipt
thereof to advise the acquiring party in writing of its election to participate in such acquisition
failing which the party receiving such notice shall have no right to such acquisition. All parties
electing to participate in such acquisition shall furnish to the acquiring party, with notice of
their election to participate, their proportionate part (the same interest which they have in the
contract area) of the costs of the acquisition, failing in which the affirmative response shall not
be deemed effective and shall not entitle such party to participate. If any parties elect not to
participate in such acquisition, the acquiring party shall notify all other parties of such refusal
and all such other parties shall have the same right to respond within fifteen (15) days thereafter
as applied in the case of the first notice. The acquiring party agrees to execute such
assignments and conveyances as are necessary to reflect the acquisition as a matter of record
as soon as reasonably possible after determination of the interests of the parties pursuant to the
foregoing provisions. There shall be no obligation of any party hereto with respect to
acquisition outside the area covered by this provision.
Robert C. Bledsoe, Problem Areas in DraftingOperatingAgreements-Some Suggested Solutions, in ST.
B. TEX., ADVANCED OIL, GAS AND MIN. L. INST. COURSE, N-24-25 (Oct. 15, 1981).

462.
463.
464.

See Conine & Kramer, supra note 1, at art. III.B.
See id.
See id

465.

See 2-19A EUGENE KUNTZ, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS

§

19A.4(a) (2016).
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terms to all other parties to the operating agreement, who then have an
option for a specified period to elect to participate in the acquisition. As
with [other] options, the notice constitutes a continuing offer that matures
into a bilateral contract of sale only when [the offer is] accepted by the
optionee in the manner and within the time prescribed [by the notice].466
Failure to provide notice in writing and as otherwise prescribed by the clause
will not be deemed notice and will not initiate the election period.46 7
However, where the AMI clause is ambiguous and the parties have
construed the provision by course of conduct to require oral notice, or where
oral notice is sufficient to place a reasonable party [on] inquiry notice, the
substantive requirements of the clause may be deemed to be completed and
the election period will be triggered.
To convert its option rights into a contract right, the optionee must
communicate its exercise of the election within the time frame prescribed
and indicate its unequivocal acceptance of the optionor's offer based on the
sales terms negotiated by the buyer and seller. If the optionee fails to
respond during the election period following proper notice, the option will
expire. Silence following knowledge of an acquisition from some other
source, whether amounting to actual or inquiry notice, can result in waiver
of the option or, if the optionor relies to its detriment on the optionee's
failure to indicate an interest, the optionee may be estopped to assert its
option rights.
[If] the AMI option is exercised properly, the optionee is entitled to an
assignment of its prescribed share in the acquisition. Under the typical
AMI, this share is equal to the optionee's fractional interest in the [c]ontract
[a]rea, as specified in Exhibit A. This allows the optionee to receive that
fractional interest of the interest acquired, thereby preserving the relative

466. Conine & Kramer, supranote 1, at art. III.B (footnotes omitted); see Courseview, Inc. v. Phillips
Petroleum Co., 312 S.W.2d 197, 207 (Tex. 1957). The event that triggers the obligation to provide notice
of an acquisition is dependent on the precise language used in the AMI provision. See San Saba Energy,
L.P. v. McCord, 167 S.W.3d 67, 69-74 (Tex. App.-Waco 2005, pet. denied). The event can be anything
ranging from obtaining a contractual right to acquire the property to an actual transfer of title. Id. In San
Saba Energy, L.P. v. McCord, an AMI party obtained the right to acquire a leasehold interest but backed
out of the transaction before title was actually transferred. Id. at 70-71. But the party still made a profit
when the contract rights in the sales agreement were sold to another entity. Id. at 71. In a suit alleging
breach of the AMI clause, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant but the
appellate court remanded the case for a trial on the proper interpretation of the triggering event in the AMI
provision due to ambiguities in the documents. See id. at 72, 74. The case stands as another warning about
the care that must be taken in drafting these provisions and the necessity of clearly addressing all the
circumstances in which the clause is to apply, particularly where AMI requirements are repeated in
multiple layers of documents and conflicting statements in the documents create uncertainties. See id at
71-74. Damages for failure to provide notice and for permitting other AMI parties to share in the
acquisition have been held to include lost revenue from the disputed interest, less acquisition costs
attributable to that interest. See, e.g., Kincaid v. W. Operating Co., 890 P.2d 249, 251, 254 (Colo. App.
1995).
467. Conine & Kramer, supra note 1, at art. III.B.

TEXAS TECH LAW REVIEW

544

[Vol. 50:489

risks and rewards that exist under the JOA.468
That said, the court will not imply an obligation to reoffer proportionately to
the electing parties the interests that are declined or waived by the
non-electing parties absent a specific provision to that effect.4 69
A number of recent cases illustrate the importance of meticulous care in
drafting the AMI provision and of punctilious compliance with its terms. 4 70
In Beckham Resources, Inc. v. Mantle Resources, L.L. C., the optionee failed
to respond to several notices from the optionor, and then argued that the
notices were deficient because they failed to include "all pertinent terms" as
required by the AMI provision-specifically that the notices did not set forth
a liquidated purchase price for the subject lease. 47 1 The consideration for the
lease, however, was to drill a deep well on the property; and the optionor
included with the notices an Authorization for Expenditure (AFE) that
estimated the cost of participating in the well.472 The court rejected the
optionee's argument that the true acquisition cost could only be determined
after the well was drilled, finding the notice sufficient.47 3

In SublSSIHoldings, L.P. v. HilcorpEnergy I, L.P., the optionor alleged
that the optionee forfeited its right to participate in the acquisition because,
although it responded that it would participate, it failed to deliver payment
within the time required.47 4 The provision stated: "If...the [receiving party]
elects to acquire its respective . .. [i]nterest, then the Offering Party shall
execute, acknowledge, and deliver to [the receiving party] an assignment
thereof, . . . and [the receiving party] shall pay ... the Offering Party .. . [the
associated] Purchase Price."475 Interpreting this language, the court
concluded that the election to participate by the optionee triggered concurrent
obligations of the receiving party (to pay) and the offering party (to deliver

468. Id (footnotes omitted); see Cont'l Res., Inc. v. PXP Gulf Coast, Inc., No. CIV-04-1681-F, 2006
WL 2865509 (W.D. Okla. 2006) (holding that the optionee was entitled to a fractional interest); Mountain
Fuel Supply Co. v. Chorney Oil Co., 335 F. Supp. 59, 62-65 (D. Wyo. 1971) (explaining that oral notice
was sufficient for an ambiguous AMI clause).
469. See, e.g., Cyanostar Energy, Inc. v. Chesapeake Expl., L.L.C., 317 P.3d 217, 220 (Okla. Civ.
App. 2013).
470. See Beckham Res., Inc. v. Mantle Res., L.L.C., No. 13-09-00083-CV, 2010 WL 672880, at *2426 (Tex. App-Corpus Christi Feb. 25, 2010, pet. denied); Subissi Holdings, L.P. v. Holcorp Energy I,
L.P., No. 04-07-00674-CV, 2008 WL 2515698, at *2-5, *1(-12 (Tex. App--San Antonio June 25, 2008,
no pet.).
471. Beckham Res., Inc., 2010 WL 672880, at *24-25.
472.

I1d. at**14-16.

1

473. Id at *24-26. Similarly, in J-O'B OperatingCo. v. Newmont Oil Co., the court held that J-O'B
failed to provide an unequivocal and unconditional acceptance of Newmont's offer when J-O'B refused
to pay its share of seismic costs. J-O'B Operating Co. v. Newmont Oil Co., 560 So. 2d 852, 859--60 (La.
Ct. App. 1990). The acquired sublease was contingent on obtaining an extension of the underlying lease,
and the underlying lease was extended based on assurances that a seismic program would be conducted.
Id. at 855-56, 858.
474. Subissi Holdings, L.P., 2008 WL 2515698, at *24.
475. Id. at *10 (emphasis in original).
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an assignment) under the consequent clause; delivery of the assignment was
not a condition precedent to payment.47 6
The optionee then argued that its payment obligation was never
triggered because the optionor never tendered a proper assignment pursuant
to another portion of the AMI provision, which stated that a receiving party
would lose its right to the offered interest "[i]f [the receiving party] ... elects
to acquire but fails to pay its Purchase Price on or before the thirtieth (30th)
dayfollowing the date that the Offering Party tenders the assignment ....
The optionor had tendered an assignment and a settlement statement after
receiving the optionee's election to participate, but the assignment was
unexecuted.47 8 The court held the unexecuted assignment was sufficient to
trigger the payment obligation, stating:
[i]f a contract calls for successive acts, . . . there is no breach by one if the
precedent act has not been performed by the other; but if the contract
contemplates concurrent acts, it is sufficient to put one party in default that
the other party is ready, willing, and offers to perform his part of the
contract. 479

For the optionee, time was of the essence, and they were not excused from
tendering payment during the thirty-day option period because the
unexecuted assignment indicated that the optionor was ready and willing to
perform.480
In Ballard v. Devon Energy Production Co., L.P., the Fifth Circuit had
occasion to interpret an AMI provision that stated in the final single-sentence
paragraph of the provision that, "[t]he above subparagraph of 3 iF" would
terminate after three years from the effective date of the AMI.481 Section 3 IF
was the AMI provision containing five paragraphs, the first three of which
related to acquisitions, the fourth of which related to surrenders of leases, and
the fifth of which was the termination clause at issue. 482 The plaintiff asserted
"[t]he above subparagraph" referred only to the surrender clause (that is, the
immediately preceding paragraph) such that the restrictions on acquisitions
remained in effect, while the defendant asserted "[t]he above subparagraph"
referred to all of subsection F of section 31 (that is, the entire AMI
provision). 483 The court concluded that the only reasonable reading was that
the termination sentence applied to the entire AMI provision.
476.
477.
478.
479.
480.
481.
482.
483.
484.

See id at *l-12.
Id at *2-5.
Id at *4-5.
Id. at *4 (quoting Perry v. Little, 419 S.W.2d 198, 201 (Tex. 1967)).
Id at *6.
Ballard v. Devon Energy Prod. Co., L.P., 678 F.3d 360, 363 (5th Cir. 2012).
Id
Id at 364.
Id at 370.
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Before an AMI provision is inserted into the JOA, the parties need to
carefully consider some of the complications that can arise in its application.
The AMI provision relies on some of the same procedures and mechanisms
used in the Preferential Right provision. 4 85 As a result, it can encounter many
of the ambiguities and difficulties often associated with the preemptive
right.4 86 For example, unanswered questions can arise concerning application
of the clause to acquisitions in which only a portion of the property being
transferred lies within the (AMI), as in some package sales, or where the
acquisition includes unsevered mineral and surface estates.48 7 Here, the
parties confront the same price allocation issues that arose in connection with
the Preferential Right.4 88
The AMI clause presents particular concerns for large companies and
firms highly active in the vicinity of the contract area due to the possibility
of inadvertently entering into separate agreements that turn out to have
overlapping areas of mutual interest. 48 9 This situation can be particularly
troublesome when companies merge, only to discover that the surviving
entity has conflicting obligations in some AMIs. 4 90 At the very least, the AMI
clause can complicate and delay industry transactions by adding a further
layer of procedures and parties that must be dealt with.491
In 2000, the Texas case of North Central Oil Corp. v. Louisiana Land
& Exploration Co. raised questions about the scope of the AMI clause.492
Prior to this case, it had been assumed by many in the industry that the
Preferential Right and the AMI provisions governed two distinctly different
types of property transfers and worked in conjunction to provide two
different protections to the JOA parties.49 3 The Preferential Right covered
transfers to an outsider of interests already dedicated to the contract area,
while the AMI governed newly acquired interests within the contract area
and its nearby vicinity.4 94 The North Central case challenged this
distinction.49 5
Various cotenancies were created in a series of almost identical farmout
agreements that incorporated by reference a JOA based on the 1956 Form
485. See Gerald F. Slattery, Jr. & Arnanda Davis Landry, UnderstandingAreas of Mutual Interest,
PreferentialRights, and Maintenance of Uniform InterestProvisions in Joint OperatingAgreements, 56
ANN. INST. ON MIN. L. 323, 324 (2009).
486. See id. at 329.
487. See id at 329-30.
488. See Ballard, 678 F.3d at 363.
489. See W.F. Pennebaker, Recent Developments in Oil and Gas Law with DraftingSuggestions, 34
INST. ON OIL & GAS L. & TAX'N 353, 359 (1983).
490. See id.
491. See id.
492. See N. Cent. Oil Corp. v. La. Land & Expl. Co., 22 S.W.3d 572, 576-77 (Tex. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] 2000, no pet.).
493. See generally id.
494. See id.
495. See generally id
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JOA, but the Preferential Right clause was struck from the form."9 When
one cotenant assigned an undivided one thirty-second working interest in the
underlying leases to another cotenant, the plaintiff, a third cotenant, brought
suit asserting it was entitled to a proportionate share of the transfer under an
AMI clause contained in the farmout agreements .49 7 The plaintiff relied on
the Texas Supreme Court's decision in Courseview, Inc. v. Phillips
Petroleum Co., which held that the acquisition of an overriding royalty
interest that previously had been carved out of a lease committed to the
contract area was still an interest covered by the AMI provision. 9 The
defendants responded by arguing that such an interpretation would convert
the AMI provision into a Preferential Right.4 9
Without endorsing the plaintiff's position, the appellate court rejected
the defendants' argument, noting that the two provisions relate to entirely
different transactions (acquisitions verses dispositions) and are triggered by
different actors (assignees versus sellers) . 500 This is particularly important in
that the restrictions placed on the Preferential Right emanate from efforts to
prevent the provision from creating unreasonable restraints on alienation and
have no application to requirements associated with the acquisition of
property.5 0t Because the court felt that both sides had reasonable
explanations for the meaning of the AMI clause, the case was remanded to
the trial court for a factual determination of the intent of the parties, leaving
02
us without definitive, guidance. 5
.If the AMI overlaps with the Preferential Right, it also might overlap
with other property provisions in the JOA, which would threaten to
undermine the structural integrity of the agreement. 50 3 Consider, for
example, the problems that would be created if an AMI clause were applied
in the context of a well abandonent. 504 When a participating party proposes
to abandon a well before the end of the "penalty" phase and the other
participating parties disagree, the abandoning party is to transfer its interest
in the well to the other participants. 0 The AMI, if applied, would require
an assignment to all bOA parties, making no distinction between participants

496. See id. at 574, 580.
497. See id. at 574.
498. Courseview, Inc. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 312 S.W.2d 197, 208 (Tex. 1957). For an opinion
seemingly to the contrary, the Twelfth District Texas Court of Appeals held that the AM provision did
not apply to an overriding royalty that was created after the date of the JOA because the AMI did not
apply to a "subsequently created interest[]." See XH, LLC v. Cabot Oil & Gas Corp., No.
12-12-00338-CV, 2014 WL 2505541, at *1 (Tex. App-Tyler May 30, 2014, no pet.).
499. N Cent. Oil Corp., 22 S.W.3d at 579.
500. IdatS581.
501. See Slattery & Landry, supra note 485, at 343.
502. See id.
503. See generally N Cent. Oil Corp., 22 S.W.3d at 579.
504. See Foaps 610-2015, supra note 2, at art. VIII.
505. See id
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and non-participants. 5 0 Because the AMI clause is a typewritten addition to
the JOA, the normal rules of construction give priority to the AMI even
though the conflicting provisions on well abandonment provide more detail
on the terms of the transfer.507
In the interest of preserving the integrity of the JOA, the AMI and the
other property provisions in the JOA should be interpreted as limited to the
specific purposes each clause was intended to serve in the context of joint
opgrations.sos Applying a limited interpretation would restrict the AMI
clause to acquisitions of new interests not previously dedicated to the contract
area for the purpose of preventing the parties from abusing their access to
information derived from joint operations and investments.5 09
C. Renewal or Extension ofLeases
The [JOA] provision . .. pertaining to the [renewal or extension] of leases
is, to a limited degree, a form of [AMI provision]. As a standard provision

in [the] ...

1982 [Form JOA, the 1989 Form JOA, and the 2015 Form JOA],

the provision is the closest the instrument[s] come[] to expressly protecting
the interests of all parties against cash-based acquisitions prompted by
knowledge generated in joint operations. However, it applies only to leases
5 10
within the contract area [that] . . . have expired.

'

For example, for situations in which a term mineral interest was subject to an
operating agreement, the JOA provision has been found not to apply to the
purchase of a future interest in a reversion that followed the term mineral
interest.5 1
The extension and renewal provision is intended to prevent ... [a
"washout"] of the interests of.. . [JOA] parties in the expiring leases
through the termination of the original lease and the subsequent execution
of new leasehold rights not subject to the terms of the [JOA]. The typical

)

506. See id.
507. See Coral Prod. Corp. v. Cent. Res., Inc., 730 N.W.2d 357, 370-71 (Neb. 2007) ("In order to
harmonize provisions that appear to be in conflict, ... courts will apply printed provisions to typewritten
provisions ....
508. See Conine, supra note 4, at 1267.
509. See generally Courseview, Inc. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 312 S.W.2d 197 (Tex. 1957). Access
to information provides a basis for distinguishing the holding in Courseview on overriding royalty interests
from the transfer of actual working interests. See id.
510. Conine, supra note 4, at 1348-49. The similarities between the AMI provision and the Renewal
or Extension clause can lead to confusion when a party is acquiring several leases within the AMI at one
time, when a party is acquiring new leases, or when a party is acquiring renewal leases. See id. Although
the provision on renewal leases does not usually specify the precise information that must be provided in
the notice, one court has held that the acquiring party must notify other JOA parties that renewal leases
are included in the properties. See McFarland Energy Inc. v. Texoil Co., No. 89-5298, 1990 WL 93848
(E.D. La. 1990).
511. See ENI Producing Props. Program Ltd. P'ship 1982-I v. Samson Inv. Co., 977 P.2d 1086, 1088
(Okla. 1999).
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renewal and extension clause will require any party securing an extension
or renewal of all or part of a lease included in the contract area . . . to notify
the other parties, who then have an option for a prescribed period to share
in the acquisition in proportion to their interests in the contract area by
paying a like portion of the acquisition costs. To clarify and limit the
timeframe of the provision, a renewal lease is often defined as any leasehold
interest acquired or contracted for within six months after the expiration of
the original lease.5 12
If less than all parties exercise their options to participate, two results
obtain. First, the electing parties' shares in the extension or renewal are
increased to reflect each electing party's proportionate interest in the
aggregate of interests electing to participate in the acquisition. Second, the
extended or renewed lease is released from the contract area and no longer
subject to the provisions of the . . . [JOA]. This is the same treatment
accorded leases proposed for surrender when only a portion of the parties
elect to retain the leases. [Earlier forms of the clause were criticized
because they failed] to subject the leases [that were] newly acquired by less
than all parties to an operating agreement of substantially similar form as
the existing . .. [JOA] . . . .513
This problem was remedied in the 1989 Form JOA and the 2015 Form
JOA.514
V. VALIDITY AND ENFORCEMENT
Because [the] various property provisions [of the operating agreement
attempt to] place significant restrictions and encumbrances on the property
rights of the parties, disagreements over their application ... [are to be
expected] .. . . In any litigation concerning ... [these provisions], validity
and enforceability play a major role .... [Issues will arise over
whether] ... the provisions ... are void for failure to comply with
traditional limitations and requirements [imposed on] real property
transactions, including those imposed under the Statute of Frauds, the Rule
against Perpetuities, and the Rule on Restraints against Alienation.515
Controversies can also be expected over whether a transferee is bound by the
terms of an operating agreement to which it was not an original signatory,
raising questions involving assumption and covenants running with the
land. 5 16

512.
513.
514.
515.
516.

Conine, supra note 4, at 1349.
Id. at 1349-50.
See FORM 610-2015, supra note 2, at art. VIII.B.2; FoRM 610-1989, supranote 15, at art. VIII.B.
Conine, supra note 4, at 1370.
See id
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A. Statute ofFrauds
In general, both mineral interests and oil and gas leaseholds have been
treated as real property interests. As such, they are subject to the rules
relating to real property, including the Statute of Frauds. Although ...
[arising from legislation that is] subject to local variations in content and
interpretation, the Statute of Fauds as it relates to real property customarily
precludes enforcement of [a conveyance] . . . unless the [transaction] has

been reduced to writing and signed by the party alleged to be bound by its
terms. Agreements . .. [governed by the] Statute of Frauds must
[(1)] embody the essential terms of the transaction, [(2)] provide a sufficient
description of the ... property [involved] to permit identification, and
[(3)] exhibit the [authorized] signature of any party obligated under its
provisions.
The Statute of Frauds has been held to require that oil and gas leases
and contracts for their transfer be in written form.517
Although at least one court has suggested that contracts for development such
as the operating agreement must comply with the Statute of Frauds, all
jurisdictions would not likely agree.
The breadth of the Statute of Frauds varies from state to state... , [and
some statutes that] apply to conveyances or contracts for conveyances of
real property ... [make no reference to the broader category of] instruments
affecting interests in land [which arguably extend far enough to include the
development agreements in general.] Thus, . . . a contract for development
of an oil and gas lease would not be subject to the [Texas] Statute of Frauds.
Nevertheless,... individual provisions of the [JOA that involve]
transfers or agreements for transfers of real property interests which must
clearly comply with the Statute of Frauds to be enforceable. Provisions
granting the operator's lien, nonconsent penalties requiring relinquishments
and forfeitures, and acreage contribution clauses ... are in this category.
Additionally, property provisions granting various options to acquire
interests inside and outside the contract area may be subject to the Statute
of Frauds requirements. Decisions pertaining to agreements other
than . . . [the JOA] have held that one form of option, the preferential right
519
... relating to mineral interests, must comply with the Statute of Frauds.

517. Id. at 1371 (internal citations omitted).
518. See id.; see also Sonat Expl. Co. v. Mann, 785 F.2d 1232, 1234 n.1 (5th Cir. 1986) (speculating
in passing that Mississippi law "would require that contracts involving oil and gas development be reduced
to writing").
519. Conine, supra note 4, at 1372-73; see Michael v. Busby, 162 S.W.2d 662 (Tex. 1942); Cove
Invs., Inc. v. Manges, 588 S.W.2d 792 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1979), rev'd on othergrounds,602
S.W.2d 512 (Tex. 1980); Cherry v. Salinas, 355 S.W.2d 833, 834-35 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1962,
writ ref'd n.r.e.); Noxon v. Cockburn, 147 S.W.2d 872, 874 (Tex. Civ. App-Galveston 1941, writ ref'd).
The danger lies primarily in failing to provide a full specification of terms for the future sale at the time
the option agreement is signed. Even where terms in a future third party agreement are adopted as the
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Texas courts have also applied the Statute of Frauds to AMI provisions. 2 0
Even if all or parts of the operating agreement are governed by the
Statute of Frauds, the usual JOA form is sufficient to be declared valid if care
is taken. 52 1 Although conceivable that an operating agreement could be oral,
"arrangements for most contemporary joint operations are sufficiently
complex to necessitate the use of a written agreement."5 22
The description of the property to be conveyed must provide at least the
means or data to identify the property with reasonable certainty. 523 As with
other real property transactions, failure to adequately identify the property
affected by the agreement can render the agreement ineffectual against that
interest. 5 24 Under Texas law, this task is aided by the ability to describe the
property in another writing that is referenced to in the JOA.525 Parole
evidence may also be admitted to identify the property with reasonable
certainty, so long as the JOA-or a document referenced in the JOAcontains essential terms identifying the "nucleus" of the location or
describing the land.526
In the specific case of the JOA, the parties will not usually know at the
time of the instrument's execution which specific properties might become
subject to a relinquishment or transfer obligation.52 7 This issue was addressed
recently in Long v. Rim Operating, Inc., in which a JOA based on the 1982
Form JOA contained a non-standard "Other Provision" requiring a party to
relinquish its interest in a lease if the party did not consent to an operation
required to perpetuate or earn an interest in the lease. 52 8 The non-consenting
working-interest owner argued that the provision was unenforceable because
the parties conditionally agreed to convey property without knowing which
property would be conveyed, or to whom the conveyances would be made. 5 29
The court held that because the provision referenced a contract area that was
option terms, the absence of a formula for determining the sales price in a package transaction may be a
fatal deficiency. See Harry M. Reasoner, PreferentialPurchaseRights in Oil and Gas Instruments, 46
TEx. L. REv. 57, 60 (1967).
520. See Westland Oil Dev. Corp. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 637 S.W.2d 903, 908-09 (Tex. 1982); Crowder
v. Tri-C Res., Inc. 821 S.W.2d 393 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, no writ). But see Palmer v.
Fuqua, 641 F.2d 1146, 1158-59 (5th Cir. 1981) (concluding that an AMI provision in a limited partnership
agreement was not an offer of property but was a requirement to make an offer to comply with a fiduciary
obligation).
521. See Conine, supra note 4, at 1373.
522. Id.
523. See Kmiec v. Reagan, 556 S.W.2d 567, 569 (Tex. 1977).
524. See Westland Oil, 637 S.W.2d at 910.
525. See McElroy v. Danciger, 241 S.W. 1098, 1102 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1922, no writ).
526. See Gates v. Asher, 280 S.W.2d 247, 248 (Tex. 1955); see also Carpenter v. Phelps, 391 S.W.3d
143 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, no pet.) (discussing how a series of emails referencing an
investor "pitch package," a Railroad Commission filing, an assignment and bill of sale, and two drawings
were insufficient to identify property).
527. See, e.g., Long v. Rim Operating, Inc., 345 S.W.3d 79, 89 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2011, pet.
denied).
528. See id.
529. Id. at 85.
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sufficiently described, the provision did not violate the Statute of Frauds.5 30
If the contract area is not sufficiently described, then a future requirement to
relinquish or transfer an interest likely will be unenforceable. 5 3 1
It is more likely that Statute of Frauds problems will develop under the
operating agreement for failure to ensure that the instrument is fully executed
by all parties or by their authorized agents.532 Because thorough title
examinations are not likely to be available when the JOA is signed and may
not be obtained afterwards, errors are common.5 In the case of individuals,
parties or their counsel "often [fail] to check local requirements on joinder of
spouses to ensure that both husbands and wives execute the instrument where
required ... ."5 Care must also be taken to ensure that parties representing
corporate and partnership interests sign in a correct and authorized
capacity.5 35
Nonetheless, failure of a single party to execute an operating agreement
will have no effect on the validity of the instrument with respect to the
executing parties under the 1989 and 2015 Form JOA, if the agreement
provides that it "shall be binding upon each party who executes the same ...
regardless of the failure of any other party to execute the same." 536
Some significant changes were made to the execution provision in the
1989-H Form JOA that were carried forward to the 2015 Form JOA, but first
some background is in order. The 1989 Form JOA added an execution
provision that allows the operator to terminate the agreement if all
non-operators have not executed the agreement before the spud date of the
initial well, but not later than five days before the date the operator was
required to commence the initial well.537 If the operator terminates the
agreement under this provision, it is required to return any sums already
advanced by the non-operators. 3 The 2015 Form JOA modified this
530. Id at 89 (citing Westland Oil Dev. Corp. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 637 S.W.2d 903, 909 (Tex. 1982)).
531. See id. at 88; Long Trs. v. Griffin, 222 S.W.3d 412, 416 (Tex. 2006).
532. See Conine, supra note 4, at 1374.
533. See id.
534. Id. at 1374-75.
535. See id at 1375.
536. See Sw. Gas Prod. Co. v. Creslenn Oil Co., 181 So. 2d 63, 68 (La. Ct. App. 1965); see also FORM
610-2015, supra note 2, at art. XV.A; FORM 610-1989, supra note 15, at art. XV.A. Note, however, that
an unexecuted sample operating agreement with incomplete provisions attached to another instrument is
of no effect. See King-Stevenson Gas & Oil Co. v. Texam Oil Corp., 466 P.2d 950, 956 (Okla. 1970).
Further, modifications of an operating agreement are not binding on the parties other than those accepting
the terms of the amendment when the agreement's obligations are individual and several, rather than joint.
See Osborn v. Rogers, 363 P.2d 219, 222 (Okla. 1961); McFarlane v. Clevenger, 665 S.W.2d 819, 82425 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1983, writ ref d n.r.e.). On the other hand, an operating agreement termed
"preliminary" by the parties can be effective until later modified if so intended by the parties. Chevron
U.S.A., Inc. v. Martin Expl. Co., 447 So.2d 469,472 (La. 1984). Estoppel may also play a role in binding
a non-executing party to the terms of the operating agreement. See Great W. Oil & Gas Co. v. Mitchell,
326 P.2d 794, 800 (Okla. 1958).
537. See FORM 610-1989, supra note 15, at art. XV.A.
538. See id

2018]

AN UPDATE FOR THE NEW 2015 FORMJOA

553

requirement slightly by allowing the operator to deduct costs already incurred
by the operator attributable to the operation before termination. 3
Alternatively, the operator could proceed and indemnify the signing
non-operators for the non-signing parties' share of the costs of the initial well,
in which case the operator would be entitled to all of the revenue that would
have been received by the non-signing parties. The 1989-H Form JOA added
an optional provision carried forward in the 2015 Form JOA that would allow
an executing party, in the event the operator elects to proceed without
signatures from all listed parties, to elect to carry its proportionate share of
the non-signing parties' share of costs. 54 0

Despite these provisions, partial performance is an exception to the
requirement that an agreement be signed by the party alleged to be subject to
its terms. 54 1 Thus, a party may be bound by the operating agreement even if
it has not executed the document when that party fails to object to the
operator's activities in that capacity over a number of years. 5 4 2
B. Rule againstPerpetuities
The common law Rule against Perpetuities provides that, "[n]o interest
is good unless it must vest, if at all, not later than twenty-one years after some
life in being at the creation of the interest."5 43 The policy behind the rule,
which is applicable to mineral estates as well as surface interests, is one of
promoting the commercial use of property by preventing restraints on the
alienation of property for undue periods of time.5 Because several property
provisions in the JOA place conditions and limitations on the transfer of
various interests, there is always a concern that the Rule against Perpetuities
could be used by the courts to declare one or more of those provisions
invalid.545 Specifically, these provisions include the carried interests and
reversionary rights created by the non-consent penalty; the preferential right;
the AMI provision; the provisions on the extension and renewal of leases;
and the acreage contribution clause-all of which seek to compel the
conveyance of property interests at a point in the future which may exceed
the time limitations prescribed by the rule.546

539.
540.
541.
542.

See FORM 610-2015, supra note 2, at art. XV.A.
See id; FoRM 610-1989, supra note 15, at art. XV.A.
See Pou v. Dominion Oil Co., 265 S.W. 886, 888 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1924).
See Auster Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Stream, 764 F.2d 381, 389 n.7 (5th Cir. 1985).

543.

J. GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES

§ 374

§ 201

(4th ed. 1942); RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY

(AM. LAW INST. 1944).

544. EUGENE KUNTZ, LAW OF OIL & GAS § 17.1 (1987); BRUCE M. KRAMER & PATRICK H. MARTIN,
WILLIAMS & MEYERS, OIL & GAS LAW § 320.1 (2015).

545. For more general information on the application of the Rule against Perpetuities in the oil and
gas context, see Bruce M. Kramer, Modern Applications of the Rule againstPerpetuitiesto Oil and Gas
Transactions: What the Duke ofNorfolkDidn't Tell You, 37 NAT. RES. J. 281 (1997).
546. See id at 300-04.
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For example, the Rule against Perpetuities has been applied to invalidate
options for the acquisition of property interests if the exercise of the option
could potentially occur beyond the time limitations of the rule.5 47 The
preferential right to purchase and other provisions in the JOA are sufficiently
analogous to such options that the courts have had to consider the application
of the Rule against Perpetuities. 54 8 Fortunately, the trend has been to relax
the inflexible application of the rule and to give effect to the intention of the
parties. 5 4 9
Many states, including Colorado, New Mexico, Kansas, North Dakota,
and California, have amended the common law rule by enacting some form
of the Uniform Statutory Rule against Perpetuities (USRAP). 550 In addition
to validating contingent future interests that satisfy the common law rule,
USRAP also validates interests that actually vest within ninety years after the
date of the grant and allows the court to reform interests that violate either
the common law rule or the ninety-year "wait-and-see" period.5 5' USRAP,
however, specially states that the statutory rule does not apply to nondonative
transactions such as commercial transactions under the rationale that the rule
"is [a] wholly inappropriate instrument of social policy to use as a control
over such arrangements." 552 Even though options and preferential rights
should be valid when USRAP is applicable, validity may turn on the effective
date of the enactment of the statute. 553
For example, in Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Whiting Oil and Gas Corp., the
Colorado Supreme Court considered whether a revocable option granted in
1983 to repurchase oil shale property violated the Rule against
Perpetuities.554 Colorado had adopted USRAP, but as enacted it only applied
to abolish the common law rule for nonvested interests created after May 31,
1991.555 The parties disagreed whether USRAP allowed the trial court to

547. See, e.g., Melcher v. Camp, 435 P.2d 107, 115 (Okla. 1967) (holding the preferential right to
purchase oil and gas lease invalid).
548. See Reasoner, supra note 519, at 65-71; e.g., Producers Oil Co. v. Gore, 610 P.2d 772, 774
(Okla. 1980).
549. See First Nat'1 Bank & Tr. Co. v. Sidwell Corp., 678 P.2d 118, 126 (Kan. 1984).
550.

See Statutory Rule against Perpetuities Summary, UNiFORM L. COMMISSION, http://www.

uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title=Statutory%2ORule%2OAgainst%2OPerpetuities
2018).
551.

UNIF. STAT. RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES

§§

(last visited Feb. 24,

1(a), 3 (2014).

552. Id. at § 4, cmt. A.
553. See Larson Operating Co. v. Petroleum, Inc., 84 P.3d 626, 633 (Kan. Ct. App. 2004).
554. See Atl. Richfield Co. v. Whiting Oil & Gas Corp., 320 P.3d 1179, 1180 (Colo. 2014).
555. COLO. REV. STAT. § 15.11.1102.5(1)(b)(I) (West 2018). In 2006, Colorado amended its
statutory Rule against Perpetuities to provide that a "nonvested property interest is invalid unless it either
vests or terminates within one thousand years after its creation." See id This 1,000 year vesting rule states
that it is only applicable to "interests in trust and powers of appointment with respect to all or any part of
a trust, which interest or power is created after May 31, 2001." Id § (1)(a). Commercial transactions
entered into after May 31, 1991 are not subject to the rule at all in Colorado. See Lynn P. Hendrix, Death
of the Rule againstPerpetuitiesin CommercialTransactions, 21 COLO. LAW. 475, 476 (1992).
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retrospectively reform a grant made before the effective date of adoption.556
The Colorado Supreme Court, however, never reached the reformation
issue-instead, the court focused on the threshold matter of whether the
option violated the common law rule."s
In past decisions, the Colorado Supreme Court had applied the rule to
ordinary options and preemptive rights without much analysis. 558 But in this

case, the court took the opportunity to expound on the litany of reasons
against applying the rule to options and preemptive rights. 55 9 These reasons
include: (1) that the vesting period based on lives in being makes little sense
in commercial transactions; (2) that the rule was designed to prevent
dead-hand control of family dynasties, not commercial transactions; and
(3) that equity and free markets favor the enforcement of options and
preferential rights in negotiated contractual arrangements.5 6 0 The court also
referred to the Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes, which expressly
states that the rule no longer applies to options and rights of first refusal with
respect to the purchase of land.56' As to its past holdings, the court concluded
that, when it had said in the past that it was applying the rule to options and
preferential rights, it really had been applying a Rule against Unreasonable
Restraints on Alienation.562
The court ultimately concluded that the option poses no effective
restraint on alienation because it was fully revocable, also quoting the rule
that "an interest, which is presently destructible, is not subject to the Rule
against Perpetuities." 5 63 Although the dicta is helpful, the court never reaches
the question of whether an ordinary option granted in a negotiated transaction
that creates an absolute right to purchase might still violate the rule.5 4
In jurisdictions that retain the common law rule, however, some courts
have found it inapplicable to provisions of the JOA.56 5 In Melcher v. Camp,
the.Oklahoma Supreme Court previously determined that a preemptive right
to acquire an oil and gas lease, if and when a lease was granted on certain
556. See At. Richfield, 320 P.3d at 1183. The court of appeals noted that some states expressly
exclude interests arising from nondonative transfers from the operation of the entire act, including the
reformation provisions, and not just from the vesting requirements. See id.
557. See id at 1191.
558. See, e.g., Atchison v. City of Englewood, 463 P.2d 297, 310-11 (Colo. 1969) (holding that the
rule's application to "ordinary options" is "firmly established"); see also Perry v. Brundage, 614 P.2d 362,
366 (Colo. 1980) (holding that the rule applies to both options and preemptive rights).
559. See Atl. Ritchfield, 320 P.3d at 1183-85,
560. See id.
561.

See.id at 1184; RESTATEMENT (THiRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES § 3.3 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST.

2000).
562. See All. Ritchfield, 320 P.3d at 1188-89 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY:
SERVITUDES § 3.3 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 2000) ("[I]n permitting the social utility of the particular
arrangement to avoid invalidation, courts in fact are applying the Rule against Unreasonable Restraints on
Alienation rather than the rule against perpetuities.").
563. GRAY, supra note 543, at 512.
564. See Atl. Rilchfield, 320 P.3dat 1191.
565. See, e.g., Producers Oil Co. v. Gore, 610 P.2d 772 (Okla. 1980).
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property, was void as a violation of the rule.566 When the validity of the
preferential right to purchase an Oklahoma oil and gas leasehold interest later
arose in the context of an operating agreement, the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals certified the question to the Oklahoma Supreme Court for
clarification. 6 7 As part of its rationale for declaring the Rule against
Perpetuities inapplicable in this latter instance, the Oklahoma Court
expressed its "strong view that the Rule against Perpetuities should not apply
to oil and gas operating agreements."S6 8 Opinions by courts in several other
producing states have reached this same conclusion.5 69
It is important to note a second basis for the decision in Producer'sOil
Co. v. Gore. The Rule against Perpetuities has no application in a situation
in which a preemptive right to purchase is contained within a lease and
limited to the duration of the leasehold estate.570 The court concluded that
the preferential option under the JOA was similarly limited to the term of
each lease within the contract area. 7 1 The preemptive right granted by the
JOA could only remain viable as long as the underlying lease itself was in
effect. Thus, the Rule against Perpetuities was inapplicable.572
It should also be noted that many cases, such as Weber v. Texas Co.,
have distinguished the preferential right to purchase from an unending option
to acquire the property at the discretion of the optionee.573 Because the
preferential right can only be exercised when the present owner decides to
sell and on terms accepted by the proposed third-party buyer, the court in
Weber reasoned that the provision did not offend the commercial purposes
behind the rule.5 74

566. Melcher v. Camp, 435 P.2d 107, 114-15 (Okla. 1967).
567. See ProducersOil, 610 P.2d at 773.
568. See id. at 774 (quoting Producers Oil Co. v. Gore, 437 F. Supp. 737, 742 (E.D. Okla. 1977)).
569. See, e.g., Greenshields v. Warren Petroleum Corp., 248 F.2d 61, 70-72 (10th Cir. 1957), cert.
denied, 355 U.S. 907 (1957); Cambridge Co. v. E. Slope Inv. Corp., 700 P.2d 537, 540 (Colo. 1985);
Denney v. Teel, 688 P.2d 803, 807-10 (Okla. 1984); Harnett v. Jones, 629 P.2d 1357, 1362-63 (Wyo.
1981). In Larson OperatingCo. v. Petroleum, Inc., the court held that the Uniform Statutory Rule against
Perpetuities adopted in Kansas, KAN. STAT. ANN § 59-3401 (West 2017), exempts non-vested property
interests created by non-donative transfers, and therefore does not apply to the preemptive right granted
in the JOA. Larson Operating Co. v. Petroleum, Inc., 84 P.3d 626 (Kan. Ct. App. 2004). The court noted
that "the rationale for this exemption is that the Rule against Perpetuities is a wholly inappropriate
instrument of social policy to use as a control over commercial and governmental transactions." Id at 633.
570. See Producers Oil, 610 P.2d at 775-76; RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 395 (AM. LAW INST.
1944).
571. Producers Oil, 610 P.2d at 776.
572. See id at 776; see Hartnett v. Jones, 629 P.2d 1357, 1362-63 (Wyo. 1981) (holding that the
preferential right to purchase contained in joint venture agreement was not voided by the rule because
partnership would terminate upon death of any partner which by definition is a life in being).
573. Weber v. Tex. Co., 83 F.2d 807, 808 (5th Cir. 1936), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 561 (1936).
574. Id.; see also Murphy Expl. & Prod. Co. v. Sun Operating Ltd. P'ship, 747 So. 2d 260 (Miss.
1999) (concluding that the Rule against Perpetuities was inapplicable to the preferential right to purchase
in the JOA).
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C. Rule against UnreasonableRestraints on Alienation
Restrictions that unreasonably interfere with the free transfer of real
property are also void under the common law. 5 75 The purpose of this rule,
like that of the Rule against Perpetuities, is to promote the utilization of land
by precluding impediments to future development.576 However, there is a
distinction between the two rules. The Rule against Restraints on Alienation
is broadly concerned with all transfer restrictions. 7 The Rule against
Perpetuities, on the other hand, applies to restrictions that specifically defer
the vesting of an interest in a third party, thereby imposing limitations on
intervening transfers. 7 Like the Rule against Perpetuities, the Rule against
Restraints on Alienation applies to mineral and oil and gas interests.57 9

On policy grounds, common law restrictions on undue restraints on
alienation are constrained by the same respect for commercial development
as observed by the courts in oil and gas cases dealing with perpetuities.580 As
long as the restraint is indirect and ancillary to a legitimate commercial
purpose, the restriction should survive judicial scrutiny under the Rule
against Undue Restraints."' Thus, it has been held that the preferential right
to purchase in an oil and gas context does not restrain alienability in the sense
prohibited by the rule.5 8 2 As previously discussed, however, the law may
distinguish between a preferential right to purchase and a pure option, the
latter of which is more likely to constitute an unreasonable restraint. 83
Under the Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes, direct restraints
on alienation are invalid if unreasonable.584 Reasonableness is determined
by weighing the utility of the restraint against the consequences. 8 The
Restatement (Third) would allow standard preferential rights under the JOA
because it states that rights of first refusal that allow the right to purchase on
the same terms and conditions as the'owner may receive from a third party
are valid." Following the Restatement and similar reasoning, Texas courts
have routinely upheld preferential rights.587
575. See, e.g., Shields v. Moffitt, 683 P.2d 530, 534 (Okla. 1984) (holding that a lease restricting
assignment by lessee without the lessor's written consent is void).
576. See Jeffrey J. Scott, Restrictions on Alienation Applied to Oil and Gas Transactions,31 ROCKY
MTN. MIN. L. INST. § 15.03(2) (1985).
577. See id
578. See Dallapi v. Campbell, 114 P.2d 646, 649 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1941).
579. See KRAMER & MARTIN, supranote 544, at § 320.1.
580. See id.
581. See Reasoner, supra note 519, at 61.
582. See Weber v. Tex. Co., 83 F.2d 807, 808 (5th Cir. 1936), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 561 (1936);
RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY

§ 413(1)

cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 1944).

583.

See supra Sections III.B.1-3 (describing certain rights to purchase as unreasonable restraints).

584.

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES

§ 3.4 (AM.

LAW INST. 2000).

585. See id.
586. See id. § 3.4 cmt. f.
587. See, e.g., Navasota Res., L.P. v. First Source Tex., Inc., 249 S.W.3d 526, 538 (Tex. App.-Waco
2008, pet. denied) (following the Restatement, citing cases, and concluding that "Texas courts have
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The Restatement (Third) takes a stricter approach for options, but the
typical AMI should also be valid under its reasoning.588 Under the
Restatement (Third), the reasonableness of an option depends on its duration
and the exercise price of the option.58 9 If the price is fair market value as it
is under a typical AMI, it is more likely to be valid than a fixed-price option
because fixed-price options are considered to discourage improvements. 9 o
The Restatement (Third) also provides that the longer the duration of
the option, the more likely it will be invalid.5 91 The AMI included with a
JOA may be limited by the term of the underlying leases if it expires with the
remaining provisions of the JOA.59 2 Even if the underlying interest is a fee
interest of unlimited term, the provisions of the operating agreement which
deem such interest subject to a lease should allow the application of similar
reasoning if the provisions of the hypothetical lease are construed to release
the mineral interest from the JOA upon the expiration of the supposed lease
term.59 3 Nevertheless, the AMI might stay outstanding for an extremely long
period. 59 4 In such case, the Restatement (Third) states that an option with a
long duration may be justified by the purpose of the option or if "it is clear
that the parties expressly.bargained over the specified duration." 5 9 5
Although one might attempt to address the duration issue by adding an
express sunset provision to the AMI (which may be wise for business
reasons), consider that the option period itself is usually an extremely short
period after the purchase of property by a party to the AMI.5 9 6 There is
another even stronger reason, however, that an AMI provision should not be
invalidated as a restraint on alienation. 59 7 Such a provision is much more a
restraint on the purchase of property than it is on the sale of property; the
seller is not constrained on its ability to sell to whomever it chooses whenever
it chooses.
Instead of a restraint on alienation, the AMI would be better
characterized as a common law restraint on competition for property within
the contract area, which is also a type of restraint subject to scrutiny.5 98 Such
restraints are also invalid if unreasonable, but the Authors are unaware of any
reported cases that applied a common law property competition restraint

without exception upheld provisions like the [Preferential Rights provision] at issue here as reasonable
restraints on alienation.").
588.

See RESTATEMENT (TifiRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES § 3.4 (AM. LAW INST. 2000).

589.
590.
591.
592.
593.
594.
595.
596.

See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See

597.

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES

598.

See id.

id. at § 3.4 cmt. e.
id
id at § 3.4 cmt. c.
generally id.
generally id.
generally id.
id at § 3.4 cmt. e.
generally cf Sunset Law, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (Bryan A. Garner, ed. 9th ed. 2009).

§ 3.6

(AM. LAW INST. 2000).
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analysis to an AMI provision.5 99 A sunset provision or defining the
geographic area narrowly might also reduce the likelihood that an AMI
would be deemed an invalid restraint on competition. 60 0 Although beyond
the scope of this Article, the parties should also be concerned with potential
anti-trust issues in the context of AMIs and JOAs generally. 60
D. Application to, and Priorityagainst, Assignees and Assignors
1. Pure ContractLaw Analysis
The typical operating agreement does not forbid the parties from
transferring their interests in the contract area. Such transfers may be subject
to preferential rights or requirements for the maintenance of a uniform
interest, but these limitations clearly contemplate that conveyances will
occur. 60 2 However, the operating agreement expressly requires that any
conveyance be made "subject" to the JOA 60 3 and proclaims that its terms shall
be binding on the assigns of each party.604 The question is whether these
provisions are adequate to assure that the transferee of a party's interest will
be bound by the terms of the JOA.
The effect of the assignment and delegation of a lease or interest subject
to a JOA on the required performance of a promise by the assignor or
assignee may depend on whether the promise is characterized as a contractual
promise or a covenant running with the land. Under a pure contract analysis,
contractual rights generally may be assigned and contractual duties may be
delegated, but the delegation of a duty or even the assumption of that duty by
an assignee does not release the assignor from liability unless the obligee of
the duty agrees to release the assignor.605 Such an assumption and release is
referred to as a novation. 60 6 If, however, the assignee assumes the obligations
of the assignor but the other parties to the contract do not release the assignor,
then the assignee is obligated to perform under the contract and the assignor
607
becomes a surety for the performance of the obligation by the assignee.
599.

See id.

600.

See generally cf Sunset Law, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (Bryan A. Garner, ed. 9th ed. 2009).

601. See generally Timothy R. Beyer, Tangled Relationships: Antitrust Considerations, Recent
Enforcement Acts, and Proposed Solutions When Using AMIs and Other Forms of Collaboration, 59
ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 13 (2013); Daniel L. Wellington et al., Benchmarking, Joint Operations, and
Antitrust Law: Boundariesfor Cooperation among Competitors in the Oil and Gas Industry, 54 ROCKY

MTN. MIN. L. INST. 31 (2008).
602. See generally supra Sections II.B. 1, III.C (discussing preferential rights and maintenance of a
uniform interest)
603. See FORM 610-2015, supra note 2 at art. VIII.D ("Every sale, encumbrance, transfer or other
disposition . . . shall be made expressly subject to this agreement .....
604. See id. at art. XIV.B.
605.

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS

606.

See generally id.

607.

See id at

§

§ 317-18

(AM. LAW INST. 2013).

328 cmt. a, Illust. 1; 9 JOHN E. MURRAY, JR. & TIMOTHY MURRAY, CORBIN ON
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This contract law analysis was applied by the Supreme Court of Texas
Seagull
Energy E&P, Inc. v. Eland Energy, Inc.608 Eland assigned its
in
interest in the lease subject to a JOA, and after the assignee failed to pay its
share of costs and declared bankruptcy, the operator pursued Eland.609 The
court rejected the argument that had been successful in the court of appeals
that the language of the operating agreement imposed no continuing
obligation on the assignor because a party was only obligated to pay costs in
proportion to its participating interest.6 10
The holding in Seagull was heavily criticized by commentators under a
number of rationales. 611 One argument against Seagull posits, applying a
landlord-tenant analysis, that the operator had no right to enforce the JOA
against Eland because it had neither privity of contract (which arises between
the original parties to the JOA) nor privity of estate with Eland, an
intermediate assignee that subsequently assigned its interest. 612 When Eland
was assigned its interest, however, it expressly assumed its assignor's
obligations under the JOA to the operator, who was likely an intended
beneficiary of the assumption. 613 Other arguments of commentators include
that the decision was contrary to the understanding of the industry 614 and that
the decision should be interpreted as limited to general obligations such as
the plugging and abandonment (P&A) costs at issue in Seagull, not
subsequent operations that are subject to consent/nonconsent and
commenced after the date of the assignment.6 15
This latter interpretation has support in decisions issued since Seagull.616
In GOM Shelf LLC v. Sun OperatingLtd. P'ship, the court applied Seagull
to hold an assignor liable for P&A operations on the Outer Continental

CONTRACTS § 49.6 (Matthew Bender ed., 2017).
608. Seagull Energy E & P, Inc. v. Eland Energy, Inc., 207 S.W.3d 342, 346-47 (Tex. 2006).
609. See id. at 344.
610. Eland Energy, Inc. v. Seagull Energy E&P, Inc., 135 S.W.3d 122, 129 (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 2006), overruled by, 207 S.W.3d 342, 347 (Tex. 2006).
611. Despite the criticism, in Pennaco Energy Inc. v. KD Co. LLC, Seagull was extended to the
liability of an assignor under surface use agreements. Pennaco Energy, Inc. v. KD Co., 363 P.3d 18, 33
(Wyo. 2015).
612. See Christopher S. Kulander & David W. Lauritzen, A Flock of Trouble: Liability under Oil and
Gas Joint OperatingAgreements after Seagull v. Eland, 14 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REv. 217, 230 (2008);
Preston R. Mundt, Comment, The Assignor Giveth and the OperatorTaketh Away: Oil and Gas Working
Interest Owners Beware of Continuing Liability, 40 TEX. TECH L. REv. 419, 423-24 (2008); see also
David A. Thomas, How FarDoes the Covenant Run? Covenants that Run with the Land in Oil and Gas
Transactions, 53 ROCKY MT. MIN. L. INST. 19, § 19-05 (2007).
613.

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS

§ 318

cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 2013) (indicating

that an assignee may or may not promise the assignor/obligor to render performance, and "[ilf he does so
promise, the obligee may in some cases be an intended beneficiary of the promise").
614. See Kulander & Lauritzen, supra note 612, at 232.
615. See David Patton, Bad Moon Rising-The ContinuingLiability ofan Assignee after Assignment,
53 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 31 § 31.03 (2007).
616. See, e.g, GOM Shelf, LLC v. Sun Operating Ltd. P'ship, No. 4:06-cv-3444, 2008 WL 901482
(S.D. Tex. 2008).
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Shelf.6 17 Although the assignment clause in the JOA at issue contained a

release "of all obligations hereunder which accrue subsequent to the date of
the delivery to the purchaser of written assignment or conveyance of such
interest, . . ."under OCSLA such obligations "accrue" when a party becomes

a lessee or owner of operating rights, not when expenses for P&A operations
are incurred.618
In Indian Oil Co., LLC v. Bishop PetroleumInc., the operator attempted
to hold an assignor liable for the costs to workover and then plug and abandon
an unproductive well.6 19 The JOA provided that an assignor is not relieved
of "obligations previously incurred by such party." 620 The court held that this
language meant the assignor was liable for obligations incurred before the
date of the assignment but not entirely new operations, and that workover
an
obligation
previously
cannot
be
considered
operations
incurred. 62 1 Because the assignor never tendered a jury instruction to
apportion damages and acknowledged in oral argument that he was liable for
P&A expenses, the matter was remanded for a new trial although the court
never affirmatively resolved the assignor's legal responsibility for P&A
costs.

622

The 2015 Form JOA addresses Seagull by the addition of the following
language in the assignment provision:
Except as otherwise provided herein, any transfer by a party shall relieve
the transferor from liability for the cost and expense of operations
attributable to the transferred interest which are conducted after the
expiration of the 30-day period above provided [receipt by operator of
transfer documents] .... 62 3
As described in Indian Oil Co., the provision then continues language
(now as a proviso) forward from the 1989 Form JOA that an assignment does
not relieve a party of obligations "incurred" before the assignment, including
those attributable to an approved operation.624 The 2015 Form then adds:

617. See id.at*ll.
618. Id. at *4; see also Nippon Oil Expl. U.S.A. Ltd. v. Murphy Expl. & Prod. Co.-USA, No.
10-2850, 2011 WL 2456358 (E.D. La. 2011) (holding the assignor responsible for its share of
decommissioning costs as accruing before the date of the assignment, but not for the increase in such costs
arising from a hurricane after the date of the assignment where, under the terms of the JOA, the operator
was required to charge the costs of fires, floods, storms, etc. to the joint account).
619. Indian Oil Co., LLC v. Bishop Petroleum Inc., 406 S.W.3d 644, 648 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.], 2013 pet. denied).
620. Id. at 657.
621. See id at 658-60.
622. Id. at 659.
623. FORM 610-2015, supranote 2, at art. VIII.D (emphasis added).
624. See id
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The transferee shall be jointly and severally liable with [the] transferor for
payment of its share of all costs and expenses attributable to an approved
operation conducted hereunder in which its transferor had agreed to
625
participate.
The release language now included in the Form JOA should be
respected by the courts to relieve an assignor of liability for subsequent
operations for which an assignor has not been provided notice or the
opportunity to participate,626 but lawsuits may continue to arise under the
assignment provision because it does not expressly address when P&A
liabilities accrue or are incurred. 6 27 The 2015 Form JOA does state that
"approved" operations in which the assignor has agreed to participate before
the assignment is incurred, but does not indicate what other obligations, such
as P&A liabilities, might be incurred before the date of an assignment.628
Further, in his 1988 article, Professor Conine wisely points out that the
JOA should contain a provision that expressly requires an assignee to assume
the obligations of its assignor to eliminate the need for an analysis in most
cases as to whether covenants run with the land where an operator or other
party seeks to hold an assignee liable. 6 2 9 Curiously, such a provision was not
added to the 2015 Form JOA.630
In light of this omission, consider the case in which an assignee of an
interest does not expressly assume the assignor's obligations and has no
notice of the JOA, despite the requirement in the JOA that the assignment be
made subject to the JOA.' Making the assignment "subject" to the JOA
may provide notice of these covenants but does not impose any personal
obligation on the assignee.632 The JOA specifically states that it is "binding
upon and shall inure to the benefit of the parties ... and their ... successors
and assigns, . . ." which may be sufficient to hold an assignee responsible for
its obligations when the assignee has notice of the JOA or accepts the benefits

625. See id.
626. See generally Seagull Energy E & P, Inc. v. Eland Energy, Inc., 207 S.W.2d 342, 344 (Tex.
2006). See also KUNTZ, supra note 465, at § 51.2 (discussing a common clause in oil and gas leases that
purports to release the lessee after an assignment). Kuntz states, in the context of an assignment of a
lease, there is no reason to question the validity of such a clause, although there is a theoretical question
whether the clause could be invoked to protect an assignor that makes an assignment to a financially
irresponsible party to escape liability. Id.
627. See FORM 610-2015, supra note 2, at art. VIII.
628. See id.
629. See Conine, supra note 4, at 1385.
630. See generally FORM 610-2015, supranote 2.
631. See id. at art. VIII.
632. See generally Chatham Pharm., Inc. v. Angier Chem. Co., 196 N.E. 2d 852, 854 (Mass. 1964)
(stating that unless assignee expressly assumes assignor's personal duties, he is not bound to perform
them); Rio Gas Co. v. Midcon Gas Servs. Corp., No. 01-96-00967-CV, 1999 WL 333152 (Tex. App.Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, pet. denied); Rosse v. N. Pump Co., 353 S.W.2d 287 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin
1962, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (noting that the phrase "subject to" is a term of qualification and not of contract).
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of the transaction.6 33 But absent notice to the assignee, an argument might
be made that neither the assignor nor the assignee is liable under the 2015
Form JOA for operations after the date of the assignment. 634 To remedy this
possibility, the language in Article VIII.D of the JOA might be revised as
follows:
Every sale, encumbrance, transfer or other disposition made by any party
shall be made expressly subject to this agreement and shall be made without
prejudice to the right of the other parties, and any transferee of an ownership
interest in any Oil and Gas Lease or Interest shall be deemed a party to this
agreement as to the interest conveyed from and after the effective date of
the transfer of ownership; provided, however, that the other parties shall not
be required to recognize any such sale, encumbrances, transfer or other
disposition for any purpose hereunder until thirty (30) days after Operator
has received a copy of the instrument of transfer or other satisfactory
evidence thereunder in writing from the transferor or transferee. In the case
of a transfer of an ownership interest in any Oil and Gas Lease or Interest,
the transferee is deemed to assume, and the transferor shall ensure that the
instrument of transfer or an instrument executed concurrently therewith
provides for the express assumption by the transferee of, [all] [the] duties
and liabilities of the transferor under this agreement with respect to the
transferred interest [arising from and after the date and time of the
assignment]. Except as otherwise provided herein, if the transferee of an
interest in an Oil and Gas Lease or Interest has expressly agreed to such an
assumption of the transferor's duties and liabilities attributable to the
transferred interest then the transferor an' tfansfer by a party shall be
relieved of the transferfrom liability under this agreement for the cost and
expense of operations attributable to the transferred interest which are
conducted after the expiration of the thirty-day period above provided; . .
2. Covenants that Run with the Land
If the assignee has not expressly assumed the obligations of its assignor,
then issues of notice and classification of provisions under the JOA as
covenants running with the land become very important. 63 5 In contrast to a
633. Reeder v. Wood Cty. Energy, L.L.C., 320 S.W.3d 433, 443, 11-13 (Tex. App-Tyler 2010),
rev'd sub nom, Reeder v. Wood Cty. Energy, LLC, 395 S.W.3d 789 (Tex. 2012), opinion supplemented
on reh g (Mar. 29,2013); see also Imperial Ref. Co. v. Kanotex Ref Co., 29 F.2d 193, 199 (8th Cir. 1928)
(holding that where assignor assigns all right and delegates all duties in assignment, assignee can impliedly
undertake the performance of the duties by voluntarily accepting the benefits of the transaction); Fasken
Land & Minerals, Ltd. v. Occidental Permian Ltd., 225 S.W.3d 577, 594 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2005, pet.
denied) (stating that quasi-estoppel precludes a party from accepting benefits and then taking an
inconsistent position to avoid obligations); Stable Energy, L.P. v. Newberry, 999 S.W.2d 538, 547 (Tex.
App.-Austin 1999, pet. denied) (noting that ratification occurs when a party to a contract acts, performs,
or acknowledges the contract).
634. See generallyFORM 610-2015, supranote 2.
635. See Conine, supra note 4, at 1385-86.
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pure contractual analysis, if a promise or "burden" under a JOA is
characterized not simply as a contractual or "personal" obligation, but a
covenant running with the land, the burden will obligate not only the
immediate parties but future assigns as well, and the assignor of the land may
be automatically relieved from its future performance of the promise upon
assignment.636 In today's climate of low oil and gas prices, classification may
also have bankruptcy implications. While an executory contract such as a
JOA may be rejected in bankruptcy,6 37 covenants that run with the land are
property interests that cannot be rejected.63 8
In the recent unreported case of TransTexas Gas Corp. v. Forcenergy
Onshore, Inc., during the pendency of the initial lawsuit, the plaintiff
received a drilling proposal from the defendant and shortly thereafter
declared bankruptcy.6 39 The defendant claimed that by not consenting to the
drilling proposal, the plaintiff should be subject to the nonconsent penalty
provisions.64 0 The plaintiff responded that because it never assumed the
obligations or signed the operating agreement when it acquired its interest, it
was not bound by the JOA. '1 The court agreed with the defendant, finding
that the entire JOA runs with the land because of the provision therein that it
was binding on successors and assigns.6 2 The court also held that the
interests of the defendant that were relinquished by the plaintiff under the
nonconsent provisions were excluded from the bankruptcy estate because the
Bankruptcy Code expressly excludes a "farmout agreement" and the JOA
met the definition of a farmout agreement.
Generally, a covenant runs with the land at law (a real covenant) when
(1) it touches and concerns the land,644 (2) the original covenanting parties
636. See id
637. See 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (West 2018) (stating that a debtor in possession, "subject to the court's
approval, may assume or reject any executory contract . . . of the debtor").
638. See Goeveia v. Tazbir, 37 F.3d 295, 298 (7th Cir. 1994); Banning Lewis Ranch Co. LLC v. City
of Col. Springs (In re Banning Lewis Ranch Co., LLC), 532 B.R. 335, 346 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2015).
639. TransTexas Gas Corp. v. Forcenergy Onshore, Inc., No. 13-10-00446-CV, 2012 WL 1255218,
at * 1 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi Apr. 12, 2012, pet. denied) (mem. op. not designated for publication).
640. Id. at *2.
641. Id.
642. Id. at *6. The court reached its conclusion with little analysis and no mention of privity of estate.
See id.
643. See id at *7 (citing Rhett G. Campbell & David M. Bennett, Bankruptcy in the New Millennium:
Energy, Insolvency, and Enron, 48 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 18, 19 (2002)). Specifically, the
Bankruptcy Code states that the property of the debtor's estate does not include "any interest of the debtor
in liquid or gaseous hydrocarbons to the extent that . .. the debtor has transferred ... such interest pursuant
to a farmout agreement. . . ." 11 U.S.C. § 541(b)(4)(A)(1). The Code defines a farmout agreement as "a
written agreement in which the owner of a .. . [working interest] ... has agreed to transfer or assign all
or a part of such right to another entity" that agrees as consideration to perform operations to develop or
produce on the property. Id. § 101(21A).
644. See RIcHARD R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 60.04(3)(a) (Michael Allan Wolf ed.,
2000). It has been said that this requirement is satisfied for a burden to run if the covenant renders the
coventator's legal interest in land less valuable, and for a benefit to run, if the coventee's legal interest in
land is rendered more valuable. See id. A covenant to pay money touches and concerns the land if the
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intended that the covenant run with the land,MS and (3) there is privity of
estate. In contrast, a covenant that runs in equity (an equitable servitude)
requires notice to the successor rather than privity, such that a purchaser for
value without actual, constructive, or inquiry notice of the covenant would
not be subject to the burden.' 6 If there is no intent that the benefit or burden
of a covenant run to successors, then the covenant is considered personal to
the original parties and will not run with the land. 647
Historically, courts of law awarded damages, but courts of equity
granted only injunctions barring certain actions.
As such, courts of equity
enforced only negative covenants-that is, a prohibition on doing something
on the land.64 9 A preferential right to purchase is a negative covenant in that
it prohibits a party to the JOA from transferring an interest without first
offering the interest to the other parties.6 10 Clearly, the requirement for a
party to pay its proportionate share of a subsequent operation is an affirmative
obligation, but so are requirements to transfer property in the future.65 1 For
example, the extension and renewal clause and the AMI clause are likely
affirmative covenants in the former case because the covenant requires a
party to contribute an extended or renewed lease and in the latter case because
it requires a party to offer a proportionate interest in a newly acquired lease
or interest to the other parties to the JOA.652 Under historical conceptions,
the benefitted party would need to show privity of estate to enforce these
obligations as covenants at law.653

money is used for improvements that touch and concern the land. Thomas, supra note 612, at
§ 19.04[5][b][iv].
645. The JOA expressly provides that "the terms hereof shall be deemed to run with the Leases or
Interests included within the [c]ontract [a]rea." Form 610-2015, supra note 2, at art. XV.B.
646.

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES

§

1.4 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 2000).

647. See Form 610-2015, supranote 2, at art. X.V.B. § 60.01[5]. In Texas, the elements are that the
covenant (1) touches and concerns the land, (2) relates to a thing in existence or specifically binds the
parties and their assigns, (3) is intended by the original parties to run with the land, and (4) the successor
to the burden has notice. Inwood N. Homeowners' Ass'n, Inc. v. Harris, 736 S.W.2d 632, 635 (Tex.
1987). Horizontal privity may also be required in Texas.
648.

See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES

§ 8.3

cmt. a (AM. LAW INST.

2000).
649. See id.
650. See Navasota Res., L.P. v. First Source Tex., Inc., 249 S.W.3d 526, 532 (Tex. App.-Waco
2008, pet. denied).
651. See generally Collins v. City of Harker Heights Tex., 503 U.S. 115, 126-27 (1992) (recognizing
that affirmative obligations involve a duty to act); Holbein v. Austral Oil Co., Inc., 609 F.2d 206, 209-10
(5th Cir. 1980) (affirming the obligation to pay a proportionate share of production costs in a mineral
lease).
652. See Dimock v. Kadane, 100 S.W.3d 602, 607-08 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2003, pet. denied)
(holding that an extension and renewal clause obligates parties that want to participate to proportionately
contribute); see also Ballard v. Devon Energy Prod. Co., 678 F.3d 360, 369 (5th Cir. 2012) (explaining
the obligations of an AMI in a JOA).
653. See generally Excel Willowbrook, L.L.C. v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 758 F.3d 592, 599600 (5th Cir. 2014) (recognizing historical obligations arising from privity of estate).
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Privity of estate comes in two basic forms: vertical privity and
horizontal privity. 6 54 Traditionally, vertical privity required that a successor
seeking to enforce a covenant must succeed to the same quantum of estate
(for example, fee simple to fee simple) held by the original covenantee, but
this requirement has been relaxed in most jurisdictions such that to show
vertical privity, the successor need only succeed to a portion of the original
estate of the covenantee. 6 5 This requirement would normally be satisfied in
the context of a JOA in which the assignee succeeds to the leasehold or other
656
interest of the assignor.
Horizontal privity, however, is more difficult. Horizontal privity
generally means that the original parties had a simultaneous existing interest
(referred to as mutual privity) as landlord and tenant or an interest as grantor
For example, a property
and grantee when the covenant was created.65
owner might reserve a covenant for itself or for a third party out of a
conveyance. 5 In the case of a JOA, when the contract is executed the parties
may not be tenants in common and the JOA may not be executed in
connection with a conveyance. 6 59 Rather, the parties may simply be working
interest owners that are combining their interests for the orderly development
of an area or to comply with state spacing and pooling requirements.6 6 0
Scholars overwhelmingly advocate for the abolition of horizontal
privity.66 1 Issued in 2000, the Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes
654. See id. at 600 n.20. Mutual privity means that at the time the covenant was created, the
covenantor and the covenantee owned a simultaneous existing interest in the same land, which might be
satisfied by a landlord-tenant relationship or when the parties are the dominant and servient owners of an
easement. 20 AM. JUR. 2D COVENANTS § 27 (2017). Mutual privity, also referred to as "Massachusetts
privily," may be required in a very small number ofjurisdictions. See, e.g., Morse v. Aldrich, 36 Mass.
449, 453-54 (1837); see also 14C MASS. PRAC., SUMMARY OF BASIC LAW § 14:110 (4th ed. 2010-2017).
The First Restatement of Property requires vertical privity and either horizontal privity or mutual privity.
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROPERTY §§ 534, 535 (AM. LAW INST. 1944). As such, many court decisions
lump together the concept of mutual privity and horizontal privity under a single heading referred to as
"horizontal privity." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES

§

2:4 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST.

2000); see also Excel Willowbrook, L.L.C., 758 F.3d at 600 n.20 (recognizing both vertical and horizontal
privity).
655.

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES

§ 5.2

cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 2000).

656. See id. § 5.2.
657. See Thomas, supra note 612, § 19.04(5)(b)(i).
658. See, e.g., Newco Energy v. Energytec, Inc. (In re Energytec, Inc.), 739 F.3d 215, 221-22 (5th
Cir. 2013) (providing that the owner of a pipeline system assigned its property rights to another, while
reserving a covenant for a third party to receive a fee for product transported through the pipeline).
659. See, e.g., Tawes v. Barnes, 340 S.W.3d 419 (Tex. 2011) (discussing a JOA without tenancy in
common or a conveyance).
660. See id. In this circumstance, the parties may have to rely on the cross-conveyance theory
expressed in Gillring Oil Co. v. Hughes, which has little judicial support. See Gillring Oil Co. v. Hughes,
618 S.W.2d 874 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1981, no writ).
661. See, e.g., Lawrence Berger, A Policy Analysis ofPromises Respecting the Use ofLand, 55 MINN.
L. REv. 167 (1970); Olin L. Browder, Running Covenants andPublicPolicy, 77 MICH. L. REV. 12 (1978);
Ralph A. Newman & Frank R. Losey, Covenants Running with the Land, and EquitableServitudes; Two
Concepts, or One?, 21 HASTINGS L.J. 1319 (1970); William B. Stoebuck, Running Covenants: An
AnalyticalPrimer, 52 WASH. L. REv. 861 (1977).
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rejects the horizontal privity requirement, reasoning that the requirement
"serves no necessary purpose and simply acts as a trap for the poorly
represented ....
Despite the American Law Institute's best efforts, the
requirement seems to persist. 663 One commentator reported in 2013 that not
a single reported case had rejected the horizontal privity requirement after
the Restatement (Third)'s adoption in 2000.664 In one recent case, a federal
bankruptcy court applying Texas law issued a nonbinding finding that
gathering agreements which dedicated gas were not covenants running with
the land, in part because they did not convey a property interest sufficient to
satisfy the horizontal privity requirement. 66 5 The parties in the case disagreed
as to whether horizontal privity had been abandoned in Texas because some
courts had analyzed whether covenants ran with the land without addressing
horizontal privity.666 The court concluded that numerous Texas courts still
expressly included horizontal privity in their analyses.667
The courts that cling to horizontal privity arguably do so in part because
they resort to concepts of equitable servitudes when such privity is lacking. 6 68
Further, because of the modern combination of courts of law and equity and
due to extreme confusion of judges and practitioners as to the difference
between covenants at law and covenants at equity, courts have over time
muddied the waters and awarded whatever relief they feel is appropriate to
remedy the breach of a covenant or servitude. 6 6 9 Given the confusion, in the
Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes, the American Law Institute
dropped the distinction between real covenants and equitable servitudes
entirely.67 0
Under the Restatement (Third), both real covenants and equitable
servitudes are encompassed within the term "covenant that runs with land." 6 7 1
A covenant runs with the land if the covenant is a "servitude," and either the
benefit or burden runs with the land.672 The term "servitude" is broadly used
to cover easements, profits, and covenants.67 3 The only requirement for the
creation of a servitude is that for the owner of the property to be burdened he

662.

663.
at 32.
664.
665.
B.R. 59,
666.
667.
668.
669.
670.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES

§ 2.4

cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 2000).

See Michael Lewyn, The Puzzling PersistenceofHorizontalPrivity,PROB. & PROP., May 2013,
See id
Sabine Oil & Gas Corp. v. HPIP Gonzales Holdings, LLC (In re Sabine Oil & Gas Corp.), 550
68-69 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2016).
Id at 65.
Id
See Lewyn, supranote 663, at 35.
See POWELL, supranote 644, at § 60.07.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES

§ 1.4

(AM. LAW INST. 2000).

671. See id.
672. See id. § 1.3.
673. See id. § 1.1(2). The Restatement (Third) states that to the extent special rules and considerations
applicable to profits for the removal of timber, oil, gas, and minerals apply, the special rules are not within
the scope of the Restatement. Id.
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must enter into a contract or make a conveyance intended to create a servitude
that complies with the Statute of Frauds or an exception to the Statute of
Frauds.6 74 In essence, the Restatement (Third) dispenses with both the privity
requirement (for covenants formerly classified as running at law) and the
notice requirement (for covenants formerly classified as running in equity),
although notice is still required for practical purposes because an unrecorded
servitude is subject to extinguishment under a local recording act unless the
servitude would be discovered by reasonable inspection or inquiry.675
Even if a burden under a JOA is determined to touch and concern the
land, it does not necessarily follow that the assignor is relieved of its
obligations under the JOA by virtue of the assignment of its property
interests.676 The Restatement (First) of Property and the Restatement (Third)
of Property: Servitudes differ in their approaches to resolving this question.6 77
Under the Restatement (First) of Property, whether such a promisor is
relieved of its liability depends upon "the intention manifested in the making
of the promise," 6 7 8 which may be inferred from the circumstances such as the
nature of the act promised.6 79 In particular, the Restatement asks whether
such promises are "of such a character that they can be satisfactorily
performed only by the possessor of the land affected ."6 80 Applying this
approach to the JOA, although a promise to convey or relinquish land only
can be performed by the possessor of the land, one might argue that other
promises, such as an obligation to pay a proportionate share of the costs of
operation after an assignment, might be of a character that the possessor of
the land need not perform the obligation. 8
The test as to the continuing liability of the promisor under the
Restatement (Third) is more crystallized, and does not depend on whether
such obligations are simply capable of being performed by the former
674. Id. § 2.1(1).
675. See id. § 7.14.
676. See id § 3.2. Technically, the Restatement (Third) also dispensed with the touch and concern
requirement and replaced it with a rule that asks whether the servitude imposes an unreasonable restraint
on alienation or an undue restraint on trade, and whether it is unconscionable, illegal or unconstitutional,
or otherwise violates public policy. See id. § 3.2 cmt a; see also Chieftan Intern. (U.S.), Inc. v. Southeast
Offshore, Inc., 553 F.3d 817, 819 (5th Cir. 2008) (holding that assignment does not necessarily relieve a
party to a JOA from its obligations).
677. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES § 4.4(1) (AM. LAW INST. 2000);
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROPERTY § 538 (AM. LAW INST. 1944).
678. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROPERTY § 538 (AM. LAW INST. 1944).

679. See id. § 538 cmt. c.
680. Id. § 538 cmt. a (emphasis added).
681. See generally Seagull Energy E & P, Inc. v. Eland Energy, Inc., 207 S.W.3d 342, 347 (Tex.
2006). In Seagull, the court cited in dicta to the examples in Restatement (First) of Property § 538,
Comment c, illustrations I and 2 as evidence that the burden to pay the P&A costs was not intended to
run with the land. See id.; RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROPERTY § 538 cmt. c, illus. 1 (AM. LAW INST.
1936). Illustration one suggests that a promise to pay for water delivered to the land would not run with
the land, while a promise to maintain a dam would run with the land. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF
PROPERTY § 538 cmt. c, illus. 1 (AM. LAW INST. 1936). The court argued that Eland could have fulfilled
its obligations after the transfer of its interest. Seagull EnergyE & P, Inc., 207 S.W.3d at 347.
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owner.6 82 Under the Restatement (Third) test, "[A]n original party or
successor to a servitude burden that runs with an interest in property incurs
liability on account of the servitude burden only for obligations that accrue
during the time the party or successor holds the burdened property
interest."683 This rule applies to a burden appurtenant, which is a burden tied
to the ownership or occupancy of particular property, as distinguished from
a burden in gross, which is not tied to ownership or occupancy.68 4 The rules
governing liability to perform contracts applies to burdens in gross. 68 5 Under
this test, one might argue that all obligations under the JOA, including the
obligation to pay costs and expenses accruing after the date of an assignment
of property, are tied to the ownership of the underlying leases and interests
within the contract area.6 8 6
3. Notice
Assuming the JOA's provisions constitute covenants running with the
land, a transferee is not bound by those provisions unless it has notice of those
provisions.68 7 One way to assure notice is to ensure that any assignment of
an interest in the contract area contains an express provision referencing the
existence of the JOA, a result obtained when an assignment provides that it
is made "subject to" the JOA as required by the provisions of most JOA
forms. 6 8 8 Another way to accomplish this is to establish constructive notice
by recording the JOA in the appropriate records. 6 89 Before the publication of
the Recording Supplement, the customary practice was to avoid recording
the operating agreement in either the real property or UCC records. 6 9 0 If
neither of these steps are taken, the only remaining way to bind the assignee
to the terms of the JOA is through inquiry notice.

682.

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES

§ 4.4(1)

(AM. LAW INST. 2000).

683. Id.
684. See id. § 1.5(1), (2).
685. See id. § 4.4(3).
686. See generally id.
687. See Inwood N. Homeowners' Ass'n, Inc. v. Harris, 736 S.W.2d 632, 635 (Tex. 1987) (citing
Westland Oil Dev. Corp. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 637 S.W.2d 903, 910-11 (Tex. 1982)) ("In Texas, a covenant
runs with the land when it touches and concerns the land; relates to a thing in existence or specifically
binds the parties and their assigns; is intended by the original parties to run with the land; and when the
successor to the burden has notice."). But see supratext accompanying notes 644-47 (noting an exception
to the notice requirement for covenants running with land at law when horizontal privity is present, which
is not common for the parties to a typical JOA).
688. See Boldrick v. BTA Oil Producers, 222 S.W.3d 672, 674-75 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2007, no
pet.) (holding the provisions of a JOA bound the assignee of an overriding royalty interest that explicitly
stated it was subject to the agreement, as required by the language of the agreement, even though the
assignee had not read the agreement.). See generally FORM 610-2015, supra note 2.
689. See generally discussion supra Section II.D.2 (explaining the origin and purpose of the
Recording Supplement).
690. See discussion supra Section II.D.2 (detailing procedures replaced by Recording Supplement).
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In Westland Oil Development Corp. v. Gulf Oil Corp., the defendant
acquired interests in a producing field through two farmout agreements.6 91
An assignment delivered pursuant to one of these farmout agreements recited
that the conveyance was subject to an operating agreement.692 Review of the
JOA would have revealed references to a related letter agreement containing
an AMI clause benefiting the plaintiff.6 93 The plaintiff asserted its rights
under the AMI clause with respect to interests acquired by the defendant
under the second farmout agreement.694 Neither the operating agreement nor
the letter agreement containing the AMI were recorded.695
The court held that the AMI was a covenant running with the land and
that knowledge of its existence was imputed to the defendant through inquiry
notice.69 6 The court held that under Texas law any purchaser of real property
is required to reasonably and diligently investigate any reference in their
chain of title until thorough knowledge of all matters affecting their chain of
title is obtained.69 7 This includes both the instruments that are specifically
referenced in recorded documents and instruments that would be revealed by
a review of those referenced materials. 698 In general, transferees are imputed
with knowledge if existing facts would cause a reasonable person to search
for a referenced document and the search, if pursued with diligence, would
lead to actual notice of the document's contents.699
Inquiry notice, however, is an uncertain method of imputing knowledge
of the JOA and subject to considerable evidentiary problems.700 Consider,
for example, Chesapeake Exploration,L.L. C. v. Valence OperatingCo.,701 in
which Chesapeake leased several properties in 2005 that Valence argued
were conveyed to it in 1991.702 The earlier 1991 conveyance to Valence
referenced a 1975 JOA that was not mentioned in the lease to Chesapeake
but covered the land leased to Chesapeake.7 03 After the court ruled that
Valence was not actually conveyed any interest in the property that was later
leased to Chesapeake, Chesapeake sought a declaratory judgment that its
lease was not subject to the 1975 JOA.704 Valence argued that Chesapeake
had inquiry notice of the JOA because the 1991 assignment to Valence
691. Westland Oil, 637 S.W.2d at 905.
692. Id. at 906.
693. See id. at 905.
694. Id.
695. See id. at 906.
696. Id. at 911.
697. Id. at 912-14.
698. See id
699. See id.
700. See generally id
701. See Chesapeake Expl., L.L.C. v. Valence Operating Co., No. H-07-2565, 2008 WL 4240486
(S.D. Tex. Sept. 10, 2008).
702. See id. at *1.
703. See id at *1-2.
704. Id. at *2-3.
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referenced the JOA.70 s The court disagreed because the 1975 JOA was not
in Chesapeake's chain of title, and it had no duty to search the entire grantor
index for all entries related to its grantor.706
There is no trustworthy method of ensuring notice to third parties and
bankruptcy trustees short of recording the instrument pursuant to local
recording statues. As such, parties should use the Model Form Recording
Supplement to provide notice to third parties.707 Without proper notice, there
is a substantial risk that assignees of interests in the contract area will not be
bound by the terms of the JOA, regardless of local rules governing other
elements for covenants running with the land.
VI. CONCLUSION

The JOA, like the oil and gas lease, is a complex instrument containing
a myriad of interdependent provisions. It is somewhat simplistic to segregate
its property terms from the rest of the document for special consideration.
Their purpose and impact are relevant only in the context of the overall
enterprise. Isolation of the provisions does, however, permit us to focus on
their significance without being distracted by the debate over fiduciary duties
and clauses dealing with operating decisions, financial commitments, and
accounting procedures.
The property provisions play a significant and sometimes crucial role in
providing the mechanisms by which a long-term transaction like the JOA can
remain viable throughout its term. They also impose duties of fairness and
equity among participants for instances in which general fiduciary duties are
disclaimed by the instrument itself All of this is achieved while maintaining
significant freedom in the transfer and disposition of property interests.
Consequently, the property provisions scattered throughout the JOA
deserve considerable respect and focused consideration during the
negotiations leading to execution of the instrument. Care must be used in
deciding whether to retain, delete, or add some of these provisions, with
particular attention given to the effect the presence or absence of the
provisions will have on future relations among the JOA parties and the
difficulties they may present for transactions outside the JOA that individual
parties may want to pursue. Properly employed, however, these provisions
can add stability to the JOA as a business transaction and secure long-term
benefits from operations within the contract area.

705.
706.
707.

Id at *5.
Id. at *6-7.
See FoRM 610-2015, supra note 2.

